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Abstract 
This thesis explores two distinct but related aspects of the relationship between the spatial 
location of people within a country and national economic growth. The first three essays set 
out to establish whether a country’s urban structure impacts economic growth at the aggregate 
level. Each paper explores a different aspect of the location of people, including the level of 
urban concentration and the size of a country’s cities. The analyses rely on cross-country 
regressions and employ different estimation techniques, including fixed effects, system GMM 
and instrumental variables. Particular attention is paid to whether the relationship differs 
between developed and developing countries and how contextual factors, such as a country’s 
economic structure and government capacity, shape the relationship. Across the three papers, 
the results consistently suggest that concentration and larger cities can be growth promoting 
at the country level; however only in developed countries or if certain contextual factors are 
met. The findings add to a growing body of empirical literature which questions the universal 
validity of the benefits of agglomeration for economic growth. Furthermore, they specifically 
address a gap in the empirical literature which so far had failed to link city size to aggregate 
growth as opposed to city-level productivity. 
The fourth essay moves to the policy level and analyses Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – a 
policy which is frequently employed to influence the location of economic activity and people. 
Specifically, it studies the performance drivers of SEZs. A scarcity of data has limited 
quantitative research on this topic so far. The analysis relies on a novel dataset, which resorts 
to nightlights as SEZ performance proxy and covers zone and policy characteristics for SEZs 
in 22 countries. The findings partially confirm, but also refute the dominant knowledge on the 
viability of SEZs. While larger zones tend to perform better, growth is difficult to sustain over 
time and particularly hard to achieve for high-technology focused zones. Other factors 
commonly assumed to matter, such as the nature of the zone operator, the incentive package 
and programme set-up, seem to be highly context dependent. Furthermore, contextual factors, 
such as proximity to markets and a pre-existing industrial base, influence zone performance. 
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Synopsis 
I. Introduction 
This PhD thesis explores two distinct but related aspects of the relationship between the spatial 
distribution of people within a country and national economic growth. The first three essays 
set out to establish empirically whether a country’s urban structure influences economic 
growth at the aggregate level. Each paper explores a different aspect of the location of people, 
including the level of concentration of the urban population within a country, the size of a 
country’s cities and contextual factors which may shape the relationship. The fourth essay 
moves to the policy level and looks at Special Economic Zones – a policy which is frequently 
employed to influence the location of economic activity and people within a country. 
Specifically, it analyses the performance drivers of Special Economic Zones in emerging 
countries, including how a zone’s location within the country affects its performance. 
The thesis is set in the context of the growing body of literature that examines the urbanization 
process, its various forms and its influence on a country’s economic performance in 
developing countries (Castells-Quintana, 2016; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014; 
Duranton, 2008; Glaeser, 2014; Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath, 2016; Henderson, 2010; Jedwab 
& Vollrath, 2015). The question of how urbanization – and frequently more specifically cities 
and agglomeration – interacts with economic development has long attracted the attention 
from both academics and policy makers (Henderson & Ioannides, 1981; Hoselitz, 1953; 
Jacobs, 1970, 1985; World Bank, 1979). Limited data for developing countries resulted in 
most empirical research focusing on the developed country’s point of view. In recent years, 
however, there has been an increasing awareness that more research is needed to understand 
how these processes may differ between developing and developed countries and that a direct 
application of empirical evidence, based on developed country data, may be misleading for 
many countries.  
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The thesis aims to contribute to closing this gap. Two out of the four substantive chapters 
employ newly assembled datasets which, on the one side, allow for a more nuanced analysis 
than previous research (in the case of the chapter 1 on urban concentration); and on the other 
side, permit to carry out the first large scale quantitative assessment on the topic (in the case 
of chapter 4 on the drivers of SEZ performance). The other two chapters add a new important 
perspective to the existing literature, by shifting the emphasis from urban concentration to the 
size of a country’s cities and evaluating potential differences between developing and 
developed countries as well as underlying contextual factors. 
In the following sections, I outline the motivation and relevance of the topic, provide an 
overview of the related literature as well as summarize the individual chapters and their main 
contributions. In the final section, I conclude, deduct policy implications and point to further 
areas of research. 
II. Motivation 
i. Urbanization and city development in a historical perspective 
Over the past 60 years, the world has undergone an unprecedented transformation in terms of 
urbanization patterns and city development. Looking around the globe today, urbanization 
rates are at unforeseen levels with large cities virtually anywhere in the world – including 
many African, Asian and Latin American countries (United Nations, 2014). In fact, the 
majority of the world’s largest cities is in developing countries. Until the 1950s, however, the 
world looked very different. For most of history, cities and urbanization were closely 
intertwined with economic success and/ or political dominance. Only in the economically and 
politically most advanced nations, the growth of large cities was possible and in turn, large 
cities brought about further development. A few examples include Alexandria around 200BC, 
Rome in 1AD or Chang’an in China in 800AD (Chandler, 1987). The relationship between 
cities and economic development is believed to be such that social scientists frequently resort 
to urbanization and cities as a proxy for economic development for periods where no data on 
GDP is available (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; De Long & Shleifer, 1993).  
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This rule was still very much in evidence in the 1950s. At that time, the majority of the world’s 
biggest cities – 20 out of 30 – were indeed located in high-income countries (United Nations, 
2014). The few exceptions to the rule were a handful of large cities in big developing 
countries, such as China, Mexico and Brazil. The poorest countries in the world at the time 
lacked, in general, very large cities.  
Until today, one can still trace a strong relationship between urbanization and economic 
development. Figure II-1 plots a country’s natural logarithm of the GDP per capita against its 
urbanization rate in 1960 and 2015: a strong positive relationship between the two can be 
observed in both points in time. The higher the economic development, the more urbanized a 
country is. There are, however, also important differences between the two graphs. In 1960, 
countries with a low level of economic development were largely rural with urbanization rates 
close to 0%. The graph for 2015, in contrast, shows a different picture. While the slope is still 
clearly positive, the urbanization level is generally higher with almost all countries being more 
than 20% urbanized. Furthermore, the slope is marginally less steep, pointing to a less 
pronounced relationship between the two variables. Jedwab and Vollrath (2015) describe these 
trends in their historical account and demonstrate that countries today are 25% to 30% more 
urbanized at any level of economic development than in the past. 
12 
 
Figure II-1: Economic development and urbanization rate1 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, GDP per capita at constant 2010US$ 
This evolution has been driven by galloping urbanization throughout the world over the past 
decades. Whereas in 1950, less than one billion people lived in cities, the number increased to 
3.6 billion in 2010 and will continue to rise to an estimated 5 billion in 2030 (United Nations, 
2014). These numbers do not only reflect an increase in the absolute number of people as a 
result of general population growth, but also a relative shift in the share of people living in 
urban versus rural areas. The share of the urban population grew from just about 30% in 1950 
to 52% in 2010. Since 2006, for the first time in history, more people live in cities than in the 
rural areas.  
The surprising element within this structural shift is the change in the geographical pattern of 
urbanization. As Jedwab and Vollrath (2015) show, up until 1950, urbanization had mainly 
taken place in the richer countries of Western Europe and North America. Poorer countries, 
in contrast, saw stagnating rates. This pattern has, however, reversed since then with the 
strongest changes occurring in developing countries. The comparative world maps for the 
years 1960 and 2011 in Figure II-2 illustrate well these changes.  
                                                     
1 Note: the country sample is kept constant for both years, 1960 and 2015, facilitating the comparison 
between the two years. 
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Figure II-2: Urbanization and large cities, 1960 and 2011 
 
Source: World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 
The shading of the countries indicates their level of urbanization with darker colours 
representing more urbanization. In 1960, (Western) Europe, Oceania and Northern America 
displayed the highest levels of urbanization together with a handful of countries in Latin 
America. Most parts of the developing world exhibited comparatively low rates at the time.  
By 2011, the vast majority of countries generally displays higher rates of urbanization than in 
1960 with the strongest changes clearly occurring across the developing world. Low- and 
middle-income countries have urbanized strongly and frequently display similar levels of 
urbanization than high-income countries (for example the majority of Latin American 
countries and Egypt). Estimates suggest that even those countries in Southern Asia and Africa, 
which are still relatively less urbanized nowadays, are expected to get close to 45% by 2030 
(United Nations, 2014). 
Figure II-2 reveals another interesting and maybe even more striking development: the 
emergence of a vast number of mega cities, the majority of them yet again located in the 
developing world. While there were only 2 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants until 
1960
2011
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the 1970s, their number increased more than ten-fold to 25 by 2010 (indicated by the red dots). 
The number of cities of 5 to 10 million inhabitants grew in parallel from merely 4 in 1950 to 
38 in 2010 (displayed by the orange dots). Again, changes are most visible in the developing 
world. The large majority of mega cities with more than 10 million inhabitants can be found 
in the populous countries of Asia. Even among the still relatively less developed and less 
urbanized countries across the African continent, massive agglomerations of 5 million 
inhabitants and above have emerged. Out of the 30 largest agglomerations in 2015, 23 are 
located in the developing world. 
In addition to this increase in the number of cities, cities have also grown considerably in size 
(Figure II-3). The average population of the world’s largest thirty agglomerations quadrupled 
from 1950 to 2015: while the average was around 4 million inhabitants in 1950, it now stands 
at 16 million (United Nations, 2014). This development is further illustrated by taking the 
example of the largest city at each point in time. The New York-Newark metropolitan area 
was the biggest agglomeration in 1950 with roughly 12 million people. Today the largest area 
is the Tokyo agglomeration with over 38 million people. Other cities, in particular in emerging 
countries, have seen an even more dramatic increase in their population. Almost half of the 
thirty largest cities in 2015 were not included in the 1950 list (those cities not capitalized in 
Figure II-3). The majority of these cities has grown between ten to fifty times over the past 
decades, with Shenzhen reaching 3,400 times its 1950 size. 
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Figure II-3: 30 largest agglomerations in 20152 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Urbanization Prospects 2014 
The growth of the large metropolis in countries with relatively low levels of urbanization 
(compared to developed countries) has brought about another phenomenon which has received 
                                                     
2 Bold capitalized cities were among the 30 largest agglomeration in 1950 
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much attention in the literature: the spatial concentration of people and economic activity in 
few cities and the associated spatial disparities between primary urban areas and lagging 
regions. Urban primacy, the share of a country’s urban population living in the largest city, is 
a frequently used indicator to measure this spatial concentration. In the developed countries 
of Europe and North America, primacy reaches average levels between 10% and 15%. In 
contrast, many developing countries, in particular low-income countries, display urban 
primacy rates of over 30%.3 Similarly, the ratio between the largest and second largest city is 
on average 2.7 for developed countries, while it raises to 3.9 for the developing countries’ 
average and reaches over 10 in a number of cases, such as Kabul, Addis Ababa, Lima and 
Buenos Aires.4  
We are thus living in a world which is – independent of income levels – consistently more 
urban than 60 years ago, and where urbanization and the formation of large cities seems at 
least partially disconnected from economic development. In contrast to the mid-20th century, 
the majority of urban development is happening in the developing world and at an 
unprecedented scale. 
ii. Urbanization, cities and economic development 
The aforementioned changes are striking not only because of their sheer scale, but also because 
they challenge traditional economic theory on urbanization and cities. First, they question the 
prevailing explanations posited by economists on the mechanisms triggering urbanization. 
Second, they have sparked a growing debate on whether cities in developing countries have 
the same catalytic effect on economic development as in developed countries.  
On the first point, as described above, urbanization and the existence of large cities in a 
country were closely connected to the economic development process throughout much of 
history. In the past, only the most developed countries were highly urbanized and had very 
large cities. Traditionally, economists explain the urbanization process with a structural shift 
                                                     
3 Primacy numbers are sourced from the World Development Indicators 
4 Own calculations based on (United Nations, 2014) 
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from an agricultural to a manufacturing based economy (Bertinelli & Black, 2004; Davis & 
Henderson, 2003). On the one hand, a sufficiently productive agricultural sector is needed to 
shift from full absorbance of labour by subsistence farming to available surplus labour in the 
countryside. On the other hand, it assumes that a growing industrial sector, which is 
quintessentially urban, attracts former rural workers: higher (expected) wages in the urban 
industrial sectors stimulate migration from rural areas to cities (Harris & Todaro, 1970; 
Henderson, 2003; Lewis, 1954). Hence, urbanization becomes a by-product of 
industrialization. This mechanism, in fact, reflects rather well the development processes at 
work in today’s developed countries: urbanization and city growth were strongly tied to the 
industrialization of their economies and economic growth (Jedwab & Vollrath, 2015).  
This traditional explanation is, however, somewhat at odds with the developments witnessed 
across the world over the past decades. Many countries with relatively low levels of economic 
development are far more urbanized today than developed countries were decades ago at 
similar stages of economic development. Developing countries have, thus, urbanized without 
the accompanying industrialization which has normally been the mechanism put forward as 
explanation. Fay and Opal (2000) describe this situation as ‘urbanization without growth’. 
While this phenomenon is not entirely new, there has been renewed interest in it from the 
economics literature over the past five to ten years, driven by the scale of city growth in many 
developing countries.5  
A diverse number of factors has been put forward as further potential mechanisms triggering 
urbanization in developing countries in addition to the structural transformation argument. So-
called push-factors drive people from the rural countryside into cities. Push-factors include 
conflicts (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002), as the rural population seeks protection in cities as well 
as negative agricultural shocks and rural poverty which decrease rural wages and thus 
incentivize an outward migration to cities (Fay & Opal, 2000; Jedwab & Vollrath, 2015).  
                                                     
5 Urbanization without industrialization has already been described as early as the 1950s (Hoselitz, 
1953) 
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Urban pull-factors are those drivers which make cities more attractive to people. They include 
urban amenities such as better urban living conditions through improved access to public 
services as well as a political urban bias (Ades & Glaeser, 1995; Davis & Henderson, 2003). 
Glaeser (2014) also proposes that developing countries urbanize earlier due to their ability to 
import food. In developed countries, by contrast, cities could only increase in population as 
the agricultural sector became more productive and could provide food for larger non-food 
producing urban population. Furthermore, Jedwab and co-authors (Gollin et al., 2016; Jedwab 
& Vollrath, 2015) argue that natural resource exports also drive urbanization in developing 
countries: ‘consumption cities’ as opposed to ‘production cities’ emerge through the income 
gains generated by the resource exploitation. As a consequence, the share of urban dwellers, 
working in the non-tradable service sectors, is much higher than in ‘production cities’ where 
the urban population works in manufacturing and the tradable service sectors.  
The second point, which has been increasingly called into question by the developments over 
the past 60 years, are the productivity gains arising from cities. Whether we look at the 
endogenous growth theory, urban economics or (new) economic geography, cities are 
supposed to bring productivity gains through agglomeration economies. While the explicit 
mechanisms and emphasis within the different schools of thought differ, the underlying 
concepts go back to the same ideas already voiced by Marshall (1890) and Jacobs (1970, 
1985): bringing people together in cities and agglomerating economic activity causes 
efficiency gains through the generation of thick labour markets, forward and backward 
linkages and knowledge spill-overs. Thick labour markets are created in cities as a larger pool 
of people facilitates firms to find employees with the required skill-sets. Conversely, a large 
number of companies located in their vicinity eases the job search for employees and reduces 
the risk of unemployment. Forward and backward linkages arise through the benefits for firms 
by being located closer to their markets and suppliers (Krugman, 1991). In the presence of 
increasing returns to scale, closeness to markets brings about efficiency as it allows firms to 
reduce transport costs. Furthermore, a network of suppliers is formed which can cater to the 
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firm’s specific needs. This is particularly the case for clusters of specific industries. And 
finally, external economies (Rosenthal & Strange, 2004) create informational spill-overs 
between different actors. In the words of Marshall (1890, p. 332): “... so great are the 
advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from nearby neighbourhood to 
one another. The mysteries of trade become no mysteries; but are as were in the air...”. 
Proximity, which is created through cities, is key to these sorts of knowledge spill-overs as 
they have shown to have a strong distance decay effect (Fischer, Scherngell, & Jansenberger, 
2009; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993).6  
Besides these general claims on the advantages of cities, there has been an increasing focus 
on praising the catalytic effect of large cities in particular. Empirical evidence in the urban 
economics tradition has stressed the productivity gains from increasing city size: a doubling 
of city size is accompanied by a 3% to 8% increase in the productivity of the urban worker 
(Duranton & Puga, 2004; Melo, Graham, & Noland, 2009; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). 
Similarly, both theoretical and empirical studies taking a new economic geography point of 
view – i.e. the level of analysis is not the city but the country – have shown that more 
concentrated urban structures are growth inducing at the country level since the agglomeration 
economies generated by the concentration of people increase the overall productivity level 
(Bertinelli & Strobl, 2007; Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Fujita & Thisse, 2003; Henderson, 
2003; Martin & Ottaviano, 2001). These findings imply, holding the population constant, that 
larger cities are indeed strongly beneficial from an economic growth point of view.  
It has also been analysed whether this effect hinges on the country’s level of economic 
development. This idea goes back to the so called ‘Williamson curve’, coined by Jeffrey 
Williamson in the sixties (Williamson, 1965). He suggested that the relationship between 
economic growth and spatial disparities within a country follows an inverted U-curve. At a 
                                                     
6 While the language, used in this short account, is based on the new economic geography literature, 
other streams describe similar channels – for instance the sharing, matching and learning mechanisms 
from the urban economics literature. For the sake of simplicity, I use the economic geography language. 
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low level of economic development, regional disparities will increase when the country 
experiences growth, at a higher level these disparities will decrease. Williamson stressed the 
high economic interdependence between regions within a country which would entail labour 
mobility to equalise any differences in regional income over time. This hypothesis is supported 
by a number of recent empirical studies, which find that agglomeration is growth inducing at 
lower levels of economic development while it matters less at higher income levels (Barrios 
& Strobl, 2009; Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014; Henderson, 
2003). 
This stream of literature has been influential in policy discussions over the past decade, leading 
to a set of well-defined policy prescriptions. Agglomeration and thus the concentration of 
people in few large cities is deemed beneficial for growth and (developing) countries should 
avoid attempting to reduce spatial disparities between more and less developed regions. 
Instead, promoting agglomeration is considered the fastest and most direct path for 
development, since the presence of a large city will multiply growth opportunities. As the 
World Bank (2009) put it most prominently in its 2009 World Development Report: 
“Economic growth is seldom balanced. Efforts to spread it prematurely will jeopardize 
progress” (p. 5-6). Based on this logic, the rationale and usefulness of ‘spatially-targeted’ 
policies, which aim to promote the development outside of the main urban areas, have been 
increasingly called into question. Instead, ‘spatially-blind’ approaches have been favoured, 
which focus on investing in people independent of where they live.   
The universal validity of such statements, however, has been increasingly called into question 
for a variety of reasons. First, our improved understanding of the factors driving urbanization 
in developing countries makes it questionable that processes which are – at least partially – 
influenced by such different forces should lead to the same outcome. Gollin et al. (2016) for 
instance suggest that ‘consumption cities’ in the developing world are less likely to have the 
same productivity inducing effect as ‘production cities’, since most people work in non-
tradable sectors with less possibilities for on-the-job learning. Second, the sheer magnitude of 
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urbanization and city development in the developing world is unprecedented in history. 
Developed country’s cities, on which most of the empirical evidence is based, are frequently 
multiple times smaller, so that a one-to-one application of the principle of ‘the bigger the 
better’ seems unlikely to hold. In fact, McCann and Acs (2011) show that 38% of the 75 most 
productive cities in the world have a population of less than 3 million inhabitants; the 
population of another 42% ranges between 3 and 7 million and only very few cities that we 
would consider as megacities make it on the list. Similarly, the OECD (2006) shows that the 
positive effect of city size on income only holds if the largest cities are excluded from the 
sample. The effect becomes negative when looking at cities with more than 7 million 
inhabitants.  
Finally, researchers also emphasize the role of a multitude of other factors besides size behind 
changes in city-level productivity (Camagni, Capello, & Caragliu, 2013, 2015). Since these 
factors differ from city to city, cities in the same size class are not necessarily equally 
productive (Storper, 2010). Among these factors, industry specific aspects such as industrial 
composition and specialization (Au & Henderson, 2006; Graham, 2009; Storper, 2010) as well 
as company size (Faggio, Silva, & Strange, 2014; Rigby & Brown, 2015) figure prominently. 
A city’s sectoral specialization, in particular, has attracted considerable attention. The tradable 
service sector and high-tech manufacturing industries are assumed to profit more from being 
located in large cities than other industries (Graham, 2009; Storper, 2010). Countries with a 
significant presence of such sectors, thus, experience stronger productivity effects from large 
cities than countries with a bigger and/or more mature manufacturing industry base. 
Furthermore, city context specific elements seem to be an important determinant for urban 
productivity levels. A city’s government capacity (Ahrend, Farchy, Kaplanis, & Lembcke, 
2014; Glaeser, 2014) and urban infrastructure (Castells-Quintana, 2016) as well as network 
integration (Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2001) and borrowed city size (Alonso, 1973) have been 
highlighted in these analyses. In the developing countries context, there has been a particular 
emphasis on the provision of an adequate urban infrastructure. Castells-Quintana (2016), for 
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instance, shows empirically that in countries with an insufficiently developed urban 
infrastructure (proxied by sanitation), urban concentration can be growth inhibiting. Glaeser 
(2014) and Ahrend et al. (2014) furthermore highlight the importance of institutional capacity, 
in order to reduce negative externalities which arise following rapid city growth.  
iii. Spatial policies – Special Economic Zones 
The increasing size of cities and perceived heightened polarization between primary urban 
areas and secondary cities have led policy makers to implement a raft of policies. On the one 
side, these policies aspire to address urgent challenges such as sanitation and transport 
infrastructure in the emerging cities in order to make them more efficient and liveable. On the 
other side, they frequently aim to ‘re-balance’ the country’s urban structures by promoting 
economic development in secondary cities and lagging regions, thereby decreasing the gap 
between these areas.   
Among this second group of policies, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been particularly 
popular over the past decades. Their number increased from just 176 in 47 countries in 1986 
to 3,500 in 130 countries in 2006 (Singa Boyenge, 2007). Recent estimates suggest that the 
number reached almost 4,500 in 2014 (The Economist, 2015). 
While SEZs are a diverse group of policies and there is no uniform definitions of what 
constitutes one, some common features can be defined (Asian Development Bank, 2015; 
OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2011). First, SEZs aim to attract (foreign) investment to specific 
areas within a country and thereby support the attraction of firms and the generation of 
employment and exports. Frequently, they are employed with the specific objective to attract 
economic activity to economically less developed regions. By establishing SEZs, countries 
also seek to either achieve a first step in their industrialisation process or to increase the value-
added of the existing manufacturing sector. Second, the SEZs’ attractiveness mainly stems 
from a favourable regulatory and/ or incentive scheme for firms directing investment into the 
SEZ rather than to the rest of the country. Reduced corporate tax rates, the exemption from 
import duties and a reduction of the regulatory burden often form part of the incentive 
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package. Third, SEZs have a clearly demarcated geographic territory. This area can range in 
size from relatively small industrial park type zones of a few hectares to entire regions of a 
country. And finally, most SEZs provide infrastructure and other services to resident firms in 
order to overcome barriers in the local business environment and facilitate the companies’ 
operations. Onsite custom offices, one-stop-shops dealing with obtaining permits for setting 
up and running companies as well as pre-built factory units and serviced land plots are among 
the services offered.  
Despite these common features, SEZs vary significantly. Different types of SEZs have 
emerged, ranging from traditional export processing zones and commercial free zones to high-
tech parks and large region wide special economic areas. Each type has a different focus, 
among other things, in terms of target companies (e.g. local versus foreign), industries (e.g. 
low-tech versus high-tech, services versus manufacturing), incentives offered as well as 
requirements imposed on firms (e.g. export or foreign ownership requirements). Even within 
the different SEZ types, zones differ considerably including in size, sectoral focus, location 
within the country, services offered, incentive package as well as the general context they are 
placed in.  
SEZs have a mixed track record in terms of investment attraction and the generation of 
employment and exports (World Bank, 2011). In fact, the final verdict on whether SEZs 
manage to achieve their stated objectives is still unclear. One the one side, the well-known 
success of Chinese Special Economic Zones has fuelled the hope of many policy makers to 
achieve a similar growth story in their own county when implementing SEZ policies. On the 
other side, a vast number of SEZs, even among the Chinese zones, has failed to deliver any 
meaningful success. Frequently, plans remain on paper and zones never become fully 
operational (FIAS, 2009). 
Taken these facts together – the diversity in the design and set-up of the zones as well as the 
highly mixed performance – there is surprisingly little quantitative comparative research on 
the drivers of SEZ success. Case studies, frequently on the more successful cases, abound. 
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They either remain descriptive or zoom into an individual or a limited group of zones, often 
within specific countries (Farole & Kweka, 2011; FIAS, 2009; Nel & Rogerson, 2013; OECD, 
2009; UNIDO, 2015; World Bank, 2011). The results of these studies have also been highly 
contrasting. While these studies are informative and contribute to a better understanding of 
the functioning of SEZs, a larger scale assessment would be desirable to complement the 
evidence.  
However, a lack of comparable cross-country data on the performance of SEZs as well as on 
the zone-specific regional and/or national policy programs, which are at the very origin of 
SEZ formation, has represented a fundamental barrier to the development of this type of 
research. The few studies which attempted to quantitatively assess what contributed and what 
hindered SEZ success (Aggarwal, 2005; Farole, 2011) rely on a low number of observations, 
which casts doubt on the generalisability of the results.  
III. Summary of the chapters 
The main focus of this thesis is on the question of how increases in city size and changes in 
the urban structure affect economic development at the country level. The aim is to contribute 
to the growing body of empirical literature which focuses on the developing country 
experience and to allow for a more nuanced perspective on some of these topics. 
The thesis comprises four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 on average city size and economic 
growth as well as chapter 4 on SEZ performance drivers are co-authored with Professor 
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. Chapter 1 on the evolution of urban concentration and growth and 
chapter 3 on city size, contextual factors and growth are single-authored.  
The first three chapters follow in the footsteps of some of the most frequently cited empirical 
papers covering the relationship between urban structure and economic growth, namely 
Henderson (2003) and Brülhart and Sbergami (2009). Each chapter examines the topic from 
a different angle and adds a new, previously not considered perspective to the debate. Chapter 
1 provides a detailed description of the evolution of urban concentration from 1985 to 2010, 
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facilitated by a newly constructed data set which allows to overcome data limitations which 
have plagued research on the topic so far. It then continues to relate the changes in the levels 
of urban concentration to economic growth. Chapter 2 examines the question from an angle 
which has received little attention to date by relating economic growth not to urban 
concentration (as the previous papers on the topic), but to the actual size of a country’s cities. 
This is an important addition to the literature since much of the research examines urban 
concentration and not city size, but is frequently cited as evidence to support claims on the 
advantages of larger cities. In the third chapter, I maintain the angle of city size and add the 
dimension of the aforementioned contextual factors to the analysis. In the final chapter, the 
focus moves to the policy level and examines the factors driving SEZ performance. To my 
knowledge, the analysis is the first quantitative assessment of this question. The following 
sections provide a brief summary of each chapter. 
i. The evolution of urban concentration and economic growth 
While urban concentration has been a focus of economic analysis for a considerable amount 
of time, little attention has been paid to describing its levels and evolution in more detail. A 
general remark on the well-known higher average levels of urban concentration in many 
developing countries frequently suffices as justification for the subject, in particular in the 
literature on the relationship between urban concentration and economic growth (see for 
example Henderson, 2003; Venables, 2005; Brülhart and Sbergami, 2009). Furthermore, the 
vast majority of the literature uses primacy as indicator for urban concentration. The 
explanatory power of urban primacy, however, is limited to the upper echelon of the city size 
distribution and may camouflage important differences underneath.  
The aim of the first substantive chapter of the thesis is therefore twofold. First, it describes the 
evolution of urban concentration from 1985 to 2010 in 68 countries around the world; and 
second, it analyses the extent to which the degree of urban concentration affected national 
economic growth in the same period. For this purpose, I built a new urban population dataset 
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which includes all cities with 50,000 inhabitants7 or more in the 68 countries considered. 
Equipped with this data, I construct a set of Herfindahl-Hirschman-Indices which capture a 
country’s urban structure in a more nuanced way than primacy. 
The analysis of the evolution of urban concentration in the first part of the paper shows that, 
in line with common perception, urban structures are on average far more concentrated in 
developing than in developed countries. However, contrary to the general perception of 
increasing levels, urban concentration has on average decreased or remained stable across the 
world (depending on the specific indicator used). However, these averages camouflage 
significant shifts within many countries, which – far from having stable levels of urban 
concentration – frequently showcase decreasing but also increasing concentration. This is true 
for both developing and developed countries. While most Latin American countries have 
lower levels of urban concentration today compared to 1985, many European, Asian and some 
African countries display higher concentration levels. Furthermore, despite decreasing 
averages, developing countries remain far more concentrated than developed countries.  
The results of the second part of the chapter, covering the econometric analysis of the 
relationship between urban concentration and economic growth, suggest that there is no 
uniform association between the two factors. I find that urban concentration is beneficial for 
economic growth in high-income countries, while this effect does not hold for developing 
countries. The results are robust to accounting for potential endogeneity issues when reverting 
to the use of IV analysis. These findings differ from previous analyses that tend to find a 
particularly important effect of urban concentration at low levels of economic development.  
ii. Average city size and economic growth 
This chapter is co-authored with Professor Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. It follows a similar 
approach as chapter 1, but moves away from the question of urban concentration and focuses 
on the role of the actual size of a country’s cities for economic growth. This is an important 
                                                     
7 In a handful of countries, the city sample is restricted to a higher city size threshold 
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addition to the existing empirical literature since it provides a so far mainly overlooked 
perspective. On the one hand, the empirical literature, linking city size to productivity, 
analyses the relationship from a city perspective, not a country growth perspective. Given that 
most countries have more than one city, maximising productivity levels of just one city may 
not be efficient for the country as a whole. On the other hand, the literature, associating urban 
concentration to economic growth at the national level, does not say much about the effect of 
city size (even though it is frequently cited in the debate): countries with very different sized 
cities can have the exact same level of urban concentration as long as the relative size 
distribution remains the same. In fact, city size is on average negatively correlated with urban 
concentration since smaller countries tend to be more concentrated while having smaller cities. 
In the context of agglomeration economies however, city size may be a more important aspect 
to analyse than the level of urban concentration. 
Chapter 2 thus addresses the link between a country’s average city size and economic growth 
in a total of 114 countries for the period between 1960 and 2010. As in the previous chapter, 
emphasis is placed on understanding potential differences between high-income and 
developing countries. The analysis – which includes pooled 2SLS, panel data analysis, system 
GMM, and an instrumental variable (IV) approach – finds the relationship between average 
city size and economic growth to be far from universally positive. Again, the results vary 
between high-income and developing countries. In high-income countries, there is consistent 
evidence of a positive link between city size and economic growth, although the effect 
decreases as the average city size increases. In contrast, the relationship does not hold for 
developing countries, for which most of the coefficients display insignificant results or point 
towards a negative connection between both factors.  
iii. Big or small cities? Does city size matter for growth? 
The third chapter maintains the city size perspective, but takes a slightly different approach 
than chapter 2. Instead of examining the role of average city size, I relate the percentage of 
the urban population living in cities of a certain size to economic growth. Under the 
28 
 
assumption that cities of a particular size maximize people’s productivity, a larger share of the 
urban population living in cities of that size should drive productivity and economic growth.  
The chapter, furthermore, incorporates additional factors, such as a country’s industrial 
composition and contextual factors, into the analysis, in order to understand how these factors 
interact with city size. I hypothesise that the balance between agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies which determines the productivity maximising city size, is affected by a 
country’s endowment of these factors.   
The econometric section follows a two-step approach. Using a panel of 113 countries between 
1980 and 2010, I, first, explore whether there are certain city sizes that are growth enhancing. 
Secondly, I introduce additional factors into the analysis to test their impact on the 
relationship. These factors are the sectoral composition of a country’s economy (as measured 
by service-sector and high-tech exports) and contextual factors (government effectiveness and 
urban infrastructure as proxied by sanitation).  
The results suggest a non-linear relationship dependent on the country’s size. In contrast to 
the prevailing view that large cities are growth inducing, I find that for the majority of 
countries it is beneficial to have relatively small cities of up to 3 million inhabitants. A large 
share of the urban population in cities with more than 10 million inhabitants is only growth 
promoting in countries with an urban population of 28.5 million and more. I, furthermore, find 
that the relationship is highly context dependent: a high share of industries that benefit from 
agglomeration economies, a well-developed urban infrastructure and an adequate level of 
governance effectiveness allow countries to take advantage of agglomeration benefits from 
larger cities.  
iv. Special Economic Zones: What makes them truly special?  
The final chapter of this thesis moves on to the policy level and looks at SEZs. This is the 
second co-authored chapter of my thesis and was developed and written in collaboration with 
Professor Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. 
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 As described above, SEZ type policies are frequently employed across the developing and 
developed world with the aim of influencing the location of economic activity within a country 
and thus in the context of the debate of urban concentration. Despite their significant 
proliferation and the diversity in their design and implementation, there is little quantitative 
research on the factors that influence their performance due to limited data for SEZ outcomes 
and characteristics. The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap and contribute to a better 
understanding of drivers of SEZ performance. 
SEZ performance is assumed to be influenced by both internal as well as external factors, 
including SEZ characteristics (such as size, sectoral focus, private versus public operator, 
location etc.), specificities of the SEZ policy (incentives offered, requirements, policy set-up 
etc.) and contextual factors (e.g. a country’s level of development, previous industrialization 
and proximity to large markets). In order to capture the diversity of factors, we rely on an 
entirely new dataset which covers a wide range of SEZ policy aspects as well as encompasses 
SEZ characteristics and contextual factors across 345 zones in 22 countries. In order to obtain 
a comparable proxy for SEZ performance, we resort to night-lights data, which has been 
shown to be a good indicator for economic activity when other traditional data is not available 
(Chen & Nordhaus, 2011; Ebener, Murray, Tandon, & Elvidge, 2005; Ghosh et al., 2010; 
Henderson, Storeygard, & Weil, 2012; Mellander, Lobo, Stolarick, & Matheson, 2015).  
The econometric analysis includes three complementary sections. First, the main analysis 
covers SEZ performance from 2007 to 2012, for which all explanatory variables are available. 
Second, a reduced dataset is used to analyse the growth performance of each zone in the five 
years after it became operational. This implies that the period of analysis varies by zone. A 
reduced number of explanatory variables is available for this section. Lastly, a deep dive into 
the Vietnamese zones allows to test whether the SEZ specific results hold once all country 
specific variation is eliminated. Two dependent variables are used throughout: the absolute 
growth of each zone and the relative growth of the zone compared to country growth.  
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The analysis reveals that SEZs cannot be seen as panacea for growth. In the majority of cases, 
SEZs are either less or only equally dynamic as the country they are placed in. This underlines 
the need for policy makers to carefully consider whether SEZs are the most appropriate tool 
for their purpose, in particular given their potentially high costs.  
The econometric analysis of the drivers of SEZ performance furthermore confirms, but also 
refutes some of the dominant views on the viability and success of SEZs. First, zone growth 
is difficult to sustain over time. Most growth happens in the early years of establishment but 
eventually peters out. Second, trying to upgrade the technological component or value-added 
of SEZs is challenging. Those SEZs in our sample, which focus on low- and medium-
technology sectors, outperformed their high-tech counterparts. Third, zone size matters: larger 
zones seem to have an advantage in terms of growth potential. And lastly, the country context 
determines SEZ performance. Firms look for low cost locations, but prefer those in close 
proximity to large cities. Proximity to big markets as well as pre-existing industrialization 
seem favourable for SEZ performance. In contrast, the incentive package, nature of the zone 
operator (public versus private) and other programme specific variables, which are frequently 
highlighted in the case study literature as performance drivers, seem highly context specific 
and are found not to be structurally correlated with SEZ performance.  
IV. Conclusion 
This PhD thesis explored the relationship between the spatial location of people within a 
country and national economic growth. The first three substantive chapters analysed whether 
a country’s urban structure impacts economic growth at the aggregate level. Each chapter 
explored a different aspect, namely the level of concentration of the urban population within 
a country, the size of a country’s cities and the role of contextual factors. The fourth essay 
explored the related policy question: what are the drivers of Special Economic Zone 
performance – a policy which is frequently employed to influence the location of economic 
activity and people within a country. The analysis contributes to a growing body of empirical 
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evidence that investigates questions of urbanization, agglomeration economies and economic 
development in developing countries.  
Across the first three chapters, I find consistent evidence to question the emphasis placed on 
the role of agglomeration and large cities for developing countries in much of the empirical 
and theoretical literature. The results in this thesis suggest that agglomeration and city size are 
a loci for economic growth, however only in high-income countries. In developing countries, 
on average, there seems to be no consistent relationship.  
The results of the third paper help to interpret this finding: the city size growth relationship is 
found to be far from uniform and shaped by a diversity of contextual factors, such as sector 
specialization, urban infrastructure, institutions and government effectiveness. Only if these 
factors are favourable, larger cities have a catalytic effect for growth. On average, high-income 
countries provide this favourable environment, hence the positive relationship between 
agglomeration, city size and growth. In developing countries, by contrast, economies are 
frequently dominated by industries which do not benefit from agglomeration economies to the 
same degree, infrastructure is less developed, government effectiveness tends to be lower, and 
cities and concentration levels are much larger than in developed countries. This does not 
suggest, however, that it is impossible for developing countries to benefit from large cities and 
agglomeration in the same way developed countries do. It is merely a combination of historical 
circumstances (which led to the emergence of more concentrated city structures and larger 
cities in the first place) and current factors (such as industrial composition and urban 
infrastructure), which hinders developing countries to retrieve a similar benefit from 
agglomeration as their high-income counterpart. 
From a policy point of view, these results have important implications. First, the frequently 
postulated trade-off between efficiency and equity may play less of a role than assumed. 
Indeed, for many developing countries it may be economically efficient to promote a 
territorially more balanced development as opposed to promoting more agglomeration. The 
emphasis in much of the influential ‘spatially-blind policy’ literature on the benefits of large 
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cities and agglomeration or on the assumption that disparities will self-correct over time, 
seems misguided in this context. Spatial policies, which promote secondary cities and the 
development in lagging regions, may in fact be both economically efficient and equitable. 
Second, the results of chapter 3 on the contextual factors emphasise the importance of 
improving urban infrastructure and government capacities in order to reduce urban 
diseconomies arising in large cities. As cities are highly persistent over time and massive cities 
are already in existence, this policy area will require particular priority.   
In terms of policy choice and implementation, chapter 4 highlights one of the largest 
challenges for spatial policies, even if one believes in the economic benefits of promoting 
growth in lagging areas: the actual feasibility of doing so. The analysis of the drivers of Special 
Economic Zones, one of the most popular tools assumed to fit this purpose, reveals that SEZs 
have been mainly successful in vicinity to the largest cities. The promotion of SEZs in more 
remote areas, which provide a less conducive context, has been proven difficult to substantiate.  
The thesis contributes to the growing empirical literature employing developing country data. 
As with most research, rather than providing a definite answer to the questions at hand, it 
unveils more questions and the necessity to ‘dig deeper’. Besides the need to further improve 
data quality and the measurement of many of the aspects considered in this thesis, a closer 
assessment of specific cases would be desirable to complement the more macro level research 
included here. How do institutions shape urban development in the developing world? Which 
sort of formal and informal institutions have contributed to the success of certain policies? 
Which were the characteristics of the underlying institutions in countries where urban 
development has gone right? How have some secondary cities managed to grow? Both a 
qualitative case study approach as well as quantitative research based on microdata will help 
to shed more light on these aspects. 
With regards to the research on Special Economic Zones, it will be important to further 
validate our results as well as include other sorts of SEZ policies which are excluded from the 
analysis due to methodological reasons. Single country studies with a large number of SEZs 
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will allow to gain a deeper understanding of the importance of SEZ infrastructure, locational 
choices as well as other services offered. Furthermore, it would be desirable to enlarge the 
research to include other types of Special Economic Zones, in particular those focusing on 
tradable services and those encompassing larger territories. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Many countries have experienced sizeable shifts in the geographical distribution of their 
population over the past decades, in particular developing countries. Population growth paired 
with galloping urbanization rates have resulted in an increase in the size of some cities, 
shrinking population in others and birth of new cities. The perceived increasing concentration 
of people has received much attention in the literature in terms of its impact on different socio-
economic aspects such as poverty reduction (Christiaensen, Weerdt, & Todo, 2013; Portes & 
Roberts, 2005; Sekkat, 2016), CO2 emissions (Makido, Dhakal, & Yamagata, 2012; Mohajeri, 
Gudmundsson, & French, 2015) and inequality (Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2015; Oyvat, 
2016). The question whether increasing agglomeration is beneficial for productivity and 
economic growth has been particularly high on the agenda. A growing number of academics 
and policy-makers have stressed the importance of urban concentration for economic growth: 
the concentration of people and firms in one place generates agglomeration economies and 
productivity gains through pooled labour markets, forward and backwards linkages as well as 
knowledge spill-overs (Fujita & Thisse, 2003; P. Martin & Ottaviano, 2001; Romer, 1986; 
Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). Many studies even posit a trade-off between a spatially-balanced 
economic development (equity) and economic efficiency in the form of a greater concentration 
of population and economic activity in one place which may potentially lead to greater 
national economic growth (see R. Martin, 2008 for an overview). More concentrated urban 
structures – in particular at low levels of development – are frequently regarded as growth 
enhancing (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Henderson, 2003; World Bank, 2009). Policies to 
stimulate economic development outside of the main cities are, in contrast, often regarded as 
inefficient and growth limiting.  
The literature on the topic, while extensive, has two important limitations. First, there is still 
limited information on how the levels of urban concentration have evolved across different 
countries in the world. While a few studies explicitly describe the patterns and evolution of 
urban concentration, the majority focuses on analysing what drives city size distribution 
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within countries (Anthony, 2014; Moomaw, 2004). When they do analyse the patterns, studies 
often remain mainly cross-sectional (Short & Pinet‐Peralta, 2009) or, when they are 
longitudinal, they focus on a specific country or region (Aroca & Atienza, 2016; Behrens & 
Bala, 2013; Cuervo & Cuervo, 2013). Frequently, general references to the well-known higher 
levels of urban concentration in developing countries and their social consequences also 
suffice as an introduction to the topic (Castells-Quintana, 2016; Henderson, 2003; Venables, 
2005). A more nuanced description is therefore desirable to understand the extent to which 
perception of increasing concentration matches reality. 
The second limitation relates to the measure of urban concentration. Most literature uses either 
levels of primacy i.e. the concentration of a country’s urban population in the largest city 
(Anthony, 2014; Behrens & Bala, 2013; Cuervo & Cuervo, 2013; Henderson, 2003) or the 
share of the urban population living in cities above a certain size threshold (Bertinelli & Strobl, 
2007; Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Sekkat, 2016) as indicators of urban concentration. This is 
particularly true for studies looking at the link between urban concentration and growth, since 
both indicators have the advantage of being available for many countries over several periods. 
They do, however, only imperfectly portray the historical shifts occurring in many countries: 
the share of the population in cities of a certain size has little to say about the relative 
distribution of the urban population; and primacy only depicts changes in the largest city and 
the overall size of the urban population. In the few studies, in which more sophisticated 
indicators of concentration are used, the samples tend to be restricted to developed countries, 
mainly in Europe (Gardiner, Martin, & Tyler, 2011). Whether these lessons can be applied to 
today’s developing countries is increasingly called into question given the rapid urban 
transformations developing countries are undergoing and potential differences in their 
developing paths. 
Our study specifically aims to address these two gaps in our knowledge. By assembling an 
entire new dataset – which permits the construction of more nuanced indicators of urban 
concentration for a large number of countries – we first examine how the level of urban 
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concentration has evolved between 1985 and 2010 in different countries. Secondly, we assess 
how changes in urban concentration have affected economic growth in the same time period. 
We furthermore specifically test for differences in impact between developed and developing 
countries. Concerns about the potential endogeneity of the variables are addressed through 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis.  
The paper adopts the following structure. The next section discusses possible indicators to 
measure the level of urban concentration, introduces the new dataset and describes the 
evolution of urban concentration in our sample. The following section provides an overview 
of the relevant literature on the link between agglomeration and growth. Section 4 introduces 
the model, data as well the estimation strategy. Section 5 examines the impact of a country’s 
urban structure on its economic performance and discusses the results. The final chapter 
concludes and lays out some further areas for research. 
1.2 The evolution of urban concentration 
1.2.1 Indices of urban concentration 
In order to describe the evolution of the urban structure of different countries around the world, 
we consider a number of indicators. Most literature concerned with the topic relies either on 
(i) urban primacy, (ii) the share of the urban population living in cities above a certain size 
threshold, (iii) Zipf’s law or (iv) the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI). Among these four, 
primacy and the share of the urban population in cities above a certain size are the most widely 
used and have been particularly popular in research that considers the link between urban 
concentration and growth (Bertinelli & Strobl, 2007; Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-
Quintana, 2016; Henderson, 2003). 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of urban primacy, it is commonly referred 
to as the percentage of the urban population living in the largest city or the ratio between the 
population of the largest city over the sum of the population of the two to four next largest 
cities (Anthony, 2014; Moomaw, 2004; Short & Pinet‐Peralta, 2009). Similarly, different 
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thresholds are used for the share of the population living in cities above a certain size, most 
prominently either 750,000 or 1 million inhabitants (Bertinelli & Strobl, 2007; Brülhart & 
Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014). The advantage of both indicators and 
thus their popularity in the literature rely on their availability for many countries and over a 
relatively long time period. This makes them particularly apt for use in panel regressions. 
As discussed in the introduction, there are, however, certain limitations when using these 
indicators. On the one side, the percentage of the urban population, which lives in cities of a 
certain size, does not say much about the relative distribution of the urban population across 
cities: as long as we do not know across how many cities this percentage is split nor how large 
the remainder of the cities are, this indicator does not reveal much about a country’s urban 
structure. Primacy, on the other side, does address the question of the relative distribution of 
people across a country’s cities. However, the descriptive power of primacy also has 
limitations as it is only concerned with the very top tier of the city distribution, potentially 
concealing important changes and differences across countries below the top echelons. 
Furthermore, both statistics are highly sensitive to how countries define what constitutes the 
“urban population”. For instance in the UK, any settlement with 10,000 and more inhabitants 
is defined as urban; in the US, urban areas have 50,000 or more inhabitants, while urban 
clusters have between 2,500 and 50,000. Hence, the base over which both indicators is 
calculated may differ significantly across countries and bias the measurement. 
This leaves us with Zipf’s law and the HHI as possible indicators to capture the level of 
concentration of a country’s urban structure. Firstly, Zipf’s law (also called rank size rule), 
describes an empirical phenomenon in which the size of a country’s cities follows a pareto 
distribution (Zipf, 1949). This law suggests that the second largest city within a country is half 
the size of the largest, the third largest city has a third of the population of the largest city and 
so forth. We can visualize this relationship by plotting the log of the population of all cities 
(x-axis) against the log of the cities’ rank (y-axis): if the city size distribution follows Zipf’s 
law, a straight downward line emerges with a slope of -1. Theoretically, this coefficient could 
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be used as a measure of urban concentration since a deviation either below or above a 
coefficient of -1 indicates more or less evenly distributed urban structures. In practice, 
however, the empirical literature on Zipf’s law has mainly aimed to test whether the law holds 
across different countries and not to describe the status and evolution of a country’s urban 
structure (Giesen & Südekum, 2011; Ioannides & Overman, 2003; Rosen & Resnick, 1980; 
Soo, 2005). This is due to the fact that in order to calculate the coefficient, information on a 
large amount of cities and over multiple time periods is needed. Most studies requiring a time-
series indicator for urban concentration have, therefore, resorted to the above-mentioned 
primacy or urban population share.   
The final option is the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI). The HHI is frequently used in 
different disciplines to measure concentration and is defined as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ (
𝑥𝑦𝑖𝑝
𝑥𝑖𝑝
)
2
𝑛𝑝
𝑦=1
 
where  
xyip = population of city y in country i in the beginning of period p 
xip = total urban population in country i in the beginning of period p 
n = number of cities in country i in the beginning of period p 
The HHI is the sum of the squared shares of each city’s contribution to the overall urban 
population in the beginning of period p. It takes values between 1/n and 1, where 1 indicates 
complete concentration. A number of authors emphasize the desirability of using the HHI as 
opposed to other indicators for urban concentration due to its superiority in describing the full 
city size distribution (as opposed to the upper echelon only) (Castells-Quintana, 2016; 
Henderson, 2003). Due to the data requirements for its calculation, it has, however, been rarely 
used (Wheaton & Shishido, 1981).  
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Based on this discussion, it is clear that Zipfs law and the HHI are more suited than primacy 
and the share of the urban population living in cities above a certain size to examine a 
country’s urban structure. Between the two, there is no clear advantage of one over the other 
in terms of their explanatory power. Our choice therefore falls on the HHI for practical 
purposes: the HHI is simpler to calculate for a large amount of countries and over multiple 
time periods. 
1.2.2 City population dataset 
In order to calculate the HHI, we built a new city population dataset from scratch. The dataset 
covers 68 countries over the period 1985 to 2010. For each country, the dataset contains 
information about the population of its cities at different points in time. The data was sourced 
from census data for each country available on citypopulation.de (Brinkhoff, no date) and 
complemented with information from the 2014 edition of the World Urbanization Prospects 
(United Nations, 2014). Different world regions are well represented in the dataset with a 
relatively even distribution between Africa (19%), Americas (21%), Asia (25%), Europe 
(32%) and Oceania (3%) (Appendix 1 provides the details). As census years vary from country 
to country, the data is projected to achieve a balanced dataset with information gathered in 
five-year intervals8. 
A frequent concern with population data for cities is whether the statistic counts the population 
within the administrative boundaries of a city only or that of the overall agglomeration (which 
may include several cities from an administrative point of view). For example, the 
administrative boundaries of Paris suggest a population of 2.2 million and a growth of around 
1% since the early eighties. If we consider the agglomeration however, Paris looks very 
different in terms of its population numbers i.e. with a population of around 10.6 million and 
a growth of 15% over the past three decades.9 As we are interested in external economies 
arising through the concentration of people and these external economies do not stop at 
                                                     
8 Some countries are not included for the entire period of analysis as only few census years are available. 
9 Numbers sourced from Brinkhoff (no date) 
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administrative boundaries, we adjust the population data to account for the size of the actual 
agglomerations. For this purpose, the contiguous boundaries of an agglomeration were defined 
through the inspection of satellite imagery, and the population of the administrative cities 
within these boundaries was added up. With this data at hand, the HHI was calculated.  
As with other measures related to urbanization and cities, the HHI is sensitive to aggregation 
bias, i.e. to the number of cities included in its calculation. In order to minimise this problem, 
we follow the approach suggested by Cheshire (1999) and Rosen and Resnick (1980) and 
calculate the HHI in multiple ways: 1) based on a size cut-off, including all cities above a 
certain size threshold and 2) based on a specified number of cities, regardless of their size. 
Using a size cut-off has the advantage of including all cities considered big enough to generate 
agglomeration economies. However, using the size cut-off leads to a very different treatment 
of small and large countries. Small countries often only have a few cities with a population 
above the defined threshold. Resorting to a specified number of cities solves this problem, but 
limits the indicator to the upper tail of the city distribution for large countries. This may affect 
results, for instance in the case of China, where there are more than 100 cities with more than 
one million inhabitants today. By contrast, in smaller countries with few cities, the indicator 
includes more cities than if based exclusively on a size cut-off. We experiment with both 
approaches and calculate the following urban agglomeration measures: a) HHI50 includes all 
cities of a country with 50,000 or more inhabitants; b) HHI100 all cities with 100,000 
inhabitants or more; and c) HHIrank includes the 25 largest cities of a country, independent 
of their size. This approach also has an important advantage, compared to studies relying on 
urban primacy, that we employ a uniform definition of what constitutes “urban” across the 
dataset and do not depend on each country’s definition. 
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1.2.3 Evolution of urban concentration 
Equipped with these HHI indices, we analyse the evolution of urban concentration from 1985 
to 2010. Figure 1-1 plots the average of the different HHIs dividing the sample into developed 
and developing countries.10 
Figure 1-1: Evolution of urban concentration 1985 – 2010  
 
Three insights emerge from Figure 1-1. First, there are marked differences in the levels of 
urban concentration. Developed countries have much less concentrated urban structures than 
developing countries across the three indicators. The difference is particularly marked for 
HHI50 and HHI100, despite a significant decrease in these indicators for developing countries 
over the period of analysis.  
Second, the average levels of concentration have remained relatively stable for developed 
countries during the period of analysis, but have changed dramatically in developing countries. 
While the average level of HHI50 and HHI100 in developing countries was higher than in 
developed countries, it decreased sharply in the former (from 0.36 to 0.28 and 0.48 to 0.36 
respectively), pointing to a decreasing concentration of the urban population. This trend can 
                                                     
10 For the purpose of this study, we define developed countries as European countries, US, Australia 
and New Zealand. Japan and Canada are not included in our dataset as the required data are not available 
for a sufficiently long time horizon.  
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be partially attributed to the rapid urbanisation process in the emerging world. Urbanization 
leads to an increase in the number of cities which pass the threshold for inclusion in the 
calculation of the indices, thus increasing the base over which the HHI is calculated.  
Finally, there are differences between the indicators in terms of their evolution. The average 
of the HHI50 and HHI100 indicators declined – albeit at a different pace – for both developed 
and developing countries, suggesting lower concentration levels. In contrast, the average 
HHIrank indicator remained stable for both groups of countries.  
Moving beyond average levels reveals greater heterogeneity between and within the 
indicators. Figure 1-2 shows the percentage of countries in which the different indicators either 
displayed a declining, a stable or a growing urban concentration. The “declining” category 
comprises of countries whose urban concentration levels decreased by more than 5%; “stable” 
countries hovered around +/- 5% from their initial level; and “growing” includes the countries 
whose indicator increased by more than 5%. Again, the sample is split into developed and 
developing countries. 
Figure 1-2: Evolution of urban concentration 1985 – 2010, by category 
For the developed countries sample, figure 1-2 unveils much greater diversity in urban 
concentration changes than the relatively stable averages Figure 1-1 suggest. For HHI50 and 
HHIrank, the stable group represents the smallest of the three groups (23% and 30% 
respectively), while for the HHI100 – where it is the second group – 41% fall into this 
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category. The large majority of developed countries have experienced significant changes in 
their urban structure. The picture differs by indicator: HHI50 and HHI100 indicate that more 
countries had less concentrated urban structures in 2010 compared to 1985. According to the 
HHIrank however, almost four out of ten developed countries had more concentrated urban 
structures in 2010 than in 1985. Only three out of ten had less concentration. Countries within 
the increasing group include Spain, Norway, New Zealand and the UK; Australia, Hungary 
and the US belong in the decreasing group. 
Among developing countries, the picture is more homogenous. Driven by increasing 
urbanization rates and a general increase in the size of cities, an overwhelming majority of the 
countries became less concentrated during the period of analysis (as measured by HHI50 and 
HHI100). When considering the HHIrank, the decreasing group – while not representing the 
majority of countries – is still the largest group. However, the development is again more 
diverse for the HHIrank with its fixed number of cities. Almost the same percentage of 
countries witnessed an increase as a decrease in concentration levels (37% vs 45%). There are 
clear geographical differences within these groups. The large majority of Latin American 
countries saw their levels of urban concentration decline regardless of the indicator 
considered. Many Asian countries in contrast had increasing levels of urban concentration, in 
particular when considering the HHIrank. One in two Asian countries is more concentrated 
today than in 1985. The same is true for Africa, where the picture however differs strongly 
between the indicators. The majority of African countries experienced increased levels of 
urban concentration for the HHIrank indicator, while the contrary is true for HHI100 and 
HHI50. 
On average, countries have, thus, become less concentrated since 1985 (HHI50 and HHI100). 
There is limited evidence of significantly more concentrated urban structures (HHIrank). This 
finding is at odds with the general perception of heightened urban concentration in many 
countries. Going beyond the averages, however, helps to reconcile this apparent contradiction 
to a certain degree: individual countries both in the developing and developed world have 
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experienced strong changes in their urban structure. If we consider the HHIrank indicator, 
with its fixed number of cities, there are as many countries with a more concentrated urban 
structure as with a less concentrated one. Furthermore, developing countries still remain more 
concentrated than developed countries which may have contributed to the general perception 
of increasing concentration. 
The differences in the results for the HHI indicators also show that passing judgement on 
whether we live in a world with more concentration or with less concentration ultimately 
depends on what we deem to be the most adequate indicator of urban concentration. Each 
indicator captures a slightly different development and has its advantages as well as 
disadvantages.  
1.3 Urban concentration and economic growth 
Turning to our second research question, we analyse how the above described evolution of 
urban concentration has impacted the countries’ economic performance. Whether a country’s 
urban structure and more generally speaking its degree of agglomeration have a bearing on 
economic development and growth has long attracted the interest of researchers. Already more 
than a century ago, Alfred Marshall’s seminal work on industrial districts (1890) described 
the productivity gains which companies experience by co-locating with other companies. Six 
decades later, Williamson (1965) coined the idea of an inverted U–shaped relationship 
between agglomeration and economic development. In this U-shaped function, levels of 
concentration rise with economic development and subsequently fall beyond a certain 
economic development threshold. The interest in the topic has not faded away and an 
increasing number of researchers has sought to find support for a relationship and to determine 
the direction of causation. In recent years, New Economic Geography (NEG) and the System 
of Cities literature have further increased the prominence of the question.  
The NEG literature stresses the economic benefits arising from concentrated urban structures. 
In the basic NEG framework, the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces 
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determines the location of economic activity and population within a country (Fujita, 
Krugman, & Venables, 1999; Krugman, 1991). On the one hand, concentration creates 
economic benefits in the form of centripetal forces, such as forward and backward linkages, 
thick labour markets, and localized knowledge spill-overs. These generate economic 
efficiency and incentivize even more demographic and economic concentration. On the other 
hand, urban concentration also gives raise to centrifugal forces, such as congestion, immobile 
factors, and increasing land rents. These work against the agglomeration benefits and disperse 
activity into other regions of the country. Based on this framework, several models have been 
proposed to examine the effect of a country’s level of concentration on economic growth and 
vice versa. In Fujita and Thisse (2003), localized knowledge spill-overs act as a strong 
centripetal force. The concentration of economic activity and population is assumed to be 
welfare enhancing provided that the trickle-down effect is strong enough (Fujita & Thisse, 
2003). Martin and Ottaviano (2001) similarly postulate that agglomeration spurs economic 
growth, as it lowers the costs of innovation through pecuniary externalities. Furthermore, 
growth fosters agglomeration as new firms tend to locate close to other innovative firms, 
making economic development and agglomeration mutually reinforcing (P. Martin & 
Ottaviano, 2001). Puga and Venables (1996) take a slightly different angle by stressing the 
role of pecuniary externalities as drivers of industrial location. They find that, as economies 
grow, increases in wages in dynamic areas eventually push some firms to relocate to lower 
wage regions. Consequently, wage differentials between regions first increase, before 
decreasing. This finding is in line with Williamson’s (1965) U-shaped curve. Overall, the 
theoretical NEG literature, thus, considers agglomeration beneficial for economic growth. 
More urban concentration is, hence, beneficial from an economic development point of view. 
The urban economics literature takes a more cautious stand on this question. While it 
emphasizes a positive effect of increased city size and agglomeration on productivity, it also 
recognized that a highly concentrated urban structure could be growth hindering (Abdel-
Rahman & Anas, 2004; Henderson, 2005). Similar to NEG, urban economists consider that 
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agglomerations generate external scale economies through the sharing and matching of inputs, 
people and ideas (Duranton & Puga, 2004). However, these benefits from increasing city 
population are at some point outweighed by urban diseconomies, such as congestion and high 
land rents. A U-shaped trajectory is in evidence again: productivity increases with city size up 
to the threshold where congestion costs cause productivity to start falling. Workers and firms 
would thus benefit from a move to another city, creating a more balanced urban structure. 
Coordination failure, however, may stop people from doing so, as an individual actor is not 
compensated for the external benefits it creates for others. This in turn may lead to the 
emergence of strongly concentrated urban structures, with the majority of the urban population 
in one city. Venables (2005) even maintains that highly concentrated urban structures may 
confine countries to low economic development. As negative externalities reduce the returns 
to job creation, they slow down economic development. In the presence of low growth, it 
becomes more difficult to start a new city, leading to urban systems that are growth inhibiting 
rather than enhancing (Venables, 2005). Thus, from the theoretical urban economics 
perspective, whether a country’s level of urban concentration is growth enhancing or not 
depends on whether the concentration of the population in a country’s prime city is perceived 
to be already beyond the tipping point or not. 
A growing body of empirical literature aims to test the predictions of the theoretical models 
on the relationship between agglomeration and economic growth. A first group of studies 
specifically examines the relationship between urban concentration and economic growth at 
the national level, using country-level panel data (Bertinelli & Strobl, 2007; Brülhart & 
Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014; Henderson, 2003). The studies resort to 
the aforementioned primacy indicator and/or the percentage of the urban population living in 
cities above a certain size as measures for the level of population concentration. They find a 
positive relationship between urban concentration and economic growth, although this 
conclusion is nuanced by a negative sign on the interaction term with GDP per capita. This 
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implies that urban concentration may be particularly important at early stages of economic 
development.  
Some studies point to important regional differences in this relationship. Pholo-Bala (2009) 
concludes that the relationship between urban concentration and economic growth is far from 
uniform across different groups of countries. While in the case of Europe the positive 
relationship holds, a growth trap at medium levels of urban concentration exists in Asia and 
Latin America. Results for Africa are highly dependent on the measure of urban structure 
employed (Pholo-Bala, 2009). Similarly Castells-Quintana (2016) identifies a potentially 
detrimental effect of urban concentration in African countries. 
A second group of studies is mainly based on European data and measures agglomeration by 
the degree of concentration of economic activities, as opposed to urban population 
concentration. While economic and urban concentration are not equivalent, they tend to go 
hand in hand. Results emerging from this literature may thus still be informative, in 
particularly since these studies usually rely on a more diverse and more nuanced set of 
indicators than the aforementioned literature on urban concentration. Interestingly, the 
findings in this group are more mixed and depend on the measure employed and scale of 
analysis. Barrios and Strobl (2009), using the standard deviation of log of regional GDP per 
capita by country, identify the existence of an inverted u-curve for the relationship between 
GDP per capita and regional inequalities. Crozet and Koenig (2007) look at whether intra-
regional inequality in GDP per capita spurs regional growth in European regions and find a 
positive relationship, but only in Northern countries. Gardiner et al. (2011) highlight that 
results depend on the spatial measure and scale used, implying that there is no unambiguous 
relationship between agglomeration and regional growth. Other research suggests a negative 
effect of agglomeration on economic growth. Bosker (2007) reports that a higher employment 
density translates into a lower growth rate, while Sbergami (2002) shows that more equal 
distribution of economic activities across regions spurs the national growth.  
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Consequently, the empirical literature on the link between agglomeration and national 
economic performance is inconclusive. Studies using measures of population concentration 
generally suggest that a concentrated urban structure is conducive to economic growth up to 
a certain threshold of economic development, but also point to important regional differences 
depending on levels of development. The results are also often beleaguered by their reliance 
on rather crude indicators. Where indicators are more sophisticated, as for the studies on 
economic agglomeration, studies tend to focus almost exclusively on the European 
experience. This calls into question the ability to generalise these results, especially to 
developing countries.  
1.4 Model and data 
In order to analyse the effect of urban concentration on national economic growth, we follow 
the existing literature on the topic (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana, 2016; 
Henderson, 2003) and specify a simple economic growth model. In this model the dependent 
variable – GDP per capita growth over five-year intervals – is explained by our different HHI 
indicators, GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, and a set of control variables. Our 
model takes the following structure:  
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 = 𝛼+𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑝 + 𝛾 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 + 𝛿 𝑿𝑖𝑝+ 𝜗𝑝 +  𝜀𝑖𝑝 
where 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 =  GDP per capita growth rate of country i in period p 
HHIip = urban concentration of country i at the beginning of period p 
GDPpcip =ln GDP per capita of country i at the beginning of period p 
Xip = a set of control variables for country i, either measured at the beginning or as an 
average of period p 
𝜗𝑝 =  time fixed effects 
𝜀ip  is the error term. 
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Our variable of interest is HHIip, the measure of the level of urban concentration in each 
country i at the beginning of period p. We use the three different versions of the HHI as 
introduced in the section on the evolution of urban concentration. To allow for a possible non-
linear relationship between urban concentration and growth, we also add the second order 
polynomials. The set of control variables comprises those generally included in cross-country 
growth regressions. These are: a) GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, to control for 
conditional convergence. Countries with a lower GDP per capita are expected to display 
higher growth rates, thus the coefficient should be negative  (Durlauf, Johnson, & Temple, 
2005); b) private investment due to its contribution to a country’s capital stock should be a 
driver of economic growth and c) government consumption as a percentage of GDP given its 
potential crowding-out effect on private investment. In addition, we control for a country’s 
size and its urbanization rate. We control both for the physical size of a country (land area) 
and the size of its population. Both variables may affect a country’s urban structure. Small 
countries (both on terms of dimension and population) are likely to have a lower number of 
cities. This generally implies more urban concentration than larger countries. Furthermore, a 
country’s size also reflects its market potential – larger countries tend to be more attractive to 
investors – and thus is also believed to influence economic performance (Alesina, Spolaore, 
& Wacziarg, 2005). Finally, we include a control for a country’s political stability and 
institutional quality. For this purpose we use the state antiquity index by Putterman and 
Bockstette (2012). The indicator measures for every 50 year period since year 1 A.D. a) if 
there was a central government, b) what percentage of a country’s current land mass has been 
governed by this government, and c) whether the government was indigenous or foreign. 
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) demonstrate that this indicator is strongly correlated 
with a country’s current institutional ability. Using a historical indicator for institutional 
quality has the advantage that it is not influenced by today’s growth performance, thus we do 
not need to worry about reverse causality between the indicator and economic growth. 
Furthermore, alternative indicators such as the World Governance Indicators are only 
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available since the mid-nineties, thus limiting their use in panel regressions. All regressions 
include time fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
GDP per capita growth, initial GDP per capita, private and government investment are sourced 
from the eighth edition of the Penn World Tables. Population size, urbanization rate and land 
area are from World Development Indicators. As mentioned, the state antiquity indicator is 
derived from Putterman and Bockstette’s dataset. Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 include a 
detailed overview of the specific variables used in the analysis, their data sources and 
descriptive statistics. 
We estimate the model using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator to allow for the inclusion 
of time-invariant variables “land area” and “state antiquity” in a panel setting (Baltagi, 
Bresson, & Pirotte, 2003). As in the case of fixed effects models, HT uses the within 
transformation of time-varying variables to estimate consistent coefficients for these variables. 
It also uses individual means of the time variant regressors as instruments for the time invariant 
variables. We also report the results of the standard country fixed effects estimator in 
Appendix 4. 
In order to test the robustness of the HT and fixed effect results and address concerns of 
endogeneity, we resort to an instrumental variable design, which relies on a country’s physical 
geographical characteristics as instruments. The rationale for the instruments and results of 
the robustness check are presented in a separate section. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Main results 
Table 1-1 shows the results for the HT estimator. Columns 1 – 3 present the results for the 
world sample, columns 4 – 6 for developed, and columns 7 – 9 for developing countries. The 
general model works well and the control variables show the expected signs. GDP per capita 
at the beginning of the period is negative and significant at the 1% level throughout all 
estimations, pointing towards a conditional catching-up process independent of the data 
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sample considered. Private investment is positive and significant for seven out of nine 
regressions, with the results being weaker for the developing countries sample. Government 
consumption retains a negative coefficient throughout all estimates and is significant in the 
world and the developed countries sample, indicating a possible crowding out of private 
investments. The indicator for state history is positive and significant in all estimates. This 
emphasizes the importance of institutions for a country’s economic performance.  The results 
for the control variables which are more directly related to a country’s urban structure, namely 
its population, land size and urbanization rate, vary somewhat by sample. Population is 
negative throughout, but insignificant in the developed countries sample. Land area is positive 
and significant when considering both samples individually, however not in the world sample. 
The level of urbanization is weakly correlated with GDP per capita growth for developed 
countries, but not for developing countries.  
Turning to our variables of interest, we find that none of our urban concentration indices 
(HHIs) or their squared terms displays a significant correlation with economic growth in the 
world sample (columns 1 to 3). This would – in contrast to some of the previous empirical 
studies – suggest that a country’s urban structure plays a minor role in its growth performance. 
However, once we divide the sample into developed and developing countries, a clearer 
picture emerges (columns 4 to 9). For the developed countries group (columns 4 to 6), the 
coefficients are consistently significant. The main terms of HHI50, HHI100 and HHIrank are 
positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The squared terms of the corresponding HHI 
are negative, but only significant for the HHI50 and HHIrank indicator. This indicates a 
positive correlation between urban concentration and economic growth for developed 
countries, which decreases as urban agglomeration increases.  
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Table 1-1: Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth in five-year intervals, 1985 – 2010 
  World Sample  Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
             
HHI50  -0.110    4.376***    -0.257   
  (0.577)    (1.268)    (0.585)   
HHI50 squared  -0.136    -5.848***    0.0418   
  (0.434)    (2.021)    (0.458)   
HHI100   0.0106    2.275**    -0.0490  
   (0.586)    (0.908)    (0.558)  
HHI100 squared   0.0788    -2.095    0.0809  
   (0.371)    (1.333)    (0.343)  
HHIrank    -0.644    6.244**    -0.300 
    (1.876)    (3.039)    (2.117) 
HHIrank squared    -0.127    -14.85**    -0.339 
    (3.242)    (6.729)    (3.772) 
Initial GDPpc   -0.577*** -0.491*** -0.476***  -0.764*** -0.677*** -0.748***  -0.602*** -0.498*** -0.479*** 
  (0.0704) (0.0869) (0.0838)  (0.0680) (0.111) (0.0790)  (0.0750) (0.0981) (0.101) 
Private investment  0.502** 0.593** 0.519**  0.469** 0.362** 0.540***  0.372 0.513* 0.372 
 (0.244) (0.241) (0.245)  (0.186) (0.177) (0.173)  (0.271) (0.290) (0.308) 
Government consumption  -0.592* -0.610* -0.694**  -1.249*** -1.342*** -1.238***  -0.147 -0.244 -0.327 
 (0.310) (0.317) (0.299)  (0.185) (0.272) (0.236)  (0.344) (0.332) (0.307) 
State history  1.883*** 1.448*** 1.473***  0.914** 0.932** 0.978**  1.905* 1.799** 1.614* 
  (0.546) (0.479) (0.459)  (0.450) (0.470) (0.418)  (1.053) (0.914) (0.842) 
LN (Population)   -0.229*** -0.140** -0.145**  -0.106 -0.102 -0.166*  -0.644*** -0.580*** -0.547*** 
  (0.0878) (0.0703) (0.0608)  (0.0878) (0.0724) (0.0929)  (0.165) (0.155) (0.135) 
LN (Land area)  0.0274 0.0153 0.0115  0.180** 0.173** 0.159**  0.323** 0.360** 0.381*** 
  (0.0794) (0.0651) (0.0597)  (0.0772) (0.0682) (0.0735)  (0.147) (0.141) (0.125) 
Urbanization rate  -0.00108 0.00234 0.00310  -0.00858** -0.00687* -0.00648**  -0.00933* -0.00481 -0.00514 
  (0.00358) (0.00362) (0.00352)  (0.00394) (0.00371) (0.00309)  (0.00522) (0.00538) (0.00554) 
Constant  3.875*** 3.194*** 3.224***  5.011*** 4.237*** 5.127***  1.114 -0.333 -0.509 
  (1.110) (1.128) (0.996)  (0.894) (0.917) (0.830)  (1.601) (1.820) (1.544) 
             
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
             
Observations  340 352 364  130 130 136  210 222 228 
Number of countries  62 64 66  23 23 24  39 41 42 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Urban concentration in developing countries has, by contrast, no effect on economic growth. 
As in the case of the results for the world sample (columns 1 to 3), none of the HHI indicators 
or their squared terms is significant (Columns 7 to 9). This implies that in the developing and 
emerging world – and contrary to what is postulated in the World Development Report 2009 
(World Bank, 2009) – urban agglomeration cannot be considered a factor in the promotion of 
greater economic growth. 
The country fixed effects results (included in Appendix 4) confirm the findings of Table 1-1. 
Urban concentration is growth promoting in developed countries, while it does not seem to 
have a systematic effect in developing countries. 
From an empirical perspective, our results contradict the main tenet in the literature (Bertinelli 
& Strobl, 2007; Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Henderson, 2003), that agglomeration economies 
are particularly important at early stages of economic development. Our results suggest that 
in fact for lower levels of economic development, urban concentration seems to be wholly 
disconnected from a country’s economic performance. They are, however, in line with the 
results of Pholo-Bala (2009), who uncovers a positive effect of urban concentration in 
European countries, which represent the majority of the countries in our developed countries 
sample.  
A potential explanation for the contrasting results may be the differing periods of analysis. 
Today, rich countries may benefit strongly from agglomeration economies due to a sectoral 
composition biased towards knowledge-intensive industries. But in less developed countries, 
continued high levels of urban concentration may lead to a prevalence of urban diseconomies 
of scale – congestion, pollution, emergence of large slums – as well as other diseconomies, 
such as inequality, social and political conflict. Urban diseconomies may thus largely 
undermine any positive effects from the concentration of economic activity in cities. 
Comparing our results to the theoretical literature, it seems that NEG models, which predict a 
growth promoting effect of concentration, are doing a reasonable job in describing current 
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mechanisms in the developed world. However, they do not appear accurate for the situation 
in many developing countries, where there seems to be no effect of urban concentration on a 
country’s economic performance. The reasons for this discrepancy may be that agglomeration 
benefits as described by NEG are more prevalent in high-tech and knowledge-intensive 
industries (Graham, 2009; Henderson, 2010) which only represent a small part of the economy 
in most developing countries. Similarly, these models may underestimate agglomeration 
diseconomies in developing countries, which are bound to be stronger than in developed 
countries, given their lower endowment in urban infrastructure and higher levels of urban 
concentration. Moreover, the results do not confirm the presence of a low economic 
development trap in our sample, stipulated as a possibility by the system of cities approach. 
For developed countries, an efficient system of cities seems to have emerged which promotes 
economic growth. By contrast, in developing countries, urban structure seems to play second 
fiddle – if at all – to a raft of other factors which are the real determinants of economic growth.  
1.5.2 Robustness check 
A recurring concern in the study of the relationship between urbanization, agglomeration and 
economic development is the question of reverse causality. Does the urban structure of a 
country drive economic growth or does economic growth drive urban concentration? The 
reality is likely to be a mix of both. To confirm the robustness of our results, we need to 
identify the effect flowing from urban concentration to economic growth. In order to do that, 
we rely on an instrumental variable (IV) design. The aim is to see whether an IV approach 
confirms the results reported in Table 1-1 and in Appendix 4. 
For the purpose of the IV analysis, we need a suitable instrument which is a) relevant, i.e. is 
driving the urban structure of a country and b) exogenous, i.e. not in any way associated with 
the country’s economic growth performance other than through its impact on the urban 
structure. As city formation is strongly path dependent, i.e. cities persist and often thrive in 
the places where they were originally founded (Bleakley & Lin, 2012), the drivers of city 
formation in the past may provide suitable instruments, capable of predicting a country’s urban 
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structure today. Geographical factors have been crucial for the establishment of cities. Cities 
have been traditionally set up in areas with suitable terrain and easy access to water and fertile 
land. Proximity to fertile land as a means to secure a regular food supply for the city’s 
population has been the paramount criterion for the establishment of cities (Motamed, Florax, 
& Masters, 2014). A large supply of fertile land has contributed to the development of larger 
cities and thus more concentrated urban structures. Limited access to fertile, arable land, by 
contrast, may have encouraged the formation of smaller cities and therefore provided the 
foundation for the development of a more balanced urban structure today. Ruggedness also 
affects the suitability of the land to build cities and in particular to trade between places (Nunn 
& Puga, 2012). The prevalence of rugged terrains is therefore likely to affect the formation of 
viable systems of cities. We therefore consider these two geographical properties to determine 
the suitability of countries to develop large cities and more or less balanced systems of cities. 
Concerning the exogeneity of these indicators, it is conceivable that both the soil quality and 
the ruggedness of a country may impact a country’s overall level of economic development 
and through this today’s economic growth performance. A look at our dataset, however, does 
not reveal any clear correlations. The simple correlation between the share of fertile land in a 
country and GDPpc growth is -0.03. That between ruggedness and economic growth: -0.02. 
These very low correlations are an indication that while these factors may have determined 
the formation of cities and systems of cities in the past, their role in providing urban prosperity 
today is almost non-existent. The below examples further confirms this notion. Some countries 
with large percentage of fertile land, such as Benin or the Philippines, are poor, whilst others 
with similar access to fertile land are highly developed (e.g. France, Germany). Similarly, 
some countries with high levels of ruggedness are highly developed (e.g. Switzerland, 
Greece), while others are at the bottom of the pyramid (e.g. Nepal, Rwanda).  
For the sake of simplicity, we only include the main term of the HHIs in the IV regression. 
We estimate the model using a pooled 2SLS estimator with robust standard errors, as our 
instruments are time-invariant and we can therefore not run the regressions in a panel setting. 
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All control variables remain the same as in the main regression. Furthermore, we add regional 
dummies in order to account for some of the heterogeneity between the regions. Table 1-2 
displays the second stage results. Our instruments work well with the first stage F-statistics 
passing comfortably the rule of thumb threshold for strong instruments proposed by Staiger 
and Stock (1997) and also exceeding the Hausman, Stock and Yogo (2005) threshold values.11 
The first step regressions are included in Appendix 5. 
The coefficients of the IV analysis confirm our main results from Table 1-1 and Appendix 4. 
All HHI indicators are insignificant in the world and developing countries samples, while 
HHIs are positive and significant in the developed countries sample (Table 1-2). Thus, the 
positive impact of urban concentration on economic growth is confirmed for developed 
countries.
                                                     
11 Note that in order to pass the standard test for the relevance of the instruments; we use ruggedness as 
an instrument for the world and the developing countries sample. For the developed countries sub-
sample, we rely on both soil quality and ruggedness. 
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Table 1-2: IV-estimates – Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth, 1985 – 2010 
  World Sample  Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
             
HHI50  0.113    0.379**    0.0781   
  (0.236)    (0.174)    (0.378)   
HHI100   0.119    0.381**    0.134  
   (0.245)    (0.171)    (0.383)  
HHIrank    0.237    0.535**    0.207 
    (0.424)    (0.269)    (0.780) 
Initial GDPpc   -0.0769*** -0.0852*** -0.0868***  -0.142*** -0.156*** -0.0974**  -0.107*** -0.118*** -0.122*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0275) (0.0249)  (0.0468) (0.0487) (0.0410)  (0.0351) (0.0339) (0.0367) 
Private investment  0.237 0.402*** 0.388**  -0.0268 -0.133 -0.206  0.207 0.388** 0.363 
 (0.159) (0.154) (0.167)  (0.383) (0.382) (0.393)  (0.191) (0.182) (0.261) 
Government consumption  -0.690*** -0.590** -0.554**  -0.894* -1.087** -0.888*  -0.563* -0.447 -0.415 
 (0.252) (0.267) (0.225)  (0.472) (0.491) (0.467)  (0.297) (0.316) (0.276) 
State history  -0.0365 0.000810 0.0174  0.00832 0.0572 -0.0581  0.0379 0.0604 0.121 
  (0.0635) (0.0751) (0.0697)  (0.0970) (0.0958) (0.101)  (0.0796) (0.124) (0.0849) 
LN (Population)   0.0135 0.0282 0.0151  -0.0185 0.00357 -0.0200  0.0211 0.0443 0.0277 
  (0.0285) (0.0389) (0.0144)  (0.0201) (0.0245) (0.0170)  (0.0475) (0.0609) (0.0180) 
LN (Land area)  0.00195 0.00342 0.00554  0.0213** 0.0146* 0.0166*  -0.00803 -0.00538 -0.00658 
  (0.00998) (0.0100) (0.0140)  (0.00846) (0.00874) (0.00943)  (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0216) 
Urbanization rate  0.00190 0.00199 0.00157*  0.00275** 0.00304** 0.00205  0.00313 0.00345 0.00290** 
 (0.00133) (0.00184) (0.000874)  (0.00132) (0.00138) (0.00149)  (0.00193) (0.00240) (0.00124) 
             
Constant  0.609*** 0.518** 0.537**  1.106** 1.290** 0.916**  0.888*** 0.746* 0.835* 
  (0.175) (0.205) (0.251)  (0.488) (0.505) (0.468)  (0.312) (0.409) (0.432) 
             
Region fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
             
First stage F-stat  24.47 18.73 18.81  20.49 29.70 19.47  17.39 10.21 13.45 
             
Observations  340 352 364  130 130 136  210 222 228 
R-squared  0.302 0.315 0.298  0.213 0.268 0.188  0.365 0.375 0.373 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated two closely related topics: firstly, the evolution of urban 
concentration in 68 countries from 1985 to 2010, employing a set of more nuanced indicators 
than used in the literature thus far. Secondly, the extent to which the degree of urban 
concentration affected national economic growth in the same period. In order to overcome the 
data limitations of past empirical literature on the topic, a new city population dataset was 
built that allows constructing a set of Herfindahl-Hirschman-Indices. We, furthermore, 
specifically analysed differences between developed and developing countries and are able to 
account for potential endogeneity through an IV design in our regressions. 
The results indicate that contrary to the general perception of heightened urban concentration, 
levels of urban concentration have decreased on average or remained stable around the world, 
depending on the indicator employed. These averages, however, conceal strong changes and 
differences at the country level. Many countries have experienced significant shifts in their 
urban structure: increased concentration can be found in many developed countries as well as 
in Asia and some countries of Africa. Levels of concentration have decreased in most parts of 
Latin America. In general, developing countries still remain much more concentrated than 
developed countries. 
The results of our analysis on the relationship between urban concentration and economic 
growth suggest that there is no uniform relationship between urban concentration and 
economic growth. Urban concentration is beneficial for economic growth in high-income 
countries, but this effect does not hold for developing countries. This contrasts with previous 
studies that find a particularly important effect for low levels of economic development.  
What are the implications of our results for policy makers who face the question of whether 
to promote further agglomeration or to promote development outside of the primary urban 
areas? As with most questions, there is no easy answer. On the one hand, the results show that, 
despite decreasing levels of urban concentration in many developing countries, urban 
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concentration still remains high and many countries saw their levels increase. Urban 
concentration may, thus, not be self-correcting with economic development as frequently 
hypothesized. Furthermore, the analysis dispel the prevailing NEG notion that a more 
concentrated urban structure is best for economic growth, in particular at low levels of 
economic development. While no uniform relationship can be deducted, the results show that 
most countries in the developing world are likely to suffer more from congestion generated 
through increased concentration than benefit from it. Hence, promoting development outside 
of primary urban areas would be beneficial from an economic point of view. 
On the other hand, developed countries with the right urban infrastructure in place and an 
economy with industries strongly benefiting from agglomeration economies highlight that 
countries can, in fact, benefit from urban concentration. This implies that sweeping policy 
recommendations are ill-advised and that more specific, country-based research may be the 
way forward in order to set up policies that may foster and make best use of the economic 
potential of cities and urban agglomeration on a case by case basis. 
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Appendix 1 – City population dataset 
Country HHI50 HHI100 HHIrank 
Number of cities 
above 10K 
Restrictions on 
inclusion in regressions 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes 179 - 180  
Australia Yes Yes Yes 102  
Austria Yes Yes Yes 63 - 76  
Azerbaijan Yes Yes Yes 31 - 35  
Bangladesh Yes Yes Yes 123 - 247  
Belgium Yes Yes - 18 - 18  
Benin Yes Yes Yes 21 - 60  
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes 19 - 44  
Brazil - - Yes 53 - 56  
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes 48 - 48  
Cambodia Yes Yes Yes 31 - 33 1995 – 2010 
Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes 68  
Chile Yes Yes Yes 59 - 61  
China Yes Yes Yes 1649 - 1686  
Colombia Yes Yes Yes 125 - 153  
Cote d`Ivoire Yes Yes Yes 43 - 80 1985 – 2000 
Denmark Yes Yes Yes 43 - 58  
Dominican Republic Yes Yes Yes 24 - 71  
Ecuador Yes Yes Yes 40 - 78  
Egypt Yes Yes Yes 69 - 179  
Ethiopia Yes Yes Yes 138  
Finland Yes Yes Yes 52 - 54  
France Yes Yes Yes 393 - 475  
Germany Yes Yes Yes 226 - 226 1990 – 2010 
Ghana Yes Yes Yes 31 - 71  
Greece Yes Yes Yes 58 - 66  
Honduras Yes Yes Yes 17 - 38  
Hungary Yes Yes Yes 69 - 69  
India Yes Yes Yes 1996 - 2332  
Ireland Yes Yes Yes 25 - 44  
Italy - - Yes 31 - 31  
Jordan Yes Yes Yes 40 - 41 1990 – 2010 
Kazakhstan Yes Yes Yes 74 - 87  
Kyrgyzstan Yes Yes Yes 23 - 27  
Mali Yes Yes Yes 17 - 46  
Malaysia Yes Yes Yes 113 1990 - 2010 
Mexico - Yes Yes 92 - 93  
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes 54  
Mongolia Yes Yes - 19 - 21  
Morocco Yes Yes Yes 75 - 100  
Mozambique Yes Yes Yes 60 - 82 1995 – 2010 
76 
 
Country HHI50 HHI100 HHIrank 
Number of cities 
above 10K 
Restrictions on 
inclusion in regressions 
Nepal Yes Yes Yes 21 - 58  
Niger Yes Yes Yes 8 - 32  
Nigeria - - Yes 37 - 42  
Norway Yes Yes Yes 49 - 49  
Pakistan Yes Yes Yes 135 - 138 1985 – 2000 
Panama Yes Yes Yes 13 - 25  
Paraguay Yes Yes Yes 10 - 19  
Peru Yes Yes Yes 54 - 117  
Philippines Yes Yes Yes 130 - 265  
Poland Yes Yes Yes 226 - 234  
Portugal Yes Yes Yes 51 - 54  
Romania Yes Yes Yes 129 - 137  
Russia Yes Yes Yes 665 - 761  
Senegal Yes Yes Yes 19 - 52  
Slovak Republic Yes Yes Yes 43 - 43  
Spain Yes Yes Yes 59 - 59  
Sweden Yes Yes Yes 117 - 117  
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes 50 - 50  
Tajikistan Yes Yes Yes 27 - 41  
Turkey Yes Yes Yes 135 - 279  
Uganda Yes Yes Yes 11 - 86  
United Kingdom - - Yes 28 - 28  
Ukraine Yes Yes Yes 210 - 216  
Uruguay Yes Yes Yes 26 - 31  
United States Yes Yes Yes 928 - 929  
Vietnam Yes Yes Yes 39 - 145  
Zambia Yes Yes Yes 24 - 48  
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Appendix 2 – Data sources for control variables 
Variable Source 
GDPpc Natural logarithm of  
“Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices “/ “Population” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Private 
Investment 
Five-year averages of “Share of gross capital formation at current PPPs”  
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Government 
Consumption 
Five-year averages of “Share of government consumption at current PPPs” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Land Area Natural logarithm of “Land area (sq. km)” 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Population Natural logarithm of “Population”  
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Urbanization 
rate 
% of population living in urban areas 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
State Antiquity Variable “statehistn50v3” 
State Antiquity Index (Statehist) database 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/louis_putterman/antiquity%20index.htm 
Ruggedness Variable “rugged_slope” 
Nathan Nunn & Diego Puga dataset  
http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
Soil % of fertile soil 
Nathan Nunn & Diego Puga dataset  
http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
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Appendix 3 – Descriptive statistics 
  Standard Deviation    
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Maximum Minimum Obs. 
HHI50 .2686185 .1920574 .1893 .037806 .8484542 .0142202 345 
HHI100 .3609915 .2616493 .2573724 .055666 1 .0046886 357 
HHrank .204461 .1014418 .1007964 .0134064 .4592862 .0533313 369 
Growth .086799 .1705554 .0810117 .1517875 .6918678 -1.052486 369 
Ln(GDPpc) 8.64969 1.29269 1.27156 .2332912 10.98374 5.7789 369 
Private investment .1949938 .0734472 .0602916 .0441101 .4988933 .0304211 369 
Government 
consumption 
.1865482 .0809189 .0643119 .053734 .6061998 .056944 369 
State history .7349033 .1646811 - - .9995915 .3611112 369 
LN (Population) 2.975971 1.348927 1.330788 .1456344 7.158376 .6693815 369 
LN (Land area) 12.87616 1.395671 - - 16.61218 10.58479 369 
Urbanization rate 55.08527 22.28428 22.0232 3.5355 93.319 6.091 369 
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Appendix 4 – Fixed effects results  
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth in five-year intervals – 1985 - 2010 
 World Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
HHI50 0.00529   4.426***   -0.220   
 (0.533)   (1.249)   (0.509)   
HHI50 squared -0.213   -5.865***   0.00755   
 (0.372)   (1.993)   (0.388)   
HHI100  0.222   2.238**   0.175  
  (0.330)   (0.953)   (0.307)  
HHI100 squared  -0.0964   -1.905   -0.0954  
  (0.258)   (1.386)   (0.240)  
HHIrank   0.153   6.261*   0.139 
   (1.760)   (3.046)   (2.064) 
HHIrank squared   -1.084   -14.83**   -0.468 
   (3.052)   (6.658)   (3.766) 
Initial GDPpc  -0.609*** -0.526*** -0.514*** -0.754*** -0.658*** -0.742*** -0.625*** -0.536*** -0.522*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0883) (0.0875) (0.0766) (0.125) (0.0893) (0.0732) (0.0930) (0.0947) 
Private investment 0.577** 0.720*** 0.661** 0.450** 0.322 0.529*** 0.403 0.575** 0.460 
(0.238) (0.247) (0.257) (0.192) (0.202) (0.179) (0.254) (0.279) (0.298) 
Government consumption -0.511* -0.544** -0.593** -1.245*** -1.330*** -1.234*** -0.152 -0.225 -0.281 
(0.261) (0.270) (0.265) (0.175) (0.250) (0.233) (0.255) (0.253) (0.234) 
LN (Population)  -0.295** -0.281** -0.271* -0.168 -0.219 -0.205 -0.891*** -0.907*** -0.917*** 
 (0.138) (0.139) (0.147) (0.174) (0.165) (0.196) (0.243) (0.249) (0.261) 
Urbanization rate -0.00101 0.00372 0.00400 -0.00852** -0.00667* -0.00642** -0.00769 -0.00247 -0.00302 
 (0.00436) (0.00522) (0.00513) (0.00387) (0.00363) (0.00310) (0.00536) (0.00597) (0.00615) 
Constant 6.351*** 5.243*** 5.251*** 8.361*** 7.538*** 8.174*** 8.227*** 7.335*** 7.557*** 
 (0.853) (1.019) (1.058) (0.720) (1.022) (0.777) (1.038) (1.205) (1.334) 
          
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 352 364 370 130 130 136 222 234 234 
R-squared 0.595 0.544 0.539 0.747 0.719 0.719 0.691 0.635 0.635 
Number of countries 64 66 67 23 23 24 41 43 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5 – First-stage IV regression results 
 World Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES HHI50 HHI100 HHIrank HHI50 HHI100 HHIrank HHI50 HHI100 HHIrank 
          
Ruggedness -0.0126*** -0.0122*** -0.00712*** -0.0174*** -0.0161*** -0.00930*** -0.0141*** -0.0140*** -0.00698*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00281) (0.00164) (0.00387) (0.00367) (0.00233) (0.00338) (0.00437) (0.00190) 
Soil    0.00333*** 0.00344*** 0.00202***    
    (0.000598) (0.000492) (0.000368)    
Initial GDPpc  0.0504*** 0.0547** 0.0141 0.110*** 0.146*** 0.0378 0.00232 -0.00784 0.0140 
 (0.0176) (0.0218) (0.0115) (0.0359) (0.0339) (0.0246) (0.0321) (0.0385) (0.0171) 
Private investment -0.0508 -0.0803 -0.117* 0.0396 0.327 0.0745 -0.0797 -0.121 -0.254*** 
(0.153) (0.164) (0.0694) (0.246) (0.226) (0.159) (0.188) (0.202) (0.0775) 
Government consumption -0.00749 0.205 -0.145** -0.569** -0.0359 -0.302* 0.134 0.348 -0.101 
(0.128) (0.163) (0.0658) (0.268) (0.223) (0.156) (0.175) (0.228) (0.0803) 
State History 0.222*** 0.292*** 0.146*** 0.278*** 0.142** 0.280*** 0.220** 0.444*** 0.0803* 
 (0.0538) (0.0646) (0.0307) (0.0714) (0.0625) (0.0401) (0.0913) (0.124) (0.0465) 
LN (Population)  -0.124*** -0.161*** -0.0260*** -0.167*** -0.225*** -0.0746*** -0.118*** -0.152*** -0.0136* 
(0.0111) (0.0119) (0.00522) (0.0200) (0.0163) (0.0104) (0.0146) (0.0157) (0.00714) 
LN (Land area) -0.00101 2.85e-06 -0.0229*** 0.0358*** 0.0564*** 0.0210** -0.00466 -0.0150 -0.0253*** 
 (0.00965) (0.0116) (0.00519) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.00884) (0.0142) (0.0179) (0.00744) 
Urbanization rate -0.00459*** -0.00682*** -0.000377 -0.00658*** -0.00715*** -0.00373*** -0.00270* -0.00435** 0.000194 
(0.000851) (0.00105) (0.000528) (0.00107) (0.00104) (0.000960) (0.00143) (0.00175) (0.000723) 
          
Constant 0.371*** 0.578*** 0.473*** -0.689** -1.244*** -0.232 0.669*** 1.001*** 0.510*** 
 (0.126) (0.158) (0.0806) (0.313) (0.277) (0.211) (0.240) (0.280) (0.127) 
          
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 340 352 364 130 130 136 210 222 228 
R-squared 0.565 0.621 0.384 0.658 0.779 0.522 0.522 0.576 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.1 Introduction 
The role of cities has been at the forefront of development policy debates over the past two 
decades. The rapid urbanization process in many developing countries paired with the ever 
increasing size of cities are simultaneously hailed as key drivers of productivity and growth, 
as well as big challenges for the developing and emerging worlds. The prominence of the topic 
is not a surprise given the sheer magnitude and speed of the changes. Recent statistics (United 
Nations, 2014) illustrate well these developments. While there were only 3 cities with more 
than 10 million inhabitants in 1960, there are 29 today. Similarly, the number of cities with 5 
to 10 million inhabitants increased from 9 to 44. Hence, not only do more people live in cities, 
they also live on average in far larger cities than 50 years ago.  
This is particularly true for the developing world, where the most dramatic changes have 
occurred in the past decades. Massive mega-cities have sprung up virtually anywhere, 
including countries as diverse as Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and Bangladesh, driving up average city sizes everywhere in the developing world. 
Once the largest cities were found in high-income countries; today it is the developing world 
that accounts for the majority of the global urbanization and for most mega cities (McCann & 
Acs, 2011; United Nations, 2014).  
While many researchers and policy makers have voiced concerns about these trends and their 
social (i.e. increased urban congestion), environmental (i.e. increased pollution) and economic 
(i.e. rising interpersonal and interspatial inequality) consequences, the 2009 World 
Development Report summarizes well an often dominant view in the economic development 
policy sphere: “No country has grown to middle-income without industrializing and 
urbanizing. None has grown to high-income without vibrant cities. The rush to cities in 
developing countries seems chaotic, but it is necessary. It seems unprecedented, but it has 
happened before” (World Bank, 2009, p. 24). Consequently, the rapid urbanization in the 
developing world, with its rising average city size and sprawling megacities, is seen as 
inevitable and beneficial from an economic perspective.  
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A wealth of theoretical and empirical literature lends support to this notion. The New 
Economic Geography School (NEG) emphasises the benefits of agglomeration and growing 
cities for economic growth in particular at low levels of economic development (Fujita & 
Thisse, 2003; Henderson, 2003; P. Martin & Ottaviano, 2001). Similarly, urban economists 
stress the static and dynamic productivity gains from increased city size (Duranton, 2015; 
Duranton & Puga, 2004; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004).  
However, some caveats in the existing literature raise questions about the universal 
applicability of the benefits of increases in average city size. First, most empirical research 
focuses, with few exceptions, on developed countries, and on the US and the UK in particular. 
Recent literature (Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath, 2016; Jedwab & Vollrath, 2015) suggests, 
however, that the drivers of urbanization differ significantly between developed and 
developing countries. Such differences in turn may impact on the expected productivity gains 
from increases in average city size. Furthermore, the sheer size of many cities in developing 
countries, differences in the industrial structure, lower institutional capacity, and limited 
infrastructure can reduce the benefits developing countries can extract from rapid increases in 
average city size. More empirical evidence from developing countries is therefore sorely 
needed. 
Second, the analytical focus of the empirical literature leaves room for interpretation with 
regards to the impact of recent urbanization trends on aggregate economic growth. Studies in 
urban economics have been mainly concerned with comparisons of productivity levels and 
changes involving cities of different sizes (Duranton & Puga, 2004; Rosenthal & Strange, 
2004), but do not address the question at an aggregate level. Some NEG research delves into 
the link between levels of urban concentration and aggregate growth (Brülhart & Sbergami, 
2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014; Henderson, 2003). However, while frequently 
cited in the literature as driving growth in countries with large cities, the indicators used are 
only indirectly linked with city size and do not reflect the size aspect of current urbanization 
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trends. It is therefore pertinent to specifically look at the relationship between an aggregate 
measure of city size, i.e. average city size, and national economic growth.  
In this paper, we address these two gaps by empirically examining the question of whether the 
average size of a country’s cities affects economic growth at the national level. The analysis 
covers average city size in 114 countries for the period between 1960 and 2010, specifically 
distinguishing between industrialized and developing countries. Different estimation 
techniques – including system generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator and an 
instrumental variable design (IV) – are used in order to address potential endogeneity concerns 
arising from the intimate relationship between urbanization and economic development. Our 
results suggest that there is indeed a positive effect of average city size on economic growth, 
however only for developed countries. We do not find evidence that the presence of large 
cities is growth inducing in developing countries – to the contrary, the IV results suggest a 
negative impact of city size on growth at the national level.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the 
theoretical and empirical literature that explores the link between city size and economic 
growth. The third section introduces the methodology, indicators used, and presents the 
dataset. The results and a test of their robustness by means of an IV approach are included in 
the fourth section, and section five discusses them in the context of the existing literature. The 
final part concludes and proposes areas for further research. 
2.2 Average city size and economic growth: from theory to empirical 
evidence 
The question of whether a country’s cities influence economic growth has been addressed by 
several streams of literature, most prominently in recent years by the New Economic 
Geography School (NEG) and urban economics. The underlying assumption is that cities, in 
particular larger ones, create agglomeration economies and thereby make people more 
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productive. This in turn increases the level of economic development at any given level of 
inputs (Duranton, 2008).  
The NEG School emphasizes the economic efficiency-related benefits of agglomeration. In 
the traditional NEG framework, centripetal forces, such as localized knowledge spill-overs, 
pooled labour markets and forward and backward linkages, make companies and people more 
productive if they concentrate in one area. Centrifugal forces, such as immobile factors, 
increasing rents and congestion in the prime area, however, incentivize people and firms to 
locate elsewhere. The relative strength of these two forces shapes the economy’s spatial 
structure and hence if people concentrate in one large city or, by contrast, spread out to smaller 
ones (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999). Several authors combine this basic framework 
with an endogenous growth model to analyse the effect of agglomeration on economic growth 
and vice versa. While the approaches vary in the specific channels used as agglomeration and 
dispersion forces, they generally conclude that more agglomeration and thus larger cities are 
beneficial for economic growth (Fujita & Thisse, 2003; P. Martin & Ottaviano, 2001).  
A number of empirical studies confirm this relationship. Henderson (2003), Bertinelli and 
Strobl (2007), Brülhart and Sbergami (2009), and Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2014) use 
urban primacy, the percentage of the urban population which lives in the largest city, as a 
measure of agglomeration and test its influence on national economic growth. They all find 
that primacy has a positive effect on economic growth, but that the positive effect decreases 
as the level of economic development rises. Brülhart and Sbergami (2009) also use the 
percentage of the urban population living in cities above 750,000 inhabitants as an alternative 
measure of urban concentration and come to the same conclusions. Evidence emerging from 
the theoretical and empirical NEG literature thus suggests that a more concentrated urban 
structure with larger cities spurs economic growth, in particular at low levels of economic 
development. Consequently, recent urbanization trends in the developing world are considered 
beneficial for economic development in these countries. 
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The urban economics literature also emphasizes productivity gains stemming from increases 
in city size but gives no unambiguous answer regarding the effect of average city size on 
national economic performance. Duranton and Puga (2004) describe a number of channels – 
similar to the NEG drivers of growth – which make people in cities more productive: the 
sharing and the matching of infrastructure, inputs, suppliers and labour as well as learning 
through the generation, diffusion, and accumulation of knowledge. Urban economics also 
underlines the importance of a dynamic effect of cities on worker’s productivity through 
learning, which increases over time (Duranton, 2008). The dominant view is that 
agglomeration economies increase with city size.  
This sort of productivity gains have been often documented at the city level. Rosenthal and 
Strange (2004), for example, indicate that a doubling of city size leads to a productivity 
increase of 3 – 8%. Melo, Graham, and Noland (2009) confirm this positive relationship in 
their meta-analysis of 34 studies, despite uncovering important regional differences. In the 
same vein, Duranton (2015) reviews the studies examining developing countries and 
concludes that productivity increases are even higher in developing countries than in the 
industrialized world. Differences in terms of productivity gains for different sectors are also 
in evidence in this type of research, with high-tech sectors and service industries exhibiting 
the strongest agglomeration economies (Graham, 2009; Henderson, 2010).  
A rise in city size also leads, however, to negative externalities such as congestion, higher 
rents and commuting time which undermine the benefits of agglomeration (Duranton & Puga, 
2004). People’s productivity within a city, therefore, does not rise ad infinitum with increases 
in city size. It follows an inverted U-shape function: productivity increases up to a certain 
threshold of city population, after which congestion costs outweigh the benefits from 
agglomeration and productivity starts to decrease. Beyond the said threshold, workers and 
firms would be better off relocating to a different city. Through this process, a system of cities 
arises within a country which – if adequately functioning – efficiently allocates people to cities 
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and maximises the productivity of a country’s urban population, as well as its national growth 
(Duranton & Puga, 2004; Henderson, 1974).  
In practice, however, this process can be obstructed by a number of factors. Coordination 
failure may prevent migration from the prime to secondary cities, as a single actor – i.e. an 
individual employee or company – cannot internalize the external benefits it creates for others 
by moving (Duranton, 2008; Venables, 2005). Furthermore, the political sway of the primary 
city, openness to trade, and a lack of an adequate intercity transport infrastructure network can 
all hamper the emergence of secondary cities (Ades & Glaeser, 1995; Duranton, 2008; Puga, 
1998). A prime city whose size is beyond optimal can therefore emerge, perhaps in 
combination with small or virtually non-existing secondary cities. Venables (2005) argues that 
this may result in a low economic development trap. The larger-than-optimum city reduces 
the productivity of workers and firms which, in turn, curtails economic growth (Venables, 
2005). Low growth makes the possibility of starting a new city more difficult, often leading 
to an ever-growing expansion of the prime city, even after it has exceeded the optimal size 
threshold.  
Hence, from a theoretical urban economics perspective whether recent dramatic increases in 
city size in the developing world are growth-inducing or detrimental to economic growth 
depends crucially on where on the productivity curve a country’s cities are and on whether a 
functioning system of cities has emerged. Whether this is the case needs to be determined 
empirically.  
As described above, the existing empirical evidence from both NEG and urban economics is 
large and points relatively uniformly to a growth promoting effect of increasing city size. 
However despite the wealth of studies, some important limitations remain. First, most research 
addressing these issues, in particular from the empirical urban economics literature, focuses 
on the developed world. Only a handful of developing countries are covered. This is 
problematic for a number of reasons related to the underlying urbanization process, likely 
differences in the balance between agglomeration economies and diseconomies, as well as the 
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absolute size of the cities in the developing world. With regards to the urbanization process, 
it is frequently assumed that developing countries follow the same path industrialized 
countries did in the past (as described in the World Development Report 2009). There is, 
however, increasing evidence that questions this assumption. Economists traditionally explain 
the urbanization process with a structural shift from an agricultural to a manufacturing-based 
economy in which higher (expected) wages in the urban industrial sectors stimulate migration 
from rural areas to cities (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). Urbanization in today’s 
developed countries is considered to have been strongly tied to industrialization and economic 
growth. In contrast, many developing countries are urbanizing in the presence of low growth 
and without a strong, accompanying industrialization process. Fay and Opal (2000) described 
this situation of “urbanization without growth” and pointed to a wide array of factors driving 
urbanization in developing countries. These included push-factors in the rural countryside 
such as conflict, negative agricultural shocks, and rural poverty as well as pull-factors from 
cities, such as better urban living conditions through improved access to public services and 
other urban amenities. Glaeser (2014) also suggested that cities have grown larger in the 
developing world due to their ability to import food. In developed countries in contrast, cities 
are historically deemed to have increased in population as the agricultural hinterland became 
more productive and could feed a larger non-food producing urban population. Furthermore, 
Jedwab and co-authors (Gollin et al., 2016; Jedwab & Vollrath, 2015) recently reported that 
urbanization in developing countries is strongly linked to natural resource exports as opposed 
to industrialization. As a consequence, the share of urban dwellers working in the non-tradable 
service sector is much higher than in developed countries, where urban population grew as 
employment in manufacturing and in the tradable service sectors. This has important 
implications for the magnitude of agglomeration economies that a city generates. As Gollin et 
al. (2016) have stressed, cities growing as a consequence of the expansion of resource exports 
do not create the same push in productivity as industrial cities.  
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Related to the previous point are differences in urban infrastructure endowments and in the 
industry composition of the cities in developing countries. As pointed out above, the balance 
between agglomeration economies and diseconomies determines the benefits from increasing 
city size. The fast growth of cities in the developing world, together with a lack of public 
resources for infrastructure investments, and economies based on low technology sectors 
imply that cities in the developing world face decreasing productivity levels at a lower city 
size than cities in the developed world. Limited institutional capacity to deal with the 
challenges aggravates this situation (Glaeser, 2014). 
Finally, cities in the developing world are frequently much larger than their counterparts in 
industrialized countries. Empirical evidence stemming from what are smaller cities in the 
developed world is unlikely to be a good explanans for the situation in developing countries, 
in particular bearing in mind the U-shaped productivity function of cities. All these aspects − 
urbanization path, the balance between agglomeration economies and diseconomies as well 
as overall city size − strongly call for caution when applying evidence generated on the basis 
of analysis conducted in developed countries to the developing world. Empirical evidence, 
which focuses on differences between developed and developing countries, is, in this respect, 
still much needed. 
The second limitation relates to the analytical focus of the existing empirical literature. On the 
one hand, empirical studies with an urban economics lens take a city perspective, i.e. they 
provide an answer to the question if people in large cities are more productive than in small 
cities. They do, however, not tackle the question at the national level. Following the system 
of cities approach it is not necessarily evident that because one city is more productive than 
another implies an overall productivity maximising effect at the country level if all resources 
are pooled in the larger city. For example, increasing the population in ‘city one’ through 
migration from ‘city two’ may make ‘city one’ more productive, but the reduction in size of 
‘city two’ may result in a larger decrease in productivity there. The result will then be sub-
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optimal at the national level. As most countries include more than one city, looking purely at 
this question from a city-level perspective may not be very revealing.  
On the other hand, a relatively large number of NEG studies address the issue at the national 
level. However, the focus of this literature is not the actual size of a country’s cities, but how 
concentrated the urban structure is. While these studies are frequently cited as evidence to 
support the notion of fostering agglomeration within developing countries, they do not say 
much about the size-related effect of cities. Most studies use urban primacy, which − if at all 
− is negatively correlated with the size of a country’s cities (e.g. there is a very low primacy 
in India despite its cities being large, but a very high primacy in most island states which have 
very small cities). The results therefore are more likely to reflect the benefits of being able to 
focus public spending in one place as a result of a concentrated urban population as opposed 
to agglomeration economies arising through city size.   
We aim to address these two limitations by studying the effect of increased average city size 
on economic growth at an aggregate level. In other words we ask the question of whether 
countries grow faster if the urban population lives on average in larger cities? We furthermore 
specifically focus on possible differences in this respect between developed and developing 
countries. 
2.3 Model and data 
In order to test these two issues, we follow the dominant approach of the empirical literature 
on urban concentration and national economic growth (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-
Quintana & Royuela, 2014; Henderson, 2003). We build a simple GDP per capita growth 
equation based on the extended Solow growth model (Durlauf, Johnson, & Temple, 2005). A 
country’s growth rate in 5 year-periods is estimated as a function of GDP per capita at the 
beginning of the period and a set control variables which reflect both variables related to the 
accumulation of factors, as well as a set of other characteristics influencing national growth 
and the size of a country’s cities. Rather than a measure for the level of urban concentration, 
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as has frequently been the case in the above-mentioned literature, we include an indicator 
depicting the average size of a country’s cities. If living in larger cities boosts people’s 
productivity, economic growth should be higher while holding the other inputs constant. The 
model takes the following form: 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 = 𝛼+𝛽 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛾 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 + 𝛿 𝑿𝑖𝑝 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝 
Where 
p denotes five-year intervals; 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝  is the GDP per capita growth rate of country i in period p; 
citysizeip  is an aggregate indicator for the average size of cities in country i; 
GDPpcip represents the natural logarithm of GDP per capita of country i at the beginning 
of period p; 
Xip  depicts a set of control variables for country i, measured either at the beginning or as 
an average of period p; 
𝜇𝑝  represents time fixed effects; and 
εip  is the error term. 
 
 
The variable of interest is citysizeip. Testing if the size of a country’s cities has an impact on 
national economic performance requires an aggregate measure of city size at the country level. 
For this purpose, we calculate the population-weighted average city size as the sum of the 
absolute number of each city’s population multiplied by its share of the urban population. This 
indicator reflects the average agglomeration (dis-)economies which a typical urban dweller 
experiences. 
The source of data is the 2014 revision of the World Urbanization Prospects [WUPS] (United 
Nations, 2014). WUPS 2014 includes, among other data, information about (i) the population 
of every city above 300,000 inhabitants, (ii) the share of the urban population living in cities 
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below 300,000 and (iii) the total urban population. It covers a total of 199 countries from 1960 
to 2010.12
 
 
We multiply the exact population size of each city above 300K with its share of the urban 
population. As there is no information available about the exact size of cities below 300K, we 
use a proxy for the average city size of cities below 300K and multiply it by the share of the 
urban population living in cities below 300K.13 These fractions are subsequently added in 
order to obtain the population weighted average city size of a country.  
How the population-weighted average city size indicator works is reflected in the following 
examples. Let us take country A which has two cities, each with 1M inhabitants. In this case, 
the population weighted average city size is: 1M*50% + 1M*50% = 1M (as would be the 
simple average). Country B, by contrast, has one city of 1.9M inhabitants and a second city of 
0.1M inhabitants. The resulting population weighted average city size is: 1.9M*95% + 
0.1M*5% = 1.81. In contrast to the simple average which as in country A would be 1M, this 
number reflects the fact that the vast majority of people live in the larger city of 1.9M 
inhabitants and therefore experience the agglomeration economies and diseconomies of a city 
of such size. Finally, country C has one city of 1.15M inhabitants and a second city of 0.2M 
inhabitants. The population weighted average city size is with roughly 1M similar to that of 
                                                     
12 One challenge with data on cities and urbanization is that the definition of what constitutes a city 
varies across countries. While some countries count villages over 1,000 inhabitants as cities, others only 
include cities starting from 10,000 inhabitants. Similarly, some consider the administrative city, while 
others have measures that are closer to the agglomeration. This makes comparisons between countries 
challenging. While WUPS 2014 relies on the local definitions, it aims to smooth out these issues as far 
as possible by correcting for agglomeration size and standardizing urban definitions. This system is not 
without problems, but despite these caveats, WUPS remains the best available dataset for the purpose 
of our analysis. 
13 In order to obtain a reasonable proxy for the cities below 300K inhabitants, we use a 
complementary dataset based on census data sourced from citypopulation.de, which includes 
population numbers for each city (including those below the 300K threshold) in a country during 
the period between 1985 and 2010. The correlation between the proxy based on the WUPS data 
and the more finely-tuned average from the second dataset is 0.94. This is a clear indication that 
the proxy works well. We resort to the WUPS dataset rather than the citypopulation.de dataset 
because of its longer time horizon and larger country coverage. 
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country A. This takes into account that, in spite of the differences between the two countries, 
the majority of the urban population lives in a city of a similar size.  
The population-weighted average city size indicator also differs considerably from primacy, 
the traditional measure used by the literature concerned with urban concentration. A country 
in which city 1 has a population of 0.3M and a city 2 has a population of 0.5M has the same 
primacy level (62.5%) as a country with one city of 3M and another city of 5M inhabitants. 
This difference in absolute size is, however, reflected in our average city size measure. 
Figure 2-1: Evolution of the median of average city size 1960 – 2010 (in 1000s)  
 
Figure 2-1 shows the evolution of the average city size as the median for the countries included 
in our regressions. The numbers are consistent with the urbanization trends addressed in the 
introduction of this paper. Overall city size increased from a median of approximately 280,000 
in 1960 to 800,000 in 2010, signalling almost a tripling of average city size. Figure 2-1 also 
illustrates the diverging trends between the industrialized and the developing world. Average 
city size in developing countries increased from 220,000 to 845,000 during the 50 year period 
considered, surpassing average city size in high-income countries around the year 1990. In the 
same period average city size in developed countries only increased from 500,000 to 650,000.  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World sample High Income Countries Developing Countries
95 
 
The control variables are those typically employed in cross-country growth regressions: initial 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) to control initial levels of wealth and for conditional convergence, 
i.e. countries are expected to grow faster if starting from a lower level, holding other factors 
constant (Durlauf et al., 2005); years of schooling as a proxy for human capital, since a more 
educated work force is assumed to be more productive and drive up growth (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1986); and private investment and government consumption as a percentage of GDP, 
due to their contribution to a country’s capital stock – the crucial growth driver in the basic 
neoclassical Solow model.  
Additionally, the model includes a number of controls which may be directly linked to the 
effect of city size on growth. The first of these is openness, which is measured as the sum of 
national exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. A country’s openness is believed to 
influence city size via its effect on the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces 
(Krugman & Elizondo, 1996). Openness is also understood to be directly related to growth 
(Sachs, Warner, Åslund, & Fischer, 1995). Failure to control for openness may therefore result 
in an omitted variable bias. The second is national population. A country’s population is 
expected to be closely linked to its average city size (i.e. India has bigger cities than, say, 
Switzerland). Furthermore, a country’s size and, by extension its market potential, can be also 
envisaged to affect national economic performance (Alesina, Spolaore, & Wacziarg, 2005). 
Controlling for population size also ensures that the results are not driven by a handful of 
specific cases, such as China or India, both of whom have experienced extremely strong 
growth in past decades. The final control relates to a country’s political system. Certain 
political systems such as dictatorships have been shown to increase city size (Ades & Glaeser, 
1995) and may at the same time impact on a country’s growth performance. We, therefore, 
include five-year averages of the widely used ‘polity indicator’ which rates countries on a 
scale from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (consolidated democracy).  
The data for the controls is sourced from the eighth edition of the Penn World Tables with the 
exception of the years of schooling indicator and the measure for the political systems. These 
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come from the Barro and Lee database and the Polity IV project dataset respectively. A more 
detailed description of the indicators and sources as well as descriptive statistics are included 
in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Depending on the specifications, our analysis covers a 
maximum of 114 countries. 
We estimate the model using pooled 2SLS as a baseline as well as country fixed effects and 
system GMM to take advantage of the panel structure of the dataset. All regressions include 
time fixed effects and robust standard errors which are clustered by country in the pooled 
2SLS regression. Average city size is instrumented with its second lag in the pooled 2SLS. 
Furthermore, we employ system GMM to address the issue of reverse causality that inevitably 
arises when studying the relationship between city size, urbanization, and economic 
development, to test if city size is in fact a result of economic growth as opposed to being a 
driver of it. Furthermore, system GMM is appropriate for dynamic panels in which the 
dependent variable is influenced by its lagged values. This is the case for our estimates because 
of the inclusion of the lagged value of GDPpc as an explanatory variable and the assumption 
that growth rates are influenced by GDPpc. System GMM addresses both points by creating 
a system of equations in which the levels of endogenous variables are instrumented with 
lagged differences and the first differences are instrumented with past levels (Roodman, 
2009). We present these results alongside the 2SLS and fixed effects estimates for all our 
regressions. As an additional robustness test to address the issue of endogeneity, we conduct 
an instrumental variable approach in a separate section, which resorts to historical data for the 
construction of the instrument. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Main results 
Table 2-1 displays the results for the 114 countries making the world sample ‒ columns 1, 3 
and 5 for the regressions with the simple term only; columns 2, 4 and 6 contain the squared 
term of average city size in order to account for possible non-linearity.  
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Table 2-1: World sample – Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth, 1960 – 2010  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled 
2SLS 
Pooled 
2SLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
       
Average city size 6.15e-05 0.0237** 0.0122 0.0461** -0.0321* -0.0312 
 (0.00388) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0215) (0.0167) (0.0348) 
Average city size squared  -0.00171***  -0.00221**  0.001000 
  (0.000584)  (0.000946)  (0.00185) 
Initial GDPpc  -0.0360*** -0.0391*** -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.014*** -0.018*** 
 (0.00979) (0.00986) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0509) (0.0404) 
Years of schooling 0.0166*** 0.0172*** 0.00667 0.00568 0.00608 0.00906 
 (0.00365) (0.00373) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0175) (0.0150) 
Private investment 0.511*** 0.512*** 0.797*** 0.786*** 0.784** 0.806*** 
 (0.117) (0.114) (0.141) (0.142) (0.357) (0.311) 
Government consumption 0.122 0.144 0.101 0.0981 0.472 0.473 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.296) (0.338) 
Openness -0.00539 -0.00796 -0.0126 -0.0121 -0.0545* -0.0548** 
 (0.0154) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0284) (0.0268) 
Population 0.0162*** 0.00926 -0.0945** -0.122*** 0.102* 0.0753* 
 (0.00508) (0.00597) (0.0450) (0.0449) (0.0544) (0.0401) 
Political system -0.000979 -0.000850 -0.00160 -0.00182 -0.00254 -0.00340 
 (0.000937) (0.000948) (0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00521) (0.00458) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.260*** 1.759*** 1.828*** -0.239 -0.158 
 (0.0718) (0.0724) (0.338) (0.334) (0.329) (0.273) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 971 971 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058 
R-squared 0.202 0.207 0.270 0.275   
Number of countries   114 114 114 114 
       
Sargans - - - - 25.44 
(0.062) 
32.66 
(0.018) 
AR1 - - - - 2.27 
(0.007) 
-2.69 
(0.007) 
AR2 - - - - 1.06 
(0.290) 
1.07 
(0.285) 
Notes: Robust standard error clustered by country in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
System GMM uses second and third lag 2-step estimator 
The model works well and the controls show the expected signs (Table 2-1). The coefficient 
of GDP per capita at the beginning of the period is negative and strongly significant in all 
estimations, indicating conditional convergence. Private investment also displays, as 
expected, positive and highly significant coefficients across all estimates. Years of schooling 
is significant in the 2SLS model only. This is in line with previous literature: Henderson 
(2003), for instance, points out that education is rarely robust in these types of regression as 
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changes in years of schooling are more likely to have an effect over a longer time horizon than 
in the short-term (Durlauf et al., 2005). Population size is significant, but with different signs 
depending on the estimation technique. Again this is not surprising as in a cross-section 
comparison large countries such as China and India have grown faster than smaller ones. If 
we look at the within changes, however, countries which experienced a strong population 
growth tend to be countries with low-income, in particular in Africa. Many of those countries 
have also experienced low growth in the past decades. 
The results for our variables of interest in the global sample provide mixed evidence. The 
coefficients for average city size – in those regressions including only average city size and 
not its squared term – are insignificant in the pooled 2SLS and fixed effects analyses, but 
negative and significant at the 10% level in the system GMM estimate (Table 2-1, Regressions 
1, 3, and 5). Once we consider the squared term in the regression analysis the picture changes. 
The pooled 2SLS and fixed effects coefficients for average city size are positive and 
significant, while the system GMM results insignificant. The squared terms coefficients are 
negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level in the 2SLS and fixed effects estimates 
respectively (Table 2-1, Regressions 2, 4, and 6). This would indicate a positive connection 
between city size and economic growth, which diminishes as the average size of cities 
increases. Overall, these results send contrasting messages about the link between average city 
size and national economic growth. If anything they may signal, as hinted in the theoretical 
section, widely differing realities about the association between city size and economic growth 
in developed and developing countries. 
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Table 2-2: By income group – Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth, 1960 – 2010   
   High-income Countries  Developing Countries 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES   Pooled 
2SLS 
Pooled 
2SLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
System  
GMM 
System 
GMM 
 Pooled  
2SLS 
Pooled 
2SLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
System  
GMM 
System 
GMM 
                
Average city size   -0.000278 0.0172* 0.0119 0.120*** 0.00785 0.0945***  -0.000215 0.0248 0.00956 0.01000 -0.0355 -0.108 
   (0.00241) (0.00939) (0.0125) (0.0434) (0.0158) (0.0281)  (0.00945) (0.0244) (0.0133) (0.0437) (0.0243) (0.0698) 
Average city size 
squared 
   -0.00112**  -0.00485**  -0.00494***   -0.00440  -6.30e-05  0.00910 
   (0.000523)  (0.00180)  (0.00141)   (0.00348)  (0.00502)  (0.00967) 
Initial GDPpc    -0.115*** -0.109*** -0.267*** -0.299*** -0.038*** -0.050***  -0.0238* -0.0268* -0.224*** -0.224*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 
   (0.0144) (0.0136) (0.0543) (0.0521) (0.0885) (0.0702)  (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0406) (0.0404) (0.0506) (0.0490) 
Years of schooling   0.00657* 0.00628* 0.0118 0.00903 -0.0201 -0.0147  0.0172*** 0.0177*** 0.00296 0.00297 0.00686 0.00829 
   (0.00348) (0.00336) (0.0138) (0.0117) (0.0356) (0.0305)  (0.00437) (0.00455) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0105) (0.0108) 
Private investment   0.574*** 0.556** 0.427* 0.383* 0.225 -0.105  0.340*** 0.344*** 0.831*** 0.831*** -0.143 0.0447 
   (0.221) (0.219) (0.225) (0.206) (0.779) (0.572)  (0.123) (0.123) (0.170) (0.168) (0.468) (0.406) 
Government 
consumption 
  0.238 0.272 -0.0756 -0.0352 0.722 0.749  0.0980 0.106 0.0631 0.0629 0.0996 0.227 
  (0.171) (0.173) (0.355) (0.369) (0.805) (0.814)  (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.119) (0.281) (0.316) 
Openness   0.0309* 0.0270 0.0871* 0.0736 0.107 0.0942  -0.0155* -0.0170* -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.00803 -0.0291 
   (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0477) (0.0469) (0.105) (0.0773)  (0.00916) (0.00923) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0323) (0.0344) 
Population   0.0134* 0.00813 0.0732 -0.0506 0.0313 -0.0423  0.0189*** 0.0145* -0.240*** -0.240*** 0.0610** 0.106*** 
   (0.00696) (0.00765) (0.0873) (0.118) (0.0669) (0.0583)  (0.00647) (0.00808) (0.0823) (0.0826) (0.0279) (0.0374) 
Political system   0.000788 0.00114 0.00193 0.000729 -0.00345 0.00455  -0.00184 -0.00194* -0.00267* -0.00267* -0.00407 -0.00427 
   (0.00177) (0.00170) (0.00209) (0.00210) (0.0109) (0.00579)  (0.00115) (0.00117) (0.00149) (0.00150) (0.00472) (0.00486) 
Constant   0.966*** 0.914*** 2.158*** 2.645*** 0.392 0.581  0.172* 0.190* 1.856*** 1.857*** -0.185 -0.217 
   (0.172) (0.171) (0.645) (0.611) (0.817) (0.724)  (0.0985) (0.105) (0.351) (0.344) (0.279) (0.275) 
                
Time fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effects 
  - - Yes Yes Yes Yes  - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
Observations   317 317 361 361 361 361  654 654 697 697 697 697 
R-squared   0.494 0.499 0.468 0.497    0.180 0.178 0.261 0.261   
Number of 
countries 
    38 38 38 38    76 76 76 76 
                
AR1   - - - - -2.47 
(0.017) 
-2.79 
(0.005) 
 - - - - -2.32 
(0.020) 
-2.36 
(0.017) 
AR2   - - - - -0.64 
(0.524) 
-0.14 
(0.888) 
 - - - - 0.92 
(0.356) 
1.00 
(0.317) 
Sargans   - - - - 30.18 
(0.017) 
28.05 
(0.061) 
 - - - - 19.32 
(0.252) 
20.48 
(0.306) 
Notes: Robust standard error clustered by country in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
System GMM uses second and third lag 2-step estimator
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In order to assess whether this is the case, we divide the sample into high-income and low- 
and middle-income countries, using the World Bank’s classification. Columns 1-6 of Table 2-
2 show the results for 38 high-income and columns 7-12 for 76 low- and middle-income 
(developing) countries. The results differ sharply between the two samples, but provide 
consistent results within the two groups. For high-income countries, there is now strong 
evidence that average city size does indeed drive national economic growth. In all regressions 
where the squared term for average city size is included (Table 2-2, Regressions 2, 4, and 6), 
the coefficient for the main term is positive and significant in all estimates, including the 
system GMM results. The negative and significant coefficient of the squared term in all 
estimates indicates that the positive effect of city size on national growth diminishes as the 
average size of a city grows. The coefficients are similar between the fixed effects and system 
GMM, but lower in the 2SLS estimate (Table 2-2, Regressions 2, 4, and 6).  
In order to understand the magnitude of the effect, we calculate the fitted values of the partial 
association between average city size and economic growth based on the system GMM 
coefficients. Raising average city size from 1M to 1.1M increases the five-year growth rate 
by 0.84%. When average city size increases from 5 to 5.1M, growth rises by 0.45%. Values 
become close to 0 around 7.5M and turn negative at approximately 9.7M. This last value 
should be interpreted with caution, as there are very few observations in our sample with such 
high average city sizes. The evidence, thus, strongly suggests that high-income countries 
indeed grow faster when the population on average lives in larger cities, although the impact 
is relatively modest.  
The contrary is true for developing countries, as shown in columns 7 to 12 of Table 2-2. No 
evidence at all can be found of an impact of average city size on economic growth. Neither 
the main term of average city size nor the squared term is significant in any of the estimations. 
We have also experimented by further dividing the sample into a low- and a middle-income 
group. The results remain insignificant for both groups. It is worth noting that the R-squared 
drops somewhat in the regressions for developing countries compared to the global sample, 
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while it significantly increases for the high-income group. This is reflective of the fact that in 
general developing countries’ growth does not seem to follow the same patterns and rules as 
in developed countries. 
2.4.2 Instrumental variable approach  
A frequent concern in regressions addressing the relationship between city size and economic 
growth is reverse causality. Is city size in fact a mere result of economic growth as opposed 
to a driver of it? In the previous section we partially addressed this issue by including system 
GMM estimations alongside the other estimation techniques. To further test the robustness of 
the results, we employ an additional instrumental variable design. 
The challenge is to find a suitable instrument for city size, i.e. a factor that is correlated to the 
size of a country’s cities but not to national economic growth, in order to isolate the exogenous 
component of city size. We resort to historic data for this purpose and employ a measure of 
the number of years that the current capital city of a country has been the capital since the 1 
A.D.14 Countries where the current capital has been an important place of political (and 
economic) power for a long time are more likely to have developed a more concentrated urban 
structure with a more dominant and larger prime city. Our population weighted average city 
size indicator should thus also be larger in a country where the current capital has been the 
main political centre for longer time periods. This hypothesis is confirmed by a brief 
examination of our dataset. Countries with large average city sizes, such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Peru, Mexico, Russia, or China also have longstanding capital cities. The 
first-stage F-stat supports the relevance of our instrument.15  
The question that remains concerns the exogeneity of the instrument. It could be argued that 
the ‘years as capital’ has an impact on the level of economic development and this, in turn, 
affects growth performance. Countries with long-established capitals may be states where 
                                                     
14 We rely on Pierskalla, Schultz and Wibbels (2014) for this purpose.  
15 The first stage results are included in Appendix 4. 
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sound political institutions – which are widely regarded as growth enhancing – have had more 
time to develop. Once again, a brief examination of the dataset suggests that no such 
correlation exists. There are countries with relatively young capitals, such as Germany and 
Australia, which are highly developed. At the same time there are countries where the capital 
was established a long time ago, such as Peru, Nepal, or Mozambique, with much lower levels 
of economic development. The two-way scatterplot of GDP per capita in 1960 and the 
instrument confirms this assertion (Appendix 3). No obvious correlation can be found between 
both factors. ‘Years as a capital’ has also an insignificant coefficient when regressed on GDP 
per capita in 1960. Finally, it is highly unlikely that the existence of a longstanding capital has 
a direct influence on the growth performance of a country over a specific short period of time.  
Table 2-3: IV estimates – Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth, 1960 – 2010  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES High-income countries Developing countries 
   
Average city size 0.0729** -0.232** 
 (0.0359) (0.102) 
Initial GDPpc  -0.075*** 0.047*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0318) 
Years of schooling 0.00685 0.0121** 
 (0.00418) (0.00585) 
Private investment 0.298** 0.306** 
 (0.151) (0.143) 
Government consumption 0.287* -0.151 
 (0.170) (0.175) 
Openness 0.0190 0.00734 
 (0.0171) (0.0169) 
Population -0.0113 0.111*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0431) 
Political system 0.00272 -0.000589 
 (0.00260) (0.00140) 
Constant 0.658*** -0.353 
 (0.223) (0.234) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 258 579 
R-squared 0.973 0.955 
   
First stage F-stat 10.07 9.62 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model is estimated using pooled 2SLS. For the sake of simplicity, we only include the 
main term in this estimate (Table 2-3). The results for high-income countries are confirmed. 
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A country’s average city size is positively and significantly associated with economic growth 
(Table 2-3, Regression 1). The coefficient is similar to the system GMM estimate reported in 
Table 2-2, roughly confirming its accuracy. Every 100,000 population increase in average city 
size raises the five-year growth rate by approximately 0.7%.  
For developing countries, the coefficient of average city size is negative and significant at the 
5% (Table 2-3, Regression 2). This contradicts the results in the previous section where no 
impact of average city size on economic growth for developing countries was reported. This 
estimate provides evidence of a detrimental impact of large cities on economic growth for 
developing countries, suggesting a 2.3% decrease in five-year growth rates for a 100,000 
inhabitant increase in average city size. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Our results provide novel insights to the debate about the economic impact of mega cities and 
overall increases in city size around the world. First, they lend support to the hypothesis by 
Gollin et al. (2016) that many cities in developing countries do not generate the same 
productivity gains as cities in developed countries. This is evidenced by both the positive 
results for high-income countries, which suggest the presence of productivity gains associated 
with larger cities, as well as the insignificant (and negative) IV-results for developing 
countries. These results are explained by the underlying mechanisms driving urbanization 
which are fundamentally different for developed and developing countries. Hence, developing 
country cities have a high share of workers in sectors that do not benefit from agglomeration 
economies. Simultaneously, developing countries’ cities are now much larger than their 
counterparts were in the developed world when they had reached the same level of economic 
development. The greater size of developing world cities has been facilitated, among other 
factors, by the possibility of importing more food, aid inflows, and improved public service 
provision (Fay & Opal, 2000; Glaeser, 2014). This in turn has contributed to intensify the 
urban diseconomies present in developing countries’ cities. Instead of being the place for 
industrialization and productivity growth as in the developed world, they are increasingly 
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becoming loci for the concentration of the poor and those at risk of severe poverty in the 
emerging world.  
Second, the evidence presented in this paper complements past empirical research on urban 
concentration and economic growth (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & 
Royuela, 2014; Henderson, 2003). At first sight, our insignificant results for developing 
countries may seem at odds with the findings of this literature, which suggest a particularly 
important role for agglomeration at early stages of development. However, they may simply 
reflect different coverage and a focus on different aspects. Urban concentration, even when 
the actual urban population is small, provides benefits for the provision of public 
infrastructure, in particular in the face of limited resources. As countries grow richer and have 
more resources, this advantage loses some of its relevance. The urban concentration literature 
may, to a considerable degree, also capture this aspect. Our average city size measure in turn 
reflects the agglomeration (dis-) economies which arise through the actual size of the cities. 
Industrialized countries with a strong tradable service sector and high-tech manufacturing 
benefit from larger cities, while in developing countries diseconomies of scale and negative 
externalities may prevail. 
Third, from a system of cities perspective, our results are also telling. The positive results for 
high-income countries suggest that people and firms are more prone to relocate in high-income 
countries, once the primary city reaches the tipping point on the productivity curve. 
Furthermore, cities in developed countries are able to overcome some of the diseconomies by 
innovating their function within the system of cities (Camagni, Capello, & Caragliu, 2015). In 
contrast, our results indicate that this is not the case for developing countries and that many of 
the cities may even be already in a low economic development trap, as suggested by Venables 
(2005). This finding is consistent with observations by other authors that show that mature 
manufacturing sectors are still located within the prime cities in developing countries as 
opposed to secondary cities, as should be expected following the systems of cities approach 
(Duranton, 2015).  
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Finally, the results also point to the need to adapt theoretical models and their assumptions, 
developed based on high-income countries, more strongly to the realities of the developing 
world. While the analysis for high-income countries is broadly in line with the predictions of 
the NEG models (Fujita & Thisse, 2003; P. Martin & Ottaviano, 2001), the insignificant 
coefficients for the developing countries sample are clearly not. One explanation may be the 
already mentioned balance between urban economies and diseconomies, which is probably 
different for developing and high-income countries. NEG models may be well calibrated to 
capture the situation for high-income countries, while they may underestimate urban 
diseconomies and over-emphasize the benefits of agglomeration in developing countries’ 
context. Some authors (Henderson, 2010; R. Martin, 2008) support this notion and argue that 
the treatment of urban diseconomies is still limited in the literature.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed whether countries grow faster if their population lives on 
average in larger cities, as has been frequently implied by recent economic theories and 
development policy alike. For this purpose, we have used a panel of 114 countries for the 
period between 1960 and 2010. We have specifically tested for varying effects of average city 
size on economic growth in high-income and in developing countries, as, until now, most 
evidence has been based on data from the developed world. A raft of estimation techniques – 
including pooled 2SLS, fixed effects, system GMM, and a novel instrumental variable – has 
been used in order to establish the relationship between average city size and economic 
growth. The system GMM and the IV analyses allow us to address statistically the concern of 
reverse causality when considering questions of urbanization, city size, and economic growth.  
The analysis has revealed that any statement about a uniform relationship between average 
city size and economic growth does not hold. For the whole sample, the evidence of such a 
relationship is inconclusive, with results differing depending on the estimation technique. 
However, there is consistent evidence of a growth promoting effect of average city size in 
high-income countries throughout all our estimation techniques. The robustness of the effect 
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is confirmed by the IV-results. An increase in the average city size of 100,000 inhabitants 
boosts a country’s five-year growth performance by up to 0.84%. This effect decreases as the 
average city size increases. Conversely, in developing countries all coefficients of the average 
city size indicator are insignificant. The IV results even suggest a negative impact of average 
city size on economic growth. The results for developing countries thus imply that city size is 
not a driver of economic growth. If it has an impact at all, it is negative. 
Whether recent urbanization trends with increasing average city size are a growth driver or 
not seems highly context dependent and the answer may very well be negative for many 
developing countries. Heterogeneity in the underlying urbanization patterns between 
developed and developing countries, a differing balance between agglomeration economies 
and diseconomies, and structural barriers to the creation of a functioning system of cities in 
developing countries may result in an urban environment which does not make its inhabitants 
more productive, as would be expected based on the literature for developed countries.  
The analysis opens several avenues for future research. In order to better understand how city 
size shapes economic growth at an aggregate level, greater protagonism needs to be awarded 
to understand the underlying urbanization paths and how these ultimately influence the 
balance between urban economies and diseconomies. In particular, there is a clear need to 
analyse in greater detail the extent and possibilities of managing urban diseconomies in a 
developing country context. Another line of analysis should explore the structural barriers to 
the creation of a functioning system of cities in developing countries.  
Finally, our analysis underlines the need to re-evaluate the increasingly widespread policy 
view that bigger cities spur economic growth. A more nuanced view of how urban policies 
impinge on overall economic growth, especially in the developing world, is required. It should 
be based on new empirical analysis, as well as on theoretical approaches that are more attuned 
to the realities of emerging countries. Otherwise the risk of coming to simplistic and, in some 
cases, perhaps overly harmful policy recommendations may increase based on the wrong 
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assumption that developing countries simply follow the same urbanisation path which was 
previously followed by developed countries. 
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Appendix 1 – Data sources 
Variable Source 
Average City Size Population weighted average city size at the beginning of the 
five-year period 
Calculated based on 
World Urbanization Prospects, the 2014 revision 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/ 
GDPpc Natural logarithm of  
“Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices “/ “Population” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Years of Schooling Years of schooling at beginning of the five-year period 
Barro & Lee dataset 
http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Private Investment Five-year averages of “Share of gross capital formation of GDP 
at current PPPs”  
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Government 
Consumption 
Five-year averages of “Share of government consumption of 
GDP at current PPPs” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Openness Five-year averages of sum of “Share of merchandise exports of 
GDP at current PPPs”and “Share of merchandise imports of 
GDP at current PPPs” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Population Population in millions at the beginning of the five-year period  
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Political System Five-year averages of “POLITY2” indicator 
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions 
Datasets 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
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Appendix 2 – Descriptive statistics 
  
Standard Deviation 
   
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Maximum Minimum Obs. 
Average city size 1.143712 1.70483 1.488533 .6116051 16.82135 .15 1014 
Growth .0996111 .1669525 .0834671 .148743 1.199445 -1.259275 1014 
Ln(GDPpc) 8.42027 1.307601 1.252394 .3871163 11.61566 4.980256 1014 
Years of schooling 5.579546 3.265375 3.096604 1.554405 13.27 .15 1014 
Private investment .2008379 .0895442 .0718894 .0550774 .6267554 .0159164 1014 
Government 
consumption 
.1853325 .0935007 .0720912 .0626505 .9272356 .0237472 1014 
Openness .4507186 .5670825 .4185368 .3827675 11.06161 .0021284 1014 
LN (Population) 2.378241 1.444446 1.405376 .3235726 7.158376 -1.815018 1014 
Political System 1.772023 7.329566 6.05452 4.161617 10 -10 1014 
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Appendix 3 – Scatterplot GDPpc and years as capital in 1960
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Appendix 4 – First-stage IV-results 
Dependent variable: average city size 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES High-income countries Developing countries 
   
Years capital 0.549*** -0.331*** 
 (0.173) (0.107) 
GDPpc -619.7*** 317.4*** 
 (149.1) (41.01) 
Years of schooling 34.15 -31.84* 
 (37.95) (16.60) 
Private investment 3,375*** -319.4 
 (890.2) (300.7) 
Government consumption -2,822*** -1,222*** 
(996.8) (273.6) 
Openness 250.1* 126.6*** 
 (141.4) (25.80) 
Population 297.7*** 476.5*** 
 (49.96) (29.49) 
Political system -29.07** 6.092 
 (14.53) (4.378) 
   
Constant 4,948*** -2,122*** 
 (1,151) (311.1) 
   
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 258 579 
R-squared 0.451 0.575 
   
F-stat of excluded instrument 10.07 
(0.0017) 
9.62 
(0.0020) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.1 Introduction 
For a long time in world history, building an empire around a city or having a large city within 
a country was crucial for economic success and/or political dominance: Alexandria around 
200BC, Rome in 1AD or Chang’an in China in 800AD are clear examples of this (Chandler, 
1987): big cities brought about development and prosperity; and development, in turn, made 
the growth of big cities possible. This rule was still very much in evidence in the 1950s. At 
that time, the majority of the world’s biggest cities – 20 out of 30 – were located in high-
income countries (United Nations, 2014). The few exceptions to the rule were cities in large 
developing countries, such as China, Mexico, and Brazil. The poorest countries in the world 
at the time lacked, in general, very large cities. 
Partially inspired by this observation, policy makers and economic theorists have long stressed 
the role of urbanization and cities for economic efficiency and growth (Duranton, 2015; 
Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992; World Bank, 2009). The size of a city is 
considered an important driver of economic development. Based mainly on empirical 
evidence from the US and the UK, research has stressed how large cities lead to greater 
productivity and economic growth (Melo, Graham, & Noland, 2009; Rosenthal & Strange, 
2004).  
Over the past few decades, however, the world has changed significantly and these changes 
have put the link between large cities and economic success under greater scrutiny. Countries 
at low levels of economic development have rapidly urbanized and very large cities are no 
longer predominantly found in rich and/or dynamic countries (United Nations, 2014). 
Moreover, cities have grown larger. This has challenged the city size/productivity link. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that the largest cities in the world today are not necessarily the 
most productive, but mid-size agglomerations (McCann & Acs, 2011). Furthermore, factors 
that are often independent of city size, such as urban infrastructure, institutional capacity and 
industry composition, are increasingly regarded as more important determinants of whether a 
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city can be judged as a motor for economic growth or not (Camagni, Capello, & Caragliu, 
2015; Castells-Quintana, 2016; Glaeser, 2014).   
The overarching aim of this paper is to delve in greater detail into the link between the size of 
cities and aggregate economic growth in order to advance our understanding of the factors that 
may influence this relationship. More specifically, we explore empirically: 1) whether in 
recent decades certain city sizes can be considered as more growth enhancing than others and 
2) how additional factors highlighted in the literature affect the city size growth relationship. 
The main contribution of our paper is twofold: 1) its adds to the relatively scarce empirical 
literature on the relationship between city size and aggregate growth (as opposed to an 
individual city or urban concentration perspective) and 2) it further explores how this 
relationship is shaped by other factors, something rarely tested in the empirical literature to 
date. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the theoretical 
and empirical literature that explores the link between city size and economic growth. The 
third section addresses our methodology, indicators used and presents the dataset. The results 
and discussion are included in the fourth section. The final part concludes and proposes areas 
for further research. 
3.2 City size and economic growth 
Economists have long taken an interest in the relationship between economic development, 
productivity, urbanization and cities (Hoselitz, 1953; Lewis, 1954; Marshall, 1890). Over the 
past two decades, the New Economic Geography (NEG) and urban economics strands were 
among those to examine the mechanisms which govern the relationship. Both schools of 
thought take different but complementary angles in examining the link, although the overall 
tenor, in particular from the empirical literature, is that city size and agglomeration are 
fundamental drivers of economic growth through their impact on people’s productivity. 
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The NEG literature generally sets out to analyse the link between agglomeration and economic 
performance at the national level. For this purpose the standard NEG framework is combined 
with endogenous growth models. In the NEG framework of industry location (Krugman, 
1991), external scale economies, which are created through the co-location of population and 
economic activity, make people and companies more productive. The mechanisms through 
which external economies increase productivity are threefold: a) knowledge spill-overs 
between workers enable learning and spur innovation; b) forward and backward linkages 
between companies, suppliers and buyers make interactions between economic actors more 
efficient; and c) a pooled labour market allows for an easier matching between firms and 
employees. Simultaneously, centrifugal forces such as high land rents, pollution, and 
congestion work in the opposite direction as population concentration grows and thus decrease 
people’s productivity. Combining this framework with an endogenous growth model allows 
to assess the link between a country’s level of agglomeration and national growth. The 
conclusion of these theoretical exercises tends to be that more agglomeration of people and 
firms and thus a more concentrated urban structure with large cities at its apex, increase 
people’s and companies productivity and is, thus, tantamount to greater economic growth 
(Fujita & Thisse, 2003; Martin & Ottaviano, 2001).  
Empirical studies, using the percentage of the urban population living in cities above 750,000 
or 1 million inhabitants as an indicator of agglomeration, support this claim (Brülhart & 
Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014)16. The larger the percentage of the 
population living in cities above these thresholds, the better the economic performance of 
countries, particularly at low levels of economic development. Henderson (2003) additionally 
claims that optimal city size has to be considered in relation to the overall size of a country. 
One drawback of this literature is, however, that it ignores the vast differences in the sizes of 
                                                     
16 A number of studies such as Henderson (2003), Brülhart & Sbergami (2009) and Castells (2016), 
also or primarily use Primacy – the percentage of the urban population that lives in the largest city – as 
an indicator of agglomeration. In this study, we are however interested in the city size aspect and not in 
how the urban population is distributed across different cities.  
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cities beyond a certain population threshold – i.e. over 1 million inhabitants. While any 
threshold is arbitrary, it is by no means obvious that cities should have a uniform relationship 
with economic growth beyond this size.  
Urban economists adopt a slightly different perspective. Instead of analysing the impact of 
city size or agglomeration on economic growth at the national level, they are concerned with 
the impact of city size on the productivity of the urban worker. In this framework, the 
mechanisms which determine people’s productivity are similar to those in the NEG literature. 
On the one side, Duranton and Puga (2004) describe forces related to the sharing of local 
infrastructure, matching of skills, suppliers and markets, and learning between people as the 
micro-foundations behind the localized scale economies that make people in cities more 
productive. They particularly emphasize the cumulative nature of knowledge generation and 
diffusion. On the other side, larger city size leads to increased rents and commuting time which 
reduces people’s productivity. Taken all together, a city’s productivity is therefore believed to 
follow an inverted U-shape function of total urban employment. Productivity increases with 
city size up to a certain population threshold, beyond which the disadvantages of 
agglomeration overshadow its benefits.  
An array of empirical studies find evidence for these productivity gains. Rosenthal & Strange 
(2004) find that labour productivity increases by 3-8% through a doubling of city size. 
Productivity gains tend to be greater in cities with high-tech sectors and service industries 
(Graham, 2009; Henderson, 2010). Meta-analyses confirm this positive relationship, although 
often underscoring the presence of important regional differences (e.g. Melo, Graham, and 
Noland, 2009). This view is reinforced by Duranton (2015) who reports that productivity gains 
are even larger in emerging countries’ cities than in cities located in high-income countries 
(e.g. productivity increases for China between 10% and 12% as a result of doubling of city 
size).  
Despite their differing approach and focus of analysis, both NEG literature and urban 
economics have contributed to forge a prevailing view: agglomerating people in larger cities 
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increases people’s and companies’ productivity and, consequently, drives economic growth. 
In recent years, however, this assertion has increasingly been called into question by a raft of 
empirical studies (Dijkstra, Garcilazo, & McCann, 2013; ESPON, 2012; McCann & Acs, 
2011). Several factors contributed to what seems an increasing need to re-examine the link 
between city size and aggregate economic growth. First, many developing countries’ cities 
have outgrown their counterparts in the developed world: out of the 30 largest agglomerations 
in 2015, 23 were located in low- and-middle income countries. Countries as different as 
Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Peru, or Indonesia are represented 
in this list (United Nations, 2014). This explosion of large cities in many developing countries, 
which often went hand in hand with the emergence of large inner city slums and significant 
congestion, has cast increasing doubt on the relationship between city size and productivity 
for developing countries.   
Second, cities have generally grown much larger than before. While New York was the largest 
city in 1950 with roughly 12 million inhabitants, today Tokyo, the largest city in the world, 
has 38 million inhabitants. Many developing country cities have grown to become mega cities: 
Delhi and Shanghai, with 26 million and 24 million inhabitants respectively are clear examples 
of this trend (United Nations, 2014). The ever growing size of megacities has brought the 
linearity of the relationship between increased city size and economic growth at these city 
dimensions into question, especially given the urban economics u-shaped productivity 
function. Recent empirical research for European countries has provided evidence for this. 
OECD (2006) for example, finds support for a positive effect of city size on income at the city 
level, but only if some of the largest cities are excluded from the sample. When restricting the 
sample to megacities of more than 7 million inhabitants, the coefficient turns negative. 
Similarly, McCann and Acs (2011) indicate that among the 75 most productive cities in the 
world 29 cities have a population of less than 3 million inhabitants, while 32 range between 3 
and 7 million. Considering the size of today’s megacities in particular, these are by no means 
the largest cities. Dijkstra, Garcilazo, and McCann (2013) explore the contribution of different 
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European cities to national economic growth. Again, they find that not only have midsize 
cities grown faster than very large cities, but also that their contribution to national economic 
growth has been greater. Research by Parkinson and co-authors covering 31 European capitals 
and 124 second-tier cities (ESPON, 2012) comes to a similar conclusion. The evidence 
emerging from this literature thus suggests a mixed picture in which the role played by city 
size is far from uniform. This research has, thus, raised pertinent questions about the types of 
city sizes that tend to be growth maximising.  
Finally, researchers have increasingly gone beyond city size and emphasized the role of other 
factors behind changes in city-level productivity (Camagni, Capello, & Caragliu, 2013; 
Camagni et al., 2015). Industry specific aspects such as industrial composition (Au & 
Henderson, 2006; Graham, 2009) and company size (Faggio, Silva, & Strange, 2014; Rigby 
& Brown, 2015), context specific elements including government capacity (Ahrend, Farchy, 
Kaplanis, & Lembcke, 2014; Glaeser, 2014), and urban infrastructure (Castells-Quintana, 
2016) as well as network integration (Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2001) and borrowed city size 
(Alonso, 1973) have featured prominently in these analyses. The importance of industrial 
composition, in particular, has attracted considerable attention. Tradable services and high-
tech manufacturing benefit more from large cities than other sectors (Graham, 2009), meaning 
that economies with a strong presence of such sectors benefit more from the presence of large 
cities than countries with a larger and/or more mature manufacturing industry base. Similarly, 
the provision of an adequate urban infrastructure is increasingly regarded as key for 
productivity and growth. Castells-Quintana (2016), for instance, shows empirically that in 
countries where the urban infrastructure, as proxied by sanitation, is not sufficiently 
developed, urban concentration can be growth inhibiting. Glaeser (2014) and Ahrend et al. 
(2014) furthermore highlight the importance of institutional capacity, in particular in 
developing countries, in order to reduce negative externalities which arise through rapid city 
growth. An empirical analysis of the city size growth link should therefore ideally account for 
these factors. 
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3.3 Model and data 
In the following sections, we empirically test the relationship between city size and aggregate 
growth. As our interest lies in the relationship between city size and growth at the national 
level and not growth at the city level, the approach of the empirical NEG literature, that 
examines the link between urban concentration and national economic growth, is most suited 
for our purpose (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana & Royuela, 2014).  
The econometric model is built around a simple GDP per capita growth equation based on the 
extended Solow growth model (Durlauf, Johnson, & Temple, 2005). We estimate a country’s 
growth rate in five-year periods as a function of an indicator for the size of a country’s cities 
as well a set of control variables commonly used in growth regressions.  The model takes the 
following simple form: 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 = 𝛼+𝛽 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛾 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝 + 𝛿 𝑿𝑖𝑝 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝 
Where 
p denotes five-year intervals; 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑝  is the GDP per capita growth rate of country i in period p; 
citysizeip  is the percentage of the urban population of country i living in cities of 
certain size at the beginning of period p; 
GDPpcip represents the ln GDP per capita of country i at the beginning of period p; 
Xip  depicts a set of control variables for country i, measured either at the beginning 
or as an average of period p; 
𝜇𝑝  represents time fixed effects; and 
εip  is the error term. 
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For the variable of interest, citysizeip, we rely on data from the 2014 World Urbanization 
Prospects (WUP) which provides information on the percentage of the urban population living 
in cities of different size categories (United Nations, 2014). We hypothesise that if cities of a 
certain size contribute to maximising the productivity of workers, a growing share of the urban 
population living in cities of that size should promote economic growth. To test this 
hypothesis, we combine different city-size categories available from the WUP to fit the OECD 
classification used in McCann and Acs (2011) as well as define further categories below and 
above the established thresholds in order to add greater nuance. We also take into 
consideration different well-established thresholds of what is considered a megacity: 7 million 
(OECD, 2006) and 10 million (United Nations, 2014). The resulting categories are the 
percentage of the urban population living in cities 1) below 500,000, 2) 500,000 to 1 million, 
3) 1 million to 3 million, 4) 3 million to 7 million, 5) 7 million to 10 million and 6) 10 million 
and more.17 An interaction term with the natural logarithm of the urban population is also 
included in the analysis, as it is conceivable that the effect depends on the size of the country 
(Henderson, 2003). 
As controls, we resort to the standard variables mainly used in cross-country growth 
regressions as well as a set of variables that may influence the size of a country’s cities and 
growth simultaneously. For the first set, we include a) initial GDP per capita to control for 
conditional convergence – growth is assumed to be faster in countries which start from a lower 
level (Durlauf et al., 2005); b) years of schooling to measure a country’s human capital (Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1986); and c) private investment as a percentage of GDP as it is assumed to be 
a key growth driver in the Solow model.  
With regards to the controls which may be directly linked to city size as well as a country’s 
economic performance, we include the following variables. The first is openness, which is 
believed to influence a country’s spatial structure and city size (Krugman & Elizondo, 1996) 
                                                     
17 Ultimately, any size threshold is arbitrary. Our goal is to provide a more nuanced analysis than studies 
thus far that rely on a unique threshold of 750,000 or 1,000,000. Resorting to the widely used city 
category definitions from OECD and the UN provides a helpful reference point for this purpose. 
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as well as to directly promote economic growth (Sachs, Warner, Åslund, & Fischer, 1995). 
Including it ensures that the coefficient of our city size categories does not wrongly capture 
this latter effect. The second is a country’s physical land area. A large surface area such as in 
India or Brazil is expected to be closely linked to the size of a country’s cities. This may also 
be the case for a country’s urban population. Similarly, a country’s size (either measured in 
physical size or population) also influences its market potential, which in turn may have an 
effect on aggregate economic performance (Alesina, Spolaore, & Wacziarg, 2005). It is 
therefore pertinent to include it in the regression. Furthermore, a number of dummy variables 
are considered in the analysis to account for the particularities in the growth and urbanization 
path that certain groups of countries may have experienced: a) continental dummies to account 
for systematic differences in the urbanization and growth paths of regions; b) economies which 
are strongly dependent on oil exports and c) states which formed part of the former Soviet 
Union. Finally, we include time fixed effects to ensure results are not driven by period specific 
trends.  
The data for the controls are derived from different sources. The years of schooling indicator 
comes from the Barro and Lee dataset, urban population from the 2014 edition of the World 
Urbanization Prospects, physical land area and the dummy for oil dominated economies is 
based on the World Development Indicators. The remainder of the data is sourced from the 
eighth edition of the Penn World Tables. A more detailed description of the indicators and 
sources as well as descriptive statistics are included in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Depending 
on the different specifications, a maximum of 113 countries is covered in the analysis. 
The model is estimated using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator. The HT has the advantage 
over a fixed effects estimator that it allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables in a 
panel setting, i.e. land area as well regional and oil dummies in our case (Baltagi, Bresson, & 
Pirotte, 2003). This approach also permits the introduction of a number of interaction terms to 
address our second research question. For the time-varying variables, the HT works analogue 
to the fixed effects models as it uses the within transformation of time-varying variables to 
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estimate consistent coefficients. In contrast to the FE model however, the HT also uses 
individual means of the time variant regressors as instruments for the time invariant variables 
and therefore allows their inclusion in the model.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Size categories and economic growth 
In order to analyse whether the percentage of the urban population living in cities of different 
size categories affects national economic growth, we include the indicators for the different 
size categories as well as their interaction terms with urban population one by one. Table 3-1 
presents the results for these estimates. 
The basic model (regression 1) works well. The control variables show the expected signs and 
remain stable when the variables of interest – the different city size categories – are introduced 
in the analysis (regressions 2 through 13). Initial GDPpc is negative and significant at the 1% 
level throughout all our estimates, indicating conditional convergence. Private investment is 
the key driver for growth in the model: the coefficient is positive and highly significant in all 
estimations. Urban population has a negative association with economic growth in most 
regressions. This result is intuitive given that urban population is highly correlated to the 
overall population. Increasing population while holding other factors such as capital and years 
of schooling constant decreases the factor endowment per person and should, hence, have a 
negative impact on GDP per capita growth. The positive coefficients of the physical land area 
are also in line with expectations: holding other factors constant, adding another unit of land 
increases factor endowment per person and growth. This result does not hold when we control 
for the percentage of the urban population living in small cities. Furthermore, the dummy for 
countries whose exports are dominated by oil has – as expected – a positive and significant 
coefficient throughout and the dummy for the countries which formed part of the former 
Soviet Union is negative and significant at the 10% level in all but two regressions.  
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Finally, years of schooling and openness are not significant in our results. While these 
coefficients do not necessarily match expectations, they are not entirely surprising. Increases 
in years of schooling are unlikely to show an immediate effect on growth (Durlauf et al., 2005). 
Likewise the results for different indicators of openness and trade integration have varied 
between studies with results frequently being insignificant (Durlauf et al., 2005). 
Let us now turn to the results for our variable of interest: the share of the urban population 
living in cities of certain size categories (regressions 2 - 13). Each indicator is inserted in the 
model individually, as there is a clear interdependence between them – first alone and then 
with the interaction term. Three out of the six size categories have a significant coefficient 
when introduced alone; four of them once the interaction term of urban population is 
considered.  
Table 3-1: Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals, 1980 – 2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
% Below 500K  0.00364*** 0.00431***     
  (0.000667) (0.000695)     
  * Urban population   -0.00166***     
   (0.000527)     
% 500K to 1M    -0.00114** -0.00199***   
    (0.000498) (0.000697)   
  * Urban population     0.00146*   
     (0.000846)   
% 1M to 3M      -0.00107** -0.00353*** 
      (0.000499) (0.000888) 
  * Urban population       0.00228*** 
       (0.000681) 
Initial GDPpc -0.475*** -0.491*** -0.503*** -0.477*** -0.478*** -0.481*** -0.488*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0284) 
Years of schooling 0.00450 0.00422 -0.00283 0.00449 0.00129 0.00400 0.000227 
 (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0128) 
Private investment 0.792*** 0.807*** 0.793*** 0.794*** 0.785*** 0.821*** 0.806*** 
 (0.124) (0.121) (0.120) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) 
Openness  0.000916 -0.00384 -0.000798 -0.00341 -0.00177 0.00258 0.00426 
 (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0156) 
Urban population -0.118*** -0.0570 0.0727 -0.112*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0391) (0.0565) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
Land area 0.0859*** 0.0554 0.0400 0.0814** 0.0761** 0.0812** 0.0755** 
 (0.0333) (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0335) (0.0337) 
Oil dummy 0.411*** 0.457*** 0.477*** 0.417*** 0.413*** 0.428*** 0.424*** 
 (0.159) (0.164) (0.160) (0.158) (0.158) (0.161) (0.163) 
Soviet union dummy -0.329* -0.289 -0.226 -0.312* -0.299* -0.322* -0.313* 
 (0.171) (0.177) (0.174) (0.171) (0.171) (0.173) (0.175) 
Constant 2.468*** 2.667*** 2.877*** 2.551*** 2.634*** 2.578*** 2.713*** 
 (0.434) (0.440) (0.437) (0.433) (0.435) (0.439) (0.443) 
        
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Oil dummy: Oil rents on average more than 15% of GDP per capita since data is available for a given country 
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Table 3-1: (continued) 
VARIABLES (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
       
% 3M to 7M  0.000181 0.00301     
 (0.000768) (0.00210)     
  * Urban population  -0.00135     
  (0.000935)     
% 7M to 10M   0.000138 -0.0139   
   (0.00117) (0.0100)   
  * Urban population    0.00426   
    (0.00302)   
% 10M +     0.00134 -0.0196* 
     (0.00142) (0.0109) 
  * Urban population      0.00587* 
      (0.00304) 
Initial GDPpc -0.475*** -0.478*** -0.474*** -0.483*** -0.477*** -0.485*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0289) 
Years of schooling 0.00441 0.00375 0.00456 0.00368 0.00400 0.00209 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Private investment 0.797*** 0.813*** 0.792*** 0.786*** 0.780*** 0.783*** 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) 
Openness  0.000691 -0.000541 0.000837 0.00134 0.00212 0.00365 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0158) 
Urban population -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
Land area 0.0860*** 0.0935*** 0.0861*** 0.0866** 0.0842** 0.0801** 
 (0.0333) (0.0340) (0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0333) (0.0334) 
Oil dummy 0.411*** 0.413** 0.410*** 0.422*** 0.418*** 0.439*** 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.162) (0.159) (0.159) 
Soviet union dummy -0.328* -0.338* -0.330* -0.330* -0.324* -0.311* 
 (0.172) (0.174) (0.171) (0.174) (0.171) (0.172) 
Constant 2.471*** 2.407*** 2.465*** 2.534*** 2.505*** 2.621*** 
 (0.434) (0.440) (0.435) (0.442) (0.435) (0.439) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Oil dummy: Oil rents on average more than 15% of GDP per capita since data is available for a given country 
The results here do not necessarily go along expectations. First, the percentage of the urban 
population living in cities below 500,000 inhabitants is positive and significant at the 1%. This 
indicates a growth promoting effect of a large share of people living in relatively small cities. 
This result holds when we add the interaction term with the urban population, however it is 
nuanced by a negative sign on the interaction term. This points to the existence of an urban 
population threshold: the connection between the percentage of the urban population living in 
cities below 500,000 inhabitants is positive up to a total urban population of 12.3 million. 
Beyond that level, it turns negative. Hence, the growth promoting effect of small cities holds 
for the great majority of countries in our sample. 77 countries out of the 113 countries included 
in our regressions had urban populations of 12.5 million or less in 2010.  
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In contrast, the coefficients for the urban population share in cities between 500,000 and 1 
million inhabitants as well as between 1 million and 3 million are negative and significant at 
the 5% level. Countries with a higher share of their urban population in mid-sized cities have 
thus had a weaker economic performance. The introduction of the interaction term strengthens 
this relationship: the coefficients becoming significant at the 1% level. Both interaction terms 
are, however, positive and significant, meaning that the effect of the share of the urban 
population in cities with a population between 1 and 3 million turns positive for countries with 
an overall urban population of 4.8 million and at 3.8 million for cities between 500,000 and 1 
million inhabitants. The influence of mid-sized cities is, thus, heavily affected by the country’s 
size. 
Beyond the 3 million threshold, the percentage of the urban population living in very large to 
megacities seems irrelevant for economic growth. All the coefficient for cities between 3 and 
7 million inhabitants and from 7 million to 10 million are insignificant (Regressions 8-11). 
For the percentage of the urban population living in megacities of more than 10 million, the 
coefficient is also not relevant (Regression 12) and only becomes significant, once the 
interaction term is introduced (Regression 13). In this case, the association is negative: the 
bigger the share of population living in very large megacities, the lower the economic growth. 
The positive coefficient of the interaction term signals that this relationship is, however, not 
always pernicious for development. In countries with urban populations larger than 28.2 
million – 25 out of the 113 countries in the sample in 2010 – the presence of megacities 
becomes a positive force for growth. However, the low level of significance – both coefficients 
at the 10% level – warrants some caution in the interpretation of these results.18 
                                                     
18 If we run regressions with alternative size categories, i.e. the percentage of the urban population living 
in cities above 1 million as well as the percentage of the urban population living in cities above 3 
million, the results suggest that the growth inducing or inhibiting effect of city size is indeed captured 
by the different categories employed in our regressions. The coefficients for 1M+ and its interaction 
with urban population mirror those for our 1M to 3M category results, while the 3M+ results are 
insignificant. 
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Taken together, our results highlight two important facts. First, in contrast to expectations, 
most of the action takes place at the lower rather than at the upper end of the urban scale: small 
cities with a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants have been a source for economic 
dynamism. By contrast, a large share of the urban population living in cities between 500,000 
and 3 million is detrimental for economic growth. Beyond that threshold, the size of cities in 
a country does not seem to affect its economic performance in a positive or a negative way. 
Second, the size of the country matters for the link between population living in cities of 
different sizes and growth: the positive connection between small cities (below 500,000) and 
national growth levels works best in relatively small countries while for countries with more 
than 12.3 million urban citizens, the relationship turns negative. The negative effect of the 
500,000 to 3 million categories is only present in countries of up to 4 million urban inhabitants. 
Megacities beyond 10 million only fuel growth in countries with more than 28.5 million 
urbanites. Roughly speaking, small cities work best in relatively small countries, megacities 
in big countries. Medium-sized cities are only detrimental to economic growth in very small 
countries.  
Our results hence neither validate current wisdom about the relationship between different city 
sizes and growth nor refute it completely. As in Henderson (2003), the analysis points to a 
strong dependence of the impact of city size on the country’s overall population. As 
mentioned, large cities are more efficient in larger countries, small ones in smaller ones. 
However, the positive economic role of cities with a population of less than 500,000 in the 
analysis in the large majority of countries in the sample is something which has been 
overlooked by a literature which has overwhelmingly tended to place the emphasis on large 
cities (Martin & Ottaviano, 2001; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). The results of the analysis 
stress that megacities become a force for aggregate economic dynamism only in the most 
populous countries, which make a small part of our sample. In fact, the greatest economic 
benefits have been extracted from the presence of relatively small cities of up to 3 million 
inhabitants rather than from the growth of megacities for most countries in the world. 
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A number of potential explanations can be put forward. First, small cities may simply make it 
easier to manage urban diseconomies, arising through increasing city size in most parts of the 
world. Congestion, high rents, and pollution do not arise in small- and medium-sized cities to 
the same degree as in larger cities. The solutions to address diseconomies of scale are also 
often easier to implement. At the same time, small- and medium-sized cities still often deliver 
many of the benefits of large cities, for instance in terms of provision of public goods and 
efficiency of market interactions. Hence, smaller cities may on average maximise productivity 
without generating negative externalities. This is probably especially true in many developing 
countries, which struggle to provide an adequate urban infrastructure. 
A second explanation may relate to the levels of urban concentration that a larger share of the 
urban population in small cities imply. The results suggest a positive effect of small cities, 
which decreases the larger the urban population and eventually turns negative. We also detect 
a negative effect of cities between 500,000 and 3 million, which turns positive beyond an 
urban population threshold of roughly 4 million. Put together, these factors suggests that a 
relatively balanced urban structure within a given country is growth promoting, but that levels 
of urban concentration should not fall beyond a certain threshold as the positive interaction 
terms with urban population for cities between 500,000 and 3 million and the negative one for 
the cities below 500,000 suggests.  
Finally, the peculiarities of the data require some caution when interpreting the insignificant 
results for larger city categories. Only a limited number of countries in the sample have cities 
with a population of 3 million inhabitants or more (43 out of the 113). Hence, there are many 
observations where the percentage of the urban population in the size categories above 3 
million is zero which may make it more difficult to obtain significant coefficients. However, 
it is worth pointing out that the results remain insignificant even if we combine these 
categories, i.e. the percentage of the urban population in cities above 3 million. This suggests 
that there is high heterogeneity in cities above this threshold: while some may be true motors 
of economic growth, as indicated by McCann and Acs (2011), others may be less so. 
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3.4.2 City size, context and economic growth 
Recent literature has shown that a variety of factors may shape the relationship between city 
size and economic growth (see literature section above). The sectoral composition of the 
economy, a country’s infrastructure endowment and the capacity of the national and city 
governments have been particularly emphasized in this regard. To explore these interactions, 
we rely on the same specifications as in the previous section and check through the 
introduction of additional variables whether a) the sectoral composition of economies, b) 
access to urban infrastructure and c) the institutional capacity affect how cities mould the 
economic growth of a country. While many other factors, such as borrowed city size, 
international linkages and the maturity of firms, may also influence the relationship, we 
analyse those factors for which information is more readily available 
3.4.2.1 Sectoral composition 
To test for the potential influence of a country’s sectoral composition on how cities affect 
economic growth, we resort to export statistics for industries which, according to the literature, 
generate the largest agglomeration economies, namely market-oriented services and high-tech 
industries (Graham, 2009; Henderson, 2010). Countries where these industries are important 
should benefit more from larger cities than countries where these industries are more trivial.  
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Table 3-2: Sectoral composition – Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals, 1980 – 2010 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                
% Below 500K  0.00235***       % Below 500K 0.00425***      
  (0.000675)        (0.000696)      
  * Service exports  0.00492         * High-tech dummy 0.00166      
  (0.00711)        (0.00156)      
  * Urban population  -0.00137***         * Urban population -0.00165***      
  (0.000424)        (0.000540)      
% 500K to 1M   -0.00266***      % 500K to 1M  -0.00190***     
   (0.000730)        (0.000705)     
  * Service exports   0.0130**       * High-tech dummy  -0.000408     
   (0.00596)        (0.00173)     
  * Urban population   0.00104        * Urban population  0.00139     
   (0.000683)        (0.000855)     
% 1M to 3M    -4.13e-05     % 1M to 3M   -0.00318***    
    (0.00101)        (0.000916)    
  * Service exports    -0.00611*      * High-tech dummy   -0.00173    
    (0.00329)        (0.00112)    
  * Urban population    0.000732       * Urban population   0.00226***    
    (0.000604)        (0.000681)    
% 3M to 7M      -0.00182    % 3M to 7M     -0.000628   
     (0.00254)        (0.00291)   
  * Service exports     0.00764*      * High-tech dummy    0.00349**   
     (0.00456)        (0.00177)   
  * Urban population     0.000195      * Urban population    -0.000366   
     (0.000933)        (0.00109)   
% 7M to 10M      -0.00453   % 7M to 10M     -0.0131  
      (0.00797)        (0.0101)  
  * Service exports      0.00166     * High-tech dummy     -0.000404  
      (0.0193)        (0.00269)  
  * Urban population      0.00143     * Urban population     0.00402  
      (0.00236)        (0.00307)  
% 10M +       -0.00632  % 10M +      -0.0184* 
       (0.00867)        (0.0110) 
   * Service exports       -0.0265     * High-tech dummy      -0.00142 
       (0.0217)        (0.00279) 
   * Urban population       0.00261      * Urban population      0.00565* 
       (0.00232)        (0.00309) 
Service exports  0.0844 0.153 0.439** 0.293 0.334 0.366*  High-tech Dummy  -0.0611 0.0552 0.0918** 0.0536 0.0552 0.0575 
  (0.491) (0.221) (0.216) (0.212) (0.211) (0.210)   (0.108) (0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0406) (0.0403) (0.0413) 
                
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                
Observations  528 528 528 528 528 528  Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries  88 88 88 88 88 88  Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For market-oriented services, UNCTAD provides export statistics for 88 countries in our 
sample since the year 1980. Based on this, we calculate the share of service exports of total 
GDP as a measure of the intensity of services in the economy in each five-year period. 
Information on high-tech exports, namely the percentage of high-tech of overall 
manufacturing exports, can be obtained from the World Development Indicators since the year 
1990. In order to maintain comparability with our base case results (1980-2010), we define a 
dummy variable to identify countries in which high-tech manufacturing plays an important 
role. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the share of high-tech goods of manufactured exports 
in a given five-year interval is larger than the 80th percentile of the overall observations 
(16.2%).19 For the vast majority of the countries the value remains constant throughout the 
period with data (1990-2010). We therefore assume them to be the same for the two five-year 
periods in the 1980s without data. In some special cases such as China and Costa Rica, where 
the export structure has changed significantly since the early 1990s, we account for this by 
assigning a 0 in the early periods and a 1 for later periods. 20 
The export measures are introduced into the regressions together with their interaction term 
with the city size categories. Table 3-2 shows the results: columns 1 – 6 for the service sector 
indicator and 7 – 12 for high-tech industries.21 
In both cases, the results for the city category below 500,000 remains unchanged with the 
main term being positive and the interaction term with urban population negative. For the 
500,000 to 1 million category, the interaction term with service exports is positive, whereas 
the main term remains negative. This indicates that while the main negative effect holds, a 
strong service sector actually mitigates the negative connection of this type of cities and 
economic growth. In contrast, high-tech industries do not seem to affect this category. 
                                                     
19 The average export share of high-tech exports of manufacturing exports remains relatively unchanged 
for the period with data, i.e. 8.9% in the 5 year period from 1991 to 1995 and 9.1% for 2006 to 2010. 
20 This is the case in only 14 out of the 113 countries, including China, Costa Rica, Iceland and Hungary, 
where there is a clear trend with little high-tech exports in the early years and strong presence in the 
later. 
21 The full results are included in Appendix 3. 
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Similarly the 1M to 3M impact remains unaffected by the accounting for high-tech industries, 
while controlling for the service sector renders the impact insignificant. The most interesting 
effect can be observed in the 3 to 7 million category which is insignificant in our base case 
results. The interaction term for both services and high-tech is positive, while the main term 
and the interaction with urban population stay insignificant. This implies a growth promoting 
effect of cities between 3 and 7 million inhabitants provided that the service sector or the high-
tech manufacturing industries play an important role in the economy. There are no changes 
for the 7 to 10 million category compared to the base case. The over 10 million becomes 
insignificant when including service exports in the analysis. We thus find that while most 
results from our base case hold when accounting for industry composition, countries can 
benefit from larger cities, i.e. a higher share of the urban population in cities between 3 and 7 
million, provided that the country’s economy has a strong presence in sectors that benefit from 
agglomeration economies. This suggests that larger city size can indeed be growth promoting, 
but only under certain conditions.  
3.4.2.2 Context 
For the analysis of how context factors shape the relationship between city size and aggregate 
growth, we consider urban infrastructure and government capacity. As in Castells-Quintana 
(2016), the share of the urban population with access to improved sanitation facilities is used 
as a proxy for urban infrastructure. We build a dummy which takes the value of 1 if more than 
90% of the urban population has access to sanitation in each five-year period. We cannot rely 
on the actual data since, as with high-tech exports, data is only available from 1990 onwards.22 
Countries with a good urban infrastructure should be able to benefit more from larger cities. 
For government capacity, we rely on the World Governance Indicators. We specifically use 
the sub-indicator “governance effectiveness” which captures the quality of public services on 
a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Data is available since 1996, so we calculate the average score for 
                                                     
22 For the period 1980-1990, we assume that the dummy takes a value of 0 if a country does not pass 
the 90% in 1990.  
136 
 
each country from 1996 to 2010. Based on this, we assign a dummy which equals one if the 
average score is 0.97 or above23 and zero if it is below.24 As with the sanitation dummy, 
countries with a higher level of government effectiveness are expected to be able to capture 
more of the benefits of larger cities. Table 3-3 presents the results: column 1 – 6 accounting 
for sanitation and 7 – 12 for government effectiveness.25    
The base case results remain largely unaffected by the introduction of the two new control 
variables with two notable exceptions. Similarly to the industrial composition results, taking 
into account sanitation and government effectiveness makes cities between 3 to 7 million 
inhabitants a driver of growth as indicated by the positive and significant interaction term. 
This result is as anticipated: larger cities can be growth promoting provided that their urban 
infrastructure is sufficiently developed and the government is effective, including 
implementing those policies aimed at mitigating the negative externalities which come with 
large city size.  
The second notable difference is the interaction term between the percentage of the urban 
population living in cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants and sanitation. It is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. This implies that despite a main positive effect of a large share of 
people in small cities, this effect is smaller in countries with a well-developed urban 
infrastructure. The urban population threshold at which a larger share of the urban population 
in small cities becomes negative is also lower than in the base analysis.  
                                                     
23 0.97 equals the 80th percentile of the observations. 
24 Most countries’ scores have not varied dramatically over the years. There are some cases where the 
difference between minimum and maximum score is larger than 1. However, these cases do not pass 
our defined threshold of 0.97 in any of the years. Thus, we believe the classification, while simplified, 
is accurate enough for our purpose. 
25 The full results are included in Appendix 2. 
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Table 3-3: Contextual factors – Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals, 1980 – 2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
               
% Below 500K 0.00448***       % Below 500K 0.00438***      
 (0.000696)        (0.000702)      
  * Sanitation -0.00350**         * Government effectiveness -0.00294      
 (0.00141)        (0.00310)      
  * Urban population -0.00135**         * Urban population -0.00149***      
 (0.000540)        (0.000547)      
% 500K to 1M  -0.00196***      % 500K to 1M  -0.00191***     
  (0.000713)        (0.000701)     
  * Sanitation  -0.000310        * Government effectiveness  0.00262     
  (0.00138)        (0.00209)     
  * Urban population  0.00150*        * Urban population  0.00100     
  (0.000858)        (0.000914)     
% 1M to 3M   -0.00369***     % 1M to 3M   -0.00321***    
   (0.000933)        (0.000920)    
  * Sanitation   0.000605       * Government effectiveness   -0.00158    
   (0.00102)        (0.00114)    
  * Urban population   0.00224***       * Urban population   0.00237***    
   (0.000687)        (0.000687)    
% 3M to 7M     -0.00165    % 3M to 7M     -0.00229   
    (0.00323)        (0.00340)   
  * Sanitation    0.00361*      * Government effectiveness    0.00412**   
    (0.00190)        (0.00205)   
  * Urban population    -7.66e-05      * Urban population    0.000251   
    (0.00115)        (0.00124)   
% 7M to 10M     -0.0134   % 7M to 10M     -0.0146  
     (0.0103)        (0.0101)  
  * Sanitation     -0.000592     * Government effectiveness     -0.00222  
     (0.00239)        (0.00352)  
  * Urban population     0.00417     * Urban population     0.00453  
     (0.00303)        (0.00305)  
% 10M +      -0.0155  % 10M +      -0.0196* 
      (0.0130)        (0.0110) 
  * Sanitation      -0.00196    * Government effectiveness      -0.00128 
      (0.00331)        (0.00373) 
  * Urban population      0.00511    * Urban population      0.00593* 
      (0.00330)        (0.00305) 
Sanitation 0.157 0.0269 -0.00649 0.0241 0.0208 0.0254  Government effectiveness 0.982** 0.768* 0.847** 0.829* 0.827* 0.815* 
 (0.104) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.0875) (0.0878) (0.0875)   (0.464) (0.414) (0.430) (0.430) (0.425) (0.417) 
               
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
               
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652  Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113  Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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This finding is in line with Castells-Quintana (2016) who shows that, in particular in 
developing countries, city growth without the adequate provision of infrastructure results in 
inefficiencies, as urban diseconomies prevail over agglomeration benefits. Furthermore, they 
provide support for the hypothesis that the positive effect of cities below 500,000 results more 
often than not from the lack of capacity of numerous countries to manage the diseconomies of 
scale associated to larger cities.  
These results clearly need to be interpreted as directional as the dummies do not capture all 
the variation between countries and over time. However, they still emphasize the need to take 
each country’s context into account when analysing the link between city size and growth. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed the link between city size and aggregate growth. Using a panel 
of 113 countries between 1980 and 2010, we have specifically explored whether there are 
certain city sizes that are growth enhancing and how additional factors highlighted in the 
literature impact the city size growth relationship. Our results suggest a non-linear relationship 
which is greatly dependent on the country’s size. A larger share of the urban population in 
small cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants is growth promoting in small- and medium-size 
countries (those with an urban population below 12.3 million). Conversely, the share of urban 
population living in medium-sized cities – defined as those between 500,000 and 3 million – 
limits economic growth in most small countries (those with an urban population roughly 
below 4 million), but facilitates economic dynamism beyond this threshold. Large populations 
living in megacities – defined as those beyond 10 million inhabitants – help growth only in 
relatively large countries, with an urban population of 28.5 million and more. Finally, cities 
between 3 and 10 million do not seem to have a systematic influence on growth at all.  
The analysis also showed that this relationship is highly context dependent: a high share of 
industries that benefit from agglomeration economies, a well-developed urban infrastructure 
and an adequate level of governance effectiveness allow countries to take advantage of 
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agglomeration benefits from larger cities, i.e. between 3 and 7 million inhabitants. It also 
reduces the benefits of a large share of the urban population in small cities below 500,000 
inhabitants. Our results thus suggest that larger cities, albeit not the very large metropoli, can 
indeed be drivers of growth, but only if the context is favourable. For many countries, smaller 
cities in fact provide a better balance between the advantages of cities and the diseconomies 
arising through growing cities.  
The results of our analysis should be interpreted as somewhat directional as data availability 
limits a more accurate measurement of the enabling sectoral composition and contextual 
factors. Similarly, the city size categories, while chosen to fit the OECD and other frequently 
used classifications, are still arbitrary and potentially camouflage greater complexity.  Despite 
these caveats, our study adds important further nuance to the scarce empirical literature which 
links city size to aggregate economic performance and which tends to emphasize the benefits 
of increased city size (Brülhart & Sbergami, 2009; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). By using more 
detailed indicators for the size of a country’s cities, it becomes evident that the benefits of 
increasing city size are not without limits and for many countries, smaller cities seem to offer 
a better balance. Furthermore, the findings complement the growing stream of literature that 
goes beyond city size to consider additional factors that shape the relationship between cities 
and economic growth (Camagni et al., 2015) and again emphasize the context dependency of 
the relationship. 
These findings are particularly pertinent in the current context in which – in contrast to 
previous centuries – the largest cities are now in developing countries and not in the developed 
world. A continued focus on the benefits of large cities over smaller ones without considering 
the context from policy makers and academics may lead to simplified and non-adequate policy 
recommendations, in particular in a developing country context.  
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Appendix 1 – Data sources  
Variable Source 
City Size 
Categories 
Percentage of urban population that lives in cities of a certain size 
calculated based on World Urbanization Prospects, the 2014 revision 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/ 
GDPpc Natural logarithm of  
“Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices “/ “Population” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Years of 
Schooling 
Years of schooling at beginning of the five-year period 
Barro & Lee dataset 
http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Private 
Investment 
Five-year averages of “Share of gross capital formation at current PPPs”  
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Openness Five-year averages of sum of “Share of merchandise exports at current 
PPPs” and “Share of merchandise imports at current PPPs” 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Urban 
Population 
Natural logarithm of the urban population at the beginning of the five-year 
period (in millions) 
Penn World Tables 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
Land Area Natural logarithm of the land area in square kilometer 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Oil Dummy Oil rents on average more than 15% of GDP per capita since data is 
available for a given country 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Services 
Exports 
Service exports as % of total GDP 
Service exports in current US$: UNCTAD 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=
17648 
GDP in current US$: World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
High-Tech-
Dummy 
Dummy based on share of high-tech goods of overall manufacturing 
exports; equals 1 if larger than the 80th percentile of the overall 
observations, which is 16.2%. 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Sanitation 
Dummy 
Dummy takes value of 1 if 90% or more of the population have access to 
sanitation. Access to sanitation is sources from World Development 
Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Dummy takes value of 1 if a country’s average score for government 
effectiveness is 0.97 or larger (80th percentile of countries) since data is 
available 
World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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Appendix 2 – Descriptive statistics  
  
Standard Deviation 
   
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Maximum Minimum Obs. 
        
% Below 500K 61.36863 20.32682 18.54052 8.502813 100 0 652 
% 500K to 1M 11.99106 14.9533 10.97207 10.53413 65.1741 0 652 
% 1M to 3M 16.08785 18.9301 15.67486 10.75994 99.98664 0 652 
% 3M to 7M 6.338234 14.21833 12.21128 7.047835 100 0 652 
% 7M to 10M 1.873779 6.570864 4.359323 4.866689 40.38609 0 652 
% 10M + 2.340507 8.529494 7.414783 4.034982 54.08545 0 652 
Growth .0689286 .1891929 .0852382 .1689796 1.199445 -1.259275 652 
Ln(GDPpc) 8.424952 1.320437 1.289883 .2256611 10.99794 4.980256 652 
Years of schooling 6.08204 3.191872 3.099505 .9629458 13.19 .28 652 
Private investment .1990553 .0830768 .0667662 .0493473 .6267554 .0159164 652 
Openness .5074964 .6697758 .5455402 .3805213 11.06161 .0060162 652 
LN (Urban population) 1.778303 1.49284 1.467248 .2757214 6.303228 -1.720663 652 
Ln (Land) 12.44327 1.753231 - - 16.61218 6.507277 652 
Service exports .0702727 .0595708 .0547594 .0240528 .2861891 0 528 
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Appendix 3 – Full results sectoral composition and context 
Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals from 1980 – 2010 – Sectoral 
Composition (1/2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDPpc -0.321*** -0.300*** -0.303*** -0.305*** -0.298*** -0.302*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0267) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0277) 
Years of schooling -0.00298 0.00194 0.000810 0.00134 0.00374 0.00295 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0106) 
Private investment 0.592*** 0.584*** 0.602*** 0.603*** 0.582*** 0.563*** 
 (0.0979) (0.0980) (0.101) (0.102) (0.0999) (0.0996) 
Openness  -0.00415 -0.00851 -0.00613 -0.00417 -0.00437 -0.00256 
 (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
Urban population 0.191*** 0.0606* 0.0444 0.0513 0.0512 0.0526 
 (0.0473) (0.0323) (0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0330) (0.0326) 
Land area -0.0370 -0.0197 -0.00874 -0.00488 -0.00900 -0.0126 
 (0.0246) (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
Oil dummy 0.463*** 0.409*** 0.391*** 0.410*** 0.396*** 0.410*** 
 (0.130) (0.118) (0.121) (0.121) (0.117) (0.118) 
Service exports 0.0844 0.153 0.439** 0.293 0.334 0.366* 
 (0.491) (0.221) (0.216) (0.212) (0.211) (0.210) 
% Below 500K 0.00235***      
 (0.000675)      
  * Service exports 0.00492      
 (0.00711)      
  * Urban population -0.00137***      
 (0.000424)      
% 500K to 1M  -0.00266***     
  (0.000730)     
  * Service exports  0.0130**     
  (0.00596)     
  * Urban population  0.00104     
  (0.000683)     
% 1M to 3M   -4.13e-05    
   (0.00101)    
  * Service exports   -0.00611*    
   (0.00329)    
  * Urban population   0.000732    
   (0.000604)    
% 3M to 7M     -0.00182   
    (0.00254)   
  * Service exports    0.00764*   
    (0.00456)   
  * Urban population    0.000195   
    (0.000933)   
% 7M to 10M     -0.00453  
     (0.00797)  
  * Service exports     0.00166  
     (0.0193)  
  * Urban population     0.00143  
     (0.00236)  
% 10M +      -0.00632 
      (0.00867) 
   * Service exports      -0.0265 
      (0.0217) 
   * Urban population      0.00261 
      (0.00232) 
Constant 2.442*** 2.316*** 2.178*** 2.154*** 2.145*** 2.219*** 
 (0.311) (0.292) (0.295) (0.296) (0.292) (0.295) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dummy for Soviet Union dropped because of collinearity 
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Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals from 1980 – 2010 – Sectoral 
Composition (2/2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDPpc -0.505*** -0.482*** -0.495*** -0.492*** -0.488*** -0.490*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0294) (0.0290) 
Years of schooling -0.00146 0.00115 -0.00335 -0.00154 0.00278 0.00170 
 (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Private investment 0.808*** 0.795*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.794*** 0.788*** 
 (0.120) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124) 
Openness  -0.00161 -0.00215 0.00189 -0.000873 0.000994 0.00338 
 (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Urban population 0.0783 -0.112*** -0.127*** -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0385) (0.0388) (0.0384) 
Land area 0.0348 0.0749** 0.0770** 0.0951*** 0.0853** 0.0789** 
 (0.0340) (0.0331) (0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0335) (0.0332) 
Oil dummy 0.477*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 0.443*** 0.434*** 0.450*** 
 (0.160) (0.157) (0.164) (0.164) (0.161) (0.158) 
Soviet union dummy -0.214 -0.282* -0.288 -0.308* -0.310* -0.293* 
 (0.173) (0.170) (0.177) (0.177) (0.174) (0.171) 
High-tech dummy -0.0611 0.0552 0.0918** 0.0536 0.0552 0.0575 
 (0.108) (0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0406) (0.0403) (0.0413) 
% Below 500K 0.00425***      
 (0.000696)      
  * High-tech dummy 0.00166      
 (0.00156)      
  * Urban population -0.00165***      
 (0.000540)      
% 500K to 1M  -0.00190***     
  (0.000705)     
 * High-tech dummy  -0.000408     
  (0.00173)     
  * Urban population  0.00139     
  (0.000855)     
% 1M to 3M   -0.00318***    
   (0.000916)    
 * High-tech Dummy   -0.00173    
   (0.00112)    
  * Urban Population   0.00226***    
   (0.000681)    
% 3M to 7M     -0.000628   
    (0.00291)   
  * High-tech dummy    0.00349**   
    (0.00177)   
  * Urban population    -0.000366   
    (0.00109)   
% 7M to 10M     -0.0131  
     (0.0101)  
  * High-tech dummy     -0.000404  
     (0.00269)  
  * Urban population     0.00402  
     (0.00307)  
% 10M +      -0.0184* 
      (0.0110) 
   * High-tech dummy      -0.00142 
      (0.00279) 
    * Urban population      0.00565* 
      (0.00309) 
Constant 2.949*** 2.675*** 2.759*** 2.503*** 2.578*** 2.665*** 
 (0.438) (0.434) (0.445) (0.444) (0.441) (0.439) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals from 1980 – 2010 – 
Contextual factors (1/2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDPpc -0.505*** -0.476*** -0.486*** -0.483*** -0.483*** -0.484*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0289) 
Years of schooling -0.00243 0.00158 0.000750 0.00231 0.00399 0.00288 
 (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
Private investment 0.809*** 0.787*** 0.798*** 0.836*** 0.784*** 0.785*** 
 (0.120) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.125) (0.124) 
Openness  -0.00168 -0.00158 0.00510 0.000119 0.00152 0.00342 
 (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Urban population 0.0511 -0.115*** -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0389) (0.0387) 
Land area 0.0405 0.0761** 0.0750** 0.0899*** 0.0862** 0.0814** 
 (0.0339) (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0334) 
Oil dummy 0.496*** 0.407*** 0.421*** 0.421*** 0.418*** 0.432*** 
 (0.163) (0.157) (0.163) (0.160) (0.162) (0.159) 
Soviet union dummy -0.196 -0.302* -0.312* -0.327* -0.334* -0.320* 
 (0.176) (0.170) (0.175) (0.173) (0.174) (0.172) 
Sanitation 0.157 0.0269 -0.00649 0.0241 0.0208 0.0254 
 (0.104) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.0875) (0.0878) (0.0875) 
% Below 500K 0.00448***      
 (0.000696)      
  * Sanitation -0.00350**      
 (0.00141)      
  * Urban population -0.00135**      
 (0.000540)      
% 500K to 1M  -0.00196***     
  (0.000713)     
  * Sanitation  -0.000310     
  (0.00138)     
  * Urban population  0.00150*     
  (0.000858)     
% 1M to 3M   -0.00369***    
   (0.000933)    
  * Sanitation   0.000605    
   (0.00102)    
  * Urban population   0.00224***    
   (0.000687)    
% 3M to 7M     -0.00165   
    (0.00323)   
  * Sanitation    0.00361*   
    (0.00190)   
  * Urban population    -7.66e-05   
    (0.00115)   
% 7M to 10M     -0.0134  
     (0.0103)  
  * Sanitation     -0.000592  
     (0.00239)  
  * Urban population     0.00417  
     (0.00303)  
% 10M +      -0.0155 
      (0.0130) 
  * Sanitation      -0.00196 
      (0.00331) 
  * Urban population      0.00511 
      (0.00330) 
Constant 2.881*** 2.620*** 2.706*** 2.484*** 2.529*** 2.594*** 
 (0.439) (0.435) (0.443) (0.439) (0.441) (0.440) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Dependent variable: GDPpc growth in five-year intervals from 1980 – 2010 – 
Contextual factors (2/2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDPpc -0.508*** -0.480*** -0.494*** -0.492*** -0.490*** -0.490*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0292) (0.0296) (0.0291) 
Years of schooling -0.00325 -0.00108 -0.00271 0.00165 0.00259 0.00162 
 (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Private investment 0.804*** 0.777*** 0.828*** 0.855*** 0.791*** 0.788*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.124) (0.128) (0.125) (0.125) 
Openness  -0.00199 -0.00345 0.00165 -0.00131 0.000988 0.00311 
 (0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
Urban population 0.0526 -0.127*** -0.142*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0389) (0.0394) (0.0390) (0.0392) (0.0389) 
Land area 0.0463 0.0829*** 0.0818*** 0.0940*** 0.0899*** 0.0832*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0311) (0.0308) 
Oil dummy 0.636*** 0.553*** 0.566*** 0.583*** 0.573*** 0.585*** 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.161) (0.162) (0.160) (0.157) 
Soviet union dummy 0.0802 0.00121 -0.00302 -0.0113 -0.0179 -0.00292 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.223) (0.223) (0.220) (0.216) 
Government effectiveness 0.982** 0.768* 0.847** 0.829* 0.827* 0.815* 
 (0.464) (0.414) (0.430) (0.430) (0.425) (0.417) 
% Below 500K 0.00438***      
 (0.000702)      
  * Government effectiveness -0.00294      
 (0.00310)      
  * Urban population -0.00149***      
 (0.000547)      
% 500K to 1M  -0.00191***     
  (0.000701)     
  * Government effectiveness  0.00262     
  (0.00209)     
  * Urban population  0.00100     
  (0.000914)     
% 1M to 3M   -0.00321***    
   (0.000920)    
  * Government effectiveness   -0.00158    
   (0.00114)    
  * Urban population   0.00237***    
   (0.000687)    
% 3M to 7M     -0.00229   
    (0.00340)   
  * Government effectiveness    0.00412**   
    (0.00205)   
  * Urban population    0.000251   
    (0.00124)   
% 7M to 10M     -0.0146  
     (0.0101)  
  * Government effectiveness     -0.00222  
     (0.00352)  
  * Urban population     0.00453  
     (0.00305)  
% 10M +      -0.0196* 
      (0.0110) 
  * Government effectiveness      -0.00128 
      (0.00373) 
  * Urban population      0.00593* 
      (0.00305) 
Constant 2.832*** 2.589*** 2.691*** 2.501*** 2.541*** 2.616*** 
 (0.399) (0.402) (0.409) (0.411) (0.408) (0.405) 
       
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Number of countries 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4 Special Economic Zones: What Makes Them 
Truly Special? A quantitative analysis of the 
drivers of SEZ performance 
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4.1 Introduction 
“Special Economic Zones” (SEZs) have been on the policy agenda for a considerable amount 
of time. The usually stated objectives of SEZs are not only centred around the aim of 
transforming local economies, by attracting inward investment and creating new jobs, but also 
by scaling the technology and know-how ladder. Developing countries have been particularly 
active on this front in recent years. SEZs have been promoted there with the intention of 
boosting exports, diversifying the economy, and generating direct and indirect jobs. 
Developed economies have also resorted to SEZs as a way to foster economic development in 
their lagging regions. The early success of some SEZs in parts of the developed world, as well 
as some early cases in China and the Asian Tigers has contributed to enhance the appeal of 
SEZs amongst policymakers in less developed regions and countries as a development tool. 
The popularity and importance of SEZs has mainly rocketed in the last two decades. While 
there were 176 zones in 47 countries in 1986, the International Labour Office (ILO) database 
registered 3,500 in 130 countries in 2006 (Singa Boyenge, 2007). The Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (2009) estimates that, in the mid-2000s, SEZs accounted for almost 20% of 
exports and employed more than 60 million people in developing countries. 
Most SEZs share a number of features: 1) they generally have a regulatory and incentive 
framework that is different from the rest of the country; 2) zones tend to provide dedicated 
infrastructure services; and 3) their area of activity is clearly delineated by physical boundaries 
(Asian Development Bank, 2015; FIAS, 2009; World Bank, 2011). However, zones differ 
greatly in the application of these features, meaning that a wide range of different types of 
SEZs have emerged in different parts of the world over the years. Even within countries, it is 
not infrequent for different forms of SEZs to coexist, each displaying a different mix of 
incentive schemes, services, industries, and target markets.  
Despite often overstated claims about the impact of the zones and the wide diversity of 
economic zone policies, there is limited empirical evidence that systematically analyses how 
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differences in the set-up of the zones impact on their performance. Hence, our knowledge as 
to which types of SEZs and which incentive schemes have been more successful in 
contributing to further the goals of the zones remains highly imperfect and partial.  
Mainly as a consequence of the limited availability of cross country data to measure SEZs’ 
outcomes and characteristics, most of the literature which has delved into the analysis of the 
impact of SEZs, has adopted a case study approach (see for example Asian Development 
Bank, 2015; Engman, Onodera, & Pinali, 2007; Nel & Rogerson, 2013; World Bank, 2011). 
Many of these cases represent solid analyses of the economic dynamism and influence of 
individual zones and provide interesting insights about their viability and the characteristics 
that make them successful. However, the case-study nature of such analyses is also not without 
problems. More often than not research has focused on the most successful cases, raising 
questions about the capacity to generalize the factors behind the success of a specific SEZ 
across economic, social, political, and legal contexts that often differ widely from those that 
have contributed to make a particular case successful. Replicating policy and incentive models 
is also tricky. As a consequence and despite providing very interesting policy insights, 
extracting wide-ranging policy implications from this type of analyses remains risky.  
The purpose of this paper is to overcome this gap in our knowledge, by shedding more light 
on the drivers of successful SEZ policies across countries from a comparative perspective. In 
order to do so, we rely on two new datasets, which were developed in collaboration with the 
World Bank’s Trade and Competitiveness Practice Department.26 The first one maps SEZs in 
22 different countries – mostly in the emerging world – assessing the characteristics of the 
zones, the incentives and enticements provided either at the zone or national level for the 
establishment of SEZs, as well as the socio-economic and institutional characteristics of the 
regions and countries in which a zone is located. The second dataset uses nightlights data as 
                                                     
26 A special thanks to the WB team, which helped to assemble the data set, in particular to Egle 
Pugaciauskaite, Elliot Rasmuson, Keith Garett and Le Duy Binh.  
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SEZ performance proxy to overcome the lack of reliable economic indicators when measuring 
SEZ performance.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the existing 
literature on SEZ performance determinants. Section 3 introduces the SEZ dataset and 
discusses the use of nightlights data to proxy SEZ performance. Section 4 lays out the 
methodology of the econometric analysis. A first descriptive account and the results of the 
econometric analysis examining the factors behind SEZ performance are presented in Section 
5 and 6. The final section summarizes the conclusions and policy implications.  
4.2 SEZ performance drivers 
SEZ programmes and zones differ along many dimensions and depend on the characteristics 
of the country and regional context in which they are located. Factors internal and external to 
the SEZ programme and zones are likely to affect a zone’s ability to attract investors, create 
employment, and facilitate firm performance and economic growth. Three sets of factors can 
be highlighted in this regard. 
The first set of factors linked to SEZ performance is related to the set-up and design of the 
overall SEZ programme. This includes the incentives package, requirements imposed on 
firms to benefit from the incentives as well as the organizational set up of the programme 
itself. Traditionally, fiscal incentives have been at the core of any SEZ policy. The underlying 
reasoning is to provide companies with an advantageous cost-reducing, fiscal environment. 
Fiscal incentives vary from country to country and from zone to zone, but frequently include 
a mix of exemptions from import duties on machinery and inputs to reductions or exemptions 
on corporate and other local taxes. Many programmes also offer subsidized utilities to 
companies, either through VAT exemptions or explicit subsidies (Asian Development Bank, 
2015). Studies have come to differing conclusions about the effectiveness of these tax-breaks. 
While Rolfe, Woodward, and Kagira (2004) and Aggarwal (2005) underline the importance 
of the incentive package from an investor’s point of view, Farole (2011) – in one of the few 
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attempts to quantitatively assess SEZ performance drivers – does not find any correlation 
between the tax holidays offered to companies and zone success in terms of employment 
generation and exports. Similarly, a recent report by the Asian Development Bank (2015) 
concludes that while many countries feel the need to offer tax incentives, their effectiveness 
may be limited and well below those of other pull-factors. In the worst-case scenario, tax 
exemptions, subsidies and other incentive packages may rear a rent-seeking behaviour by 
firms in the zone, undermining the entire viability of the SEZs scheme (Rodríguez‐Pose & 
Arbix, 2001; World Bank, 2011).  
Exemptions from national labour regulations and the facilitation of administrative services 
through national one-stop-shops is another popular way of providing non-fiscal benefits to 
companies (Asian Development Bank, 2015; OECD, 2009). While the reduction of labour 
protection is frequently seen with concern with regards to its social impacts (Jauch, 2002), 
several authors claim that more flexible labour regulations have contributed to the success of 
many SEZ policies (Aggarwal, 2005; Madani, 1999; Watson, 2001). Administrative 
facilitation through one-stop-shops, by contrast, is generally approved of and considered best 
practice by many international institutions (Asian Development Bank, 2015; Farole & Kweka, 
2011).  
Programmes also differ in the requirements needed by companies in order to benefit from the 
incentive packages. As the aim of many programmes is to attract foreign direct investment, 
some programmes specifically target foreign companies, meaning that often only firms either 
partially or fully owned by foreign investors benefit from the incentives schemes. Similarly, 
as the aim of many policies is to increase a country’s export performance, some policies 
impose a minimum level of exports. Finally, certain programmes also require minimum 
investment or minimum of employment thresholds in order for the company to access the tax 
breaks.  
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Despite the proliferation of tax breaks and holidays, incentives, and subsidies that inevitably 
accompany the formation and development of a SEZ, few studies have looked into the 
question if and how these incentives and requirements may impact zone performance. Many 
of those studies focus on specific incentives and not necessarily on the entire package, when 
providing policy recommendations. The OECD (2009), for instance, advocates the need to 
remove minimum export requirements in order to avoid a bias against local firms and to ensure 
compliance with WTO regulations. But even in this case, it does however not say much about 
how such a measure would impact on SEZ performance. 
The organizational set-up of the SEZ programme has also been linked to the success of the 
policies. An independent zone regulator – expected to be shielded from political pressures as 
well as equipped with sufficient resources – is commonly considered to facilitate an efficient 
overview of SEZ programme development and implementation (Farole & Kweka, 2011; 
OECD, 2009). As a consequence, independent regulators may lead to better economic 
outcomes at the zone level. Furthermore, the time and period in the cycle of the establishment 
of the programmes may influence zone performance. Some studies have pointed to a first 
mover advantage. Countries that moved early in order to establish SEZ programmes are often 
regarded as more likely to have been successful than late comers (Watson, 2001). Start-up 
periods for successful policy implementation are also considered to matter in the success of 
the zones. The experience a country has in the implementation of the SEZ policies may also 
contribute to the effectiveness of the zone programme. 
The second set of factors is made of SEZ characteristics, that is, characteristics that are 
exclusively related to the structure and layout of the zone. SEZ characteristics are generally 
linked to the dimension of the zone, the sectors targeted, its location as well as to the services 
and infrastructure provided within the zone. In recent years, there has been a shift in the 
literature and among policy-makers to highlighting the importance of these factors as opposed 
to purely relying on the incentive package provided in the overall SEZ programme (UNCTAD, 
2015). Furthermore and in contrast to contextual factors, zone characteristics can be 
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influenced and/or modified relatively easily. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the SEZ-
specific characteristics will affect the economic performance of the zone.  
Among the most prominent SEZ characteristics is the maturity of the zone. Several case 
studies have highlighted the challenge for zones to kick-start growth as well as to maintain it 
after the initial years of success, as competition from other countries for FDI increases 
(Henderson & Phillips, 2007; World Bank, 2011). The technological content of the zone is 
another factor that may make a difference for economic success. Many zones in less developed 
areas have increasingly aimed to attract investors in the high-tech sector as opposed to the 
low-tech manufacturing on which many initially successful zones relied (Asian Development 
Bank, 2015). High-tech zones are regarded as a faster and more illustrious way to achieve 
employment creation and economic growth than low-tech, low cost and often massive 
production zones. However, questions have been raised about the viability of high-tech zones 
in less-developed environments, as they are not always very successful (Luger & Goldstein, 
1991; Quintas, Wield, & Massey, 1992). The nature of the operator has also been identified 
as a success driver with best practice guides frequently emphasizing the advantages of private 
operators over publicly run zones (Farole & Kweka, 2011; OECD, 2009; Watson, 2001). 
Farole (2011) does however not find any correlation between the type of zone operator and 
SEZ performance. 
An important question also concerns the location choice. SEZ policies frequently have an 
explicit spatial aspect, i.e. they aim to promote the economic development of certain regions. 
At the same time, a strategic location close to ports, consumer markets, and the labour pool 
are elements many firms actively consider when deciding on location (Aggarwal, 2005). 
Several studies have stated that closeness to ports or large cities is more likely to spur zone 
dynamism than locating a SEZ in more remote areas (Asian Development Bank, 2015; 
Madani, 1999). 
The type of services provided within the zones may also affect the economic dynamism of the 
zone factor. Traditionally many zones have provided services aimed at easing infrastructural 
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and other challenges in the country. These services range from the existence of a dedicated 
customs-office to, among others, the provision of more reliable utilities – electricity supplies 
in particular. Increasingly, zones also offer other, “softer” services such as human resources, 
restaurants, housing services and one-stop-shop facilities onsite to deal with administrative 
processes for the companies within the zone (Farole, 2011; World Bank, 2011). 
Finally, the regional and country context in which the SEZs are located also matter for the 
success of the zone. While the aim of many SEZ programmes is to overcome the challenges 
that companies face in the local environment, SEZs do not operate in a void and are likely to 
be heavily influenced by the socioeconomic characteristic, market potential and general 
business climate of the host country. The country and regional context, in which a SEZ 
operates, have therefore been highlighted as key for a successful SEZ policy implementation 
(Farole, 2011). A number of authors stress the importance of the national investment 
environment and institutions for FDI (Daude & Stein, 2007; Portugal-Perez & Wilson, 2012) 
and thus the success of SEZs. Aggarwal (2005) and Farole (2011) specifically emphasize a 
strong correlation between SEZ outcomes and the general business climate. Moreover, the 
attractiveness of a host country is enhanced/diminished by its proximity/distance and access 
(or lack of it) to large markets (Madani, 1999; Rolfe et al., 2004; Watson, 2001) as well as by 
its industrial structure. Trade between countries decreases as distance and trade costs increase 
(Disdier & Head, 2008). Hence, proximity to a large national or international market is an 
attractive feature for efficiency seeking investors. Favourable national industrial structures 
with a solid pre-existing manufacturing base also increase a host country’s attractiveness 
(Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). Economies, primarily reliant on agricultural production, will 
in all likelihood, have a more difficult time convincing investors of their capabilities to 
produce manufacturing goods at a large scale than countries with a pre-existing industry base. 
Finally, a country’s overall socio-economic context may be an important stimulus/deterrent 
for investors. Efficiency seeking investors in labour intensive sectors require a sufficiently 
large and cheap workforce and are therefore prone to look for cheaper locations with an 
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abundant supply of labour. Human capital endowments, affecting productivity, are also 
assumed to play a role in making places more or less attractive for firms, in particular in the 
process of upgrading to higher value added products (Larrain, Lopez-Calva, & Rodriguez-
Clare, 2009; World Bank, 2011). 
As this overview shows, a large amount of factors, both internal and external to the zones and 
to SEZ policies, are on the table as potential drivers of zone performance. While much has 
already been written about the impact of these factors from a case study approach, a more 
systematic quantitative analysis of whether these factors apply universally is still missing.  
4.3 Gathering data on SEZ characteristics and performance 
In order to identify which of the above factors has a systematic bearing on SEZ performance, 
a dataset is needed that reflects both zone-specific characteristics as well as the diversity of 
programme related factors, such as legislative provisions, institutional frameworks and fiscal 
incentives. For this purpose, a new SEZ dataset was assembled in collaboration with the World 
Bank’s Trade and Competitiveness Practice. Furthermore, to overcome the lack of comparable 
SEZ performance data, we resort to nightlights data as a SEZ performance proxy. The 
following section provides details about how the data was collected and the resulting database, 
before turning to the econometric analysis. 
4.3.1 SEZ database 
In order to collect data about SEZ characteristics, first, a workable definition of SEZs has to 
be established. The definition has to embrace not only conceptual but also practical 
considerations, linked to the suitability of the zone for the use of nightlights data as a proxy 
for its performance as well as data availability. Consequently, all zones included in the dataset 
fulfil the following five criteria: 
 A differentiating regulatory framework and/or incentive scheme for the SEZ is the 
essential differentiator in order to define what constitutes a SEZ. This is in line with 
most literature and allows establishing the all-important distinction between SEZs and 
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other types of industrial parks. 
 A focus on manufacturing or services within the zone with the objective of singling out 
and eliminating zones that are primarily commercial and logistics hubs.  
 The presence of clear territorial boundaries in order to be able to better delimit 
performance using nightlight data. This implies that some SEZ schemes, such as single 
factory zones or large wide zones, are excluded from the analysis. 
 A minimum size of 50ha in order to increase the reliability of the nightlights 
measurement as a proxy for zone performance. This is determined by the size of the 
grid-cells in the nightlights dataset; the data is furthermore restricted to zones with a 
maximum size of 1000ha to ensure better comparability of the zones. 
 The SEZs had to be operational by the year 2007, meaning that at least one company 
had started operations within the SEZ by then. This criterion ensures that a reasonable 
variation in the nightlights can be detected between start of operations and 2012, which 
is the last year for which nightlight data is available. 
For the selection of the countries covered in the database, a number of factors were considered 
such as geography, income levels, and maturity of zone programmes. The objective was to 
allow for a considerable variation in SEZ experiences to be represented in the sample. The 
selection was furthermore guided by more practical considerations regarding data availability 
for a given country, time of establishment of the SEZ policy as well as type and number of 
SEZs.  
In each targeted country, the aim was to identify the entire population of zones and filter them 
based on their fulfilment of the five criteria. For each of the qualifying zones, information was 
collected for SEZ-specific and programme-related variables using a variety of sources. These 
included information available online from SEZ and public authority homepages, reports from 
international organization and related sources. We, furthermore, reached out to SEZ 
authorities and zones over email and phone to verify and complement the data collected online.  
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Table 4-1: Overview SEZs per country 
Countries Number of zones 
East Asia & Pacific 255 (73%) 
China 33 
Philippines 29 
Malaysia 6 
South Korea 64 
Thailand 20 
Vietnam 103 
Europe & Central Asia 40 (10%) 
Turkey 36 
Russia 4 
Middle East and North Africa & Sub-Saharan Africa 6 (2%) 
Ghana 1 
Jordan 1 
Kenya 1 
Lesotho 1 
Nigeria 1 
South Africa 1 
Latin America & Caribbean 26 (7.5%) 
Argentina 4 
Chile 3 
Colombia 6 
Dominican Republic 10 
Honduras 3 
South Asia 19 (5%) 
Bangladesh  8 
India 8 
Pakistan 3 
Total 346 (100%) 
 
The resulting sample includes 346 zones in 22 countries across the developing world and 
South Korea. Table 4-1 provides an overview of the resulting country coverage and number 
of zones per country. As indicated in the table, the sample covers countries from all over the 
developing world. It is, however, biased towards countries in the East Asia and Pacific region. 
On the one hand, this reflects the strong proliferation of SEZ policies in this region. On the 
other hand, this is driven by the fact that many Latin American zones do not fulfil the size 
requirements (e.g. out of the more than 60 zones in the Dominican Republic, only 10 have the 
required size to be included in the sample). Furthermore, many countries introduced their zone 
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programme only recently and thus have a more limited number of zones which fulfil the time 
criterion. 
Table 4-2: Characteristics of SEZs included in the dataset 
Period of establishment  
Before 1990 
1990 to 1999 
Since 2000 
61 (18%) 
105 (30%) 
180 (52%) 
Average size  
Below 100ha 
Between 100ha and 200ha 
Between 200ha and 500ha 
Above 500ha 
70 (20%) 
130 (38%) 
113 (33%) 
33 (9%) 
Sector focus  
Manufacturing 
Services 
Mixed 
241 (70%) 
1 (0.3%) 
104 (30%) 
Technology intensity of industry  
Low and medium technology 274 (79%) 
High-technology 72 (21%) 
Zone operator  
Public 142 (41%) 
PPP 116 (34%) 
Private 85 (25%) 
Table 4-2 provides an overview of some key characteristics of the SEZs, i.e. the time of 
establishment of the zones, the sector focus, technology intensity and size. The majority of 
zones have become operational since the year 2000 (52%), 30% in the nineties and 18% before 
1990. This reflects their increasing popularity as a policy tool. There is a wide variety of zones 
according to size: 20% of zones are smaller than 100ha, 38% range between 100ha and 200ha, 
33% between 200ha and 500ha, and the remainder (9%) is above 500ha. The largest zone 
included is 998ha and the smallest 51ha. In terms of the sector, 70% of the total are 
fundamentally manufacturing zones, 30% are mixed and one zone is purely service focused. 
The near absence of service oriented zones is due to the fact that they tend to be much smaller 
in area and thus fall through the filter. Approximately 21% of zones used in the analysis 
contain a sectoral focus on high-technology manufacturing. 
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The type of zone operator is distributed between public, private, or public-private partnership 
(PPP), depending on the set-up of the management company. 41% of all zones are entirely 
publicly managed, while 25% are privately run. 34% are PPPs, in which both the private and 
the public sector are involved.  
4.3.2 SEZ performance proxy 
Ideally, SEZ performance should be measured using indicators such as FDI inflows into the 
zones, exports from the zone and employment generation (both direct and indirect). However, 
as mentioned in the introduction, the lack of such data for a large amount of SEZs and 
countries requires an alternative approach. The use of night-time light data as a proxy for the 
economic performance of an individual SEZ provides a suitable and increasingly popular 
alternative to those cases where direct economic data are not readily available (Chen & 
Nordhaus, 2011; Elvidge et al., 2007; Ghosh et al., 2010; Henderson, Storeygard, & Weil, 
2012). 
Stemming from the field of remote-sensing, economists and other social scientists have 
increasingly resorted to light data as a proxy for economic activity (Ebener, C., Tandon, & 
Elvidge, 2005; Elvidge, Baugh, Anderson, Sutton, & Ghosh, 2012; Florida, Gulden, & 
Mellander, 2008; Henderson et al., 2012). Nightlight data is available from the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) for the period 1992 – 2012. The dataset provides 
the average luminosity created by human activity going from 0 to 63 in cells of roughly one 
square kilometre, covering the majority of the world’s land area. Given the small size of the 
grid cells, reliable measurements can be obtained for almost any geographical area. Mellander, 
Lobo, Stolarick, and Matheson (2015) demonstrate that the correlation between the luminosity 
and alternative data for economic activity is high even at a very small scale. They use data on 
employment and number of firms from the Swedish Statistics Bureau, which is geocoded in 
cells of 250m x 250m, and compare it to the nightlights data. They find a high correlation 
between the two. Similarly, Levin and Duke (2012) conclude in a study for Israel that the data 
is highly appropriate to proxy the extent of human activity at a small scale. 
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However, the use of night-time lights data is not without caveats. Recent critics advise caution 
on the use of this type of indicator as a proxy for GDP. In particular, while luminosity could 
be considered, as we have seen, a good proxy for GDP when employed at country level, the 
risks increase when artificial night-time light data is considered at the subnational level. As 
indicated by Keola, Andersson, and Hall (2015), studies resorting to nightlights data to 
calculate economic activity have a tendency “to underestimate economic activities that emit 
less or no additional night-time light as they grow”. This is particularly problematic for areas 
with a high dependence on agricultural activities. For cases such as Burundi, Cambodia and 
Laos, this would lead to an overestimation of regional inequalities: lights in these countries 
are concentrated in the capital cities, but the agricultural and mining activity which supports 
more peripheral regions is not captured by luminosity data (Keola et al., 2015). Given that 
most SEZs in our sample (see Table 4-2) either focus on manufacturing or are mixed, our 
estimates should be less affected by this. Differences between different manufacturing sectors 
are however, while probably less pronounced, still plausible; hence, any results of the analyses 
will have to be considered in light of these caveats. 
But how reliable are night-time light data when measuring the economic performance of 
SEZs? In order to use the nightlights data as an SEZ performance proxy, we calculate the 
luminosity for each zone. For this purpose, we identify the size, location and centroid of each 
SEZ using google maps satellite imagery as well as online sources from the national SEZ 
authorities and the SEZ homepages. We then draw a circle around the centroid as a proxy for 
the area of the SEZ. The night-lights within the area of the circle are assumed to reflect the 
economic activity within the zone.  
To determine the length of the radius used to draw the circle, it is assumed that the SEZ has a 
squared shape identical to the overall surface of the SEZ. A circle is then drawn around the 
centroid which touches each corner of the square. The resulting surface of the circle is 
consequently slightly larger than the actual zone. Experiments with other radius lengths were 
conducted, but it was found that this method provided the best fit with the alternative 
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performance measurements. This circle is then overlaid onto the nightlights raster file. If the 
circumference of the circle (which represents the zone) intersects or passes beyond the 
centroid of the night-lights cell (such that the centre of the pixel is within the buffer), the pixel 
is included in that count. If the buffer covers more than one nightlights cell, the values of both 
cells are added up. 
To test the suitability of the nightlights as a SEZ performance proxy, we collect data on the 
number of companies and employment for a number of SEZs, as an alternative performance 
measure. Figure 4-1 shows a simple scatterplot between the number of firms and employment 
and the nightlights proxy. Both graphs display a clear positive association between the 
alternative measures and our proxy.  
Figure 4-1: Correlation between nightlights, number of firms and SEZ employment 
 
To further test the fit, we run two simple regressions, in which the number of firms and SEZ 
employment are the dependent variables and our nightlights proxy the explanatory variable, 
controlling for country fixed effects. In both cases, the nightlights are a highly significant 
predictor of the number of firms and the employment within the zone (see appendix 1 for the 
regression results). It can therefore be concluded that, in spite of the caveats, nightlights 
represent a good proxy for the economic performance of a zone. 
It is, however, fair to state that while our proxy on average is a good predictor of SEZ 
performance, there is some spread around the trend line. To identify potential sources of this 
heterogeneity in the fit of the night-light as a proxy for SEZ performance, the satellite images 
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of the outliers visible in the scatterplot were inspected. Location in densely populated areas, 
next to large highways and/or directly on the coastline were the factors that affected the 
accuracy of the proxy. Zones located in densely populated areas or next to highways were 
reflecting a higher amount of lights from outside the zone. This is in line with Levin and Duke 
(2012), who find that a significant amount of the lights reflected in the nightlights imagery 
stems from streets. In order to minimize this reflection, the level of population density around 
the zone (on a scale from 1 to 3) is identified for each zone. Information as to whether specific 
SEZs are located next to a large water body or a highway is also recorded. These three factors 
are included in the regressions as structural nightlights controls (see following section). 
4.4 Methodology  
Equipped with these two datasets, we operationalize the three sets of SEZ performance 
determinants described in the literature section of this paper using the following simple 
econometric model:  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑍 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡0 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝐸𝑍 programme factors𝑖,𝑡0
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡0  
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜖𝑖 
where   
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, a measure of success of an individual SEZ (i) at time t,  
 SEZ-related factors: characterizing the dimension of the zone, location, the type of 
sectors targeted, and services provided within the zones. These are zone specific 
variables;  
 SEZ-regulatory variables: linked to the incentives offered, the requirements imposed, 
and the organizational set-up of the programme. These variables are either national 
level variables or SEZ specific, in those cases where multiple SEZ regimes exist 
within a country; 
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 Country/ regional level endowments: reflecting economic, social, political, and 
institutional factors at the country and regional level that may impact SEZ 
performance as well as proximity to markets; 
 Structural nightlights controls: factors to improve the fit of nightlights as a SEZ 
performance proxy (see previous section) 
 𝜖i is the robust standard error clustered at the within-country region level 
In order to maximize the number of zones included in the analysis – especially taking into 
account that the SEZ phenomenon has really taken off in emerging countries in the last few 
years – the main period of analysis covers the years between 2007 and 2012 for which all 
variables are available. To add further nuance to these findings, we also present two 
complementary sets of results. First, we run regressions on the same cross country dataset. In 
this section, however, we look at each zone’s growth performance during the first 5 years after 
the zone became operational and not during the fixed period from 2007 to 2012. The aim of 
this exercise is to uncover the factors that facilitate the success of SEZs during the initial years 
of operation, regardless of when they were founded. This implies that the period of analysis 
covers the first five years in the life of a zone and varies by zone. The sample for this analysis 
is reduced as data is not available for every zone in the sample in the period immediately after 
their establishment. The reduction in the dataset fundamentally concerns older zones. Second, 
we present the results of a ‘deep dive’ into the performance of the Vietnamese zones. Taking 
this within country perspective allows to focus on zone characteristics, since both the 
contextual environment and policies are the same for all zones within the country.  
4.4.1 SEZ performance 
The dependent variable, Δyit, is the proxy for SEZ performance based on nightlights data as 
described in the previous section. We use two variations in the different sections: (1) the 
growth rate of the nightlights emitted from the SEZ in the period of analysis and (2) the ratio 
of the change of the nightlight emissions within the zone compared to the change in nightlights 
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in the entire country. While the first indicator, the growth rate of nightlights in the zone, 
provides an indication of absolute growth and is our main dependent variable, the second 
indicator is a relative performance measure and captures whether a zone has grown faster than 
the national average. This allows to tease out differences in national growth across countries, 
as less dynamic zones in rapidly growing countries may often have – as a consequence of the 
overall dynamism of the country – higher rates of growth than very dynamic zones in low 
growth countries. This relative indicator is expected to reflect better the capacity of the SEZs 
to act as a motor of national growth within a country and is used as a robustness check in the 
main regressions. 
4.4.2 SEZ variables 
A number of key characteristics of the zone are taken into account in order to determine if 
zone-related factors can make a difference for SEZ performance. First, the size of the zone is 
included to test if there are potential differences depending on zone extension. Years operating 
represents the number of years the zone had been in operation in 2007, which helps to 
understand if zone performance is affected by zone maturity. A dummy for high-technology 
is included if the zone focuses on attracting firms in the high-tech sector.27 To understand 
whether the type of zone management makes a structural difference for zone performance, the 
analysis considers the nature of management, distinguishing between whether a zone is 
operated by the public sector, as public-private partnership (PPP), or private entity.28 The 
attractiveness of the location of the zone is measured using the road distance to the largest 
city.29 And finally to reflect a zone’s infrastructure, two dummies capture if a zone offers a 
one-stop-shop onsite and if it has its own power sub-station to ensure a reliable electricity 
supply. These last variables are only included in the deep dive section for Vietnam. A detailed 
                                                     
27 The dummy takes the value of 1, if the zone either ‘self-proclaims’ on their advertising material that 
it specifically targets high-tech sectors or if companies established are in high-tech sectors, as defined 
by OECD. 
28 This indicator also takes into account the development stage of the zone. For instance, if a zone was 
developed by a public entity, but is operated privately, the indicators reflect this as PPP. 
29 We also experimented with the road distance to the closest city with at least 500K and 300K 
inhabitants as well as the road distance to the closest major port. As both indicators yielded insignificant 
results, they are not presented here. 
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list of variables for each zone is available in the Appendix 2 of this report. The information is 
sourced from the dataset described in the previous section.  
4.4.3 SEZ programme variables 
To capture the diversity of different SEZ policies, as described in the conceptual framework, 
the analysis includes information on the incentive package provided to companies, 
requirements imposed on the firms in order to be able to locate within the SEZ, and a number 
of factors depicting the institutional set up of the zone programme. The level of corporate tax 
breaks is calculated as an index based on the level of tax exemption and the number of years 
granted over a 20 years horizon. This index can take values from 20 – reflecting a company 
that is 100% exempt from paying corporate income tax over the entire 20 year horizon – to 0 
– indicating 0% exemption in any of the years. A dummy which takes the value of 1, if firms 
within the SEZ benefit from subsidized utilities is also included in the dataset. Non-fiscal 
incentives are captured using two dummies which reflect whether firms are exempt from 
following certain labour regulations that normally apply within the country; and if there is a 
national one-stop-shop available to companies to facilitate administrative processes. The 
existence of a minimum investment requirement is also included as an explanatory variable as 
is the level of foreign ownership required from companies. Both variables reflect the potential 
presence of restrictions on companies in order to participate in the zone. Finally, the 
institutional set-up of the SEZ programme is considered in the dataset. As pointed out above, 
having an independent zone regulator is regarded as best practice and is therefore added as a 
potential driver of zone performance. As is the case with the SEZ related variables, the data 
stem from the newly built dataset and details can be found in Appendix 2. 
4.4.4 Contextual factors – country and regional level endowment 
A set of variables reflecting the country and regional endowments is used as a base model in 
order to control for the contextual factors that may influence the SEZ. At the country level, 
controls for the proximity of a country to large markets, the level of industrialization, GDP 
per capita, and the general business environment, as reflected in institutional variables, are 
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included in the dataset. The indicator for proximity to large markets is calculated based on the 
inverse distance of the country, in which the SEZ is located, to the US and Europe. The 
distance is calculated using information sourced from http://www.distancefromto.net/. The 
higher this indicator, the closer the country is to these markets. Given the importance of access 
to markets for companies, we would expect this coefficient to be positive. Level of 
industrialization is the GDP generated by a country’s manufacturing sector as a percentage 
share of the overall GDP at the beginning of the period of analysis. The data is sourced from 
the World Development Indicators. A higher share of pre-existing industry reflects the 
inherent capacity of the host country to produce manufacturing goods (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 
2009). A higher value, keeping other things equal, should therefore be attractive to companies, 
leading to a positive coefficient. The natural logarithm of GDP per capita reflects a country’s 
overall level of development and also provides an indication of the wage level. We do not 
have a strong prior on the sign of this coefficient: on the one hand, companies may require a 
minimum level of development in order to be attracted to an area. The sign may thus be 
positive. On the other hand, provided that salary levels are lower in poorer countries, zones in 
less wealthy countries may be particularly attractive for firms searching to reduce costs. 
Different variables are tested in order to capture the general institutional and business 
environment in the host country. The Rule of Law estimate is based on Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi’s (2011) Worldwide Governance Indicators and is also sourced from the World 
Development Indicators. The values of this indicator range from -2.5 to 2.5. The value for the 
beginning of the period of analysis is used. The higher the value, the better the rule of law. A 
higher score, reflecting a more stable institutional environment, should be positively 
correlated with SEZ performance. We also test the Ease of Doing business rank, however do 
not include the results in the main body of the paper as the results are insignificant. Finally, a 
country’s nightlights growth is also included in the regression to control for the overall change 
in economic performance in the country. This allows us to single out whether a zone’s 
performance was actually driven by the other characteristics included or simply followed 
national growth.   
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These country variables are complemented by a proxy, which reflects the level of development 
and socio-economic characteristics of the within-country region the zone is located in. As 
mentioned above, for political and social reasons, zones are frequently located in lagging 
regions within a country to stimulate economic activity in these areas. The natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the regional GDPpc over national GDPpc provides an indication of how well-
off a region is, in comparison to the national average. Values over 0 indicate that the zone has 
a higher GDPpc than the national average and is thus likely to be endowed with better socio-
economic characteristics, but also higher salaries. Values below 0 indicate the opposite case. 
The variable, thus, allows us to test if zones in lagging regions are performing better or worse 
than those located in the economic cores. This variable is sourced from Gennaioli, La Porta, 
Lopez De Silanes, and Shleifer (2014) and reflects the level at the beginning of the period of 
analysis.30 It is also worthwhile noting that complementing the national controls with the ratio 
allows to control for the immediate geographical context of the SEZ, which, particularly in 
large countries, may be very different from the national average. Details for all variables are 
included in Appendix 2. 
4.5 Descriptive analysis of SEZ performance 
4.5.1 Zone performance 2007 - 2012 
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we examine the performance of the 346 SEZs in 
our dataset for the main period of analysis (2007-2012). The average of the absolute growth 
rate across all SEZs is 14.7% over the entire period. A median growth performance of 2.8% 
and a standard deviation of 28% indicate a vast spread in growth among the SEZs. Looking at 
the relative SEZ performance (zone growth compared to the national growth) presents further 
interesting insights. An average ratio of 0.98 shows that zones on average have grown roughly 
at the same speed as the countries they are located in. Similarly to the absolute performance, 
the median is, at 0.95, lower than the national growth level. Again, there is a considerable 
                                                     
30 http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/growth-regions 
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spread with a standard deviation of 0.22. SEZ growth performance has on average, thus, been 
rather moderate – and far from displaying the stellar performance that often drove the design 
and launch of SEZs. Consequently, the ambitious goals of SEZ policies have been far from 
fulfilled during the period of analysis. There is, moreover, a large diversity in zone 
performance. Appendix 3 shows further details of the summary statistics per country.  
For the purpose of a first descriptive analysis, the zones are grouped into different performance 
categories. For the absolute performance the following three groups are used: 1) shrinking, 2) 
stable, and 3) growing. ‘Shrinking’ includes those zones, whose absolute light emissions 
shrank by more than 5% over the period of 2007 to 2012; ‘stable’ zones are those that remained 
within a +/- 5% range over the entire period; and the ‘growing’ group includes those SEZs 
with an increase in the absolute nightlights emissions of more than 5%.31 The zones 
performance relative to that of national growth is captured by the following categories: 1) 
slower; 2) equal; and 3) faster. The ‘slower’ group includes those zones, whose ratio between 
zone and national growth is less than 0.9, the ‘equal’ group, those which are between 0.9 and 
1.1, while the ‘faster’ group, all zones with a ratio larger than 1.1. 
Figure 4-2 shows the number of zones in each of the groups. The numbers reflects the large 
variability in zone performance. While only 33 of the zones considered in the analysis shrank 
from 2007 to 2012, 150 remained relatively stable and 163 grew. This implies that only half 
of the zones exhibited a positive growth performance. Looking at the performance relative to 
national growth paints an even less optimistic picture: only 65 zones grew considerably faster 
than the national average, while the vast majority of zones grew at the speed of the national 
economy. One out of four zones grew well below the national average.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Growth rates refer to the entire period of analysis, not the yearly growth rate. 
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Figure 4-2: Number of SEZs in each performance category, 2007 – 2012 
 
Figure 4-3 depicts the average SEZ growth performance per country. The y-axis plots the 
absolute growth performance, while the x-axis shows the ratio of zone over national growth. 
Countries above the average horizontal line had SEZs that performed better than the average, 
those below the line shrank. Among those countries included in the study, only zones in 
Pakistan experienced absolute negative growth rates during the period of analysis. Zones in 
Malaysia, Lesotho, Jordan, South Africa, and Korea remained on average relatively stable. 
The remaining countries display a strong increase in nightlights within the zones.  
Figure 4-3: National averages of absolute and relative SEZ growth, 2007 – 2012 
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The picture is, however, less favourable when we consider the relative growth performance of 
the zones. The majority of countries has an average ratio below 1 and is therefore positioned 
to the left of the vertical line, indicating that nightlights in the zones grew slower than in the 
country as a whole. Even countries where the absolute zone growth was dynamic, such as in 
Kenya, Turkey, and Ghana, SEZ growth was lower than overall national growth. In other 
countries with a high absolute growth, such as Vietnam and Russia, zones did grow faster than 
the national average. However the ratio of average zone growth relative to national economic 
growth never exceeds 1.06.    
There is no clear pattern in what concerns the geographical distribution of the success of SEZs. 
Figure 4-3 shows that successful zone programmes, both in absolute and relative terms, can 
be found in different parts of the world. Zone performance within countries (Appendix 3) also 
displays considerable heterogeneity. Taking the case of Vietnam, which figures positively in 
terms of absolute and relative growth, zones with stellar performance combine with others 
whose economic growth levels have left a lot to be desired. Zones in the country fall almost 
evenly in the faster (33), equal (38), and slower (32) categories. A similar, albeit more positive, 
picture emerges for absolute growth: 70 Vietnamese zones grew during the period of analysis, 
while only 11 shrank, and 22 remained stable. A standard deviation of 37% for absolute 
growth demonstrates the significant differences between zones. 
4.5.2 Zone performance, SEZ characteristics and policies 
To obtain a first understanding of how SEZ characteristics and policies may relate to SEZ 
performance, we plot absolute SEZ performance (the SEZ growth rate) against some of the 
explanatory variables included in the econometric analysis. Figure 4-4 compares, by means of 
simple scatterplots, zone characteristics (on the x-axis) – the year the zone became operational, 
its size, and the distance to the largest city in the country – with the economic performance of 
the zone (on the y-axis). 
The years in operation figure displays a clear negative correlation with zone growth from 
2007-2012. More recently-established zones seem to perform better than older ones, although 
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the spread is large even among zones established relatively recently. The association between 
zone size, on one side, and zone performance, on the other, is positive. The last scatterplot, 
which relates the distance to the largest city with the performance, reveals a slight positive 
correlation, which counterintuitively would suggest that zones which are located further away 
from the largest city in the country are more dynamic. Overall, the evidence arising from the 
scatterplots for a correlation between certain zone characteristics and performance is limited. 
They rather underline that there is considerable variation in zone performance depending on 
which the zone characteristic is taken into account. 
Figure 4-4: SEZ growth and SEZ maturity, size and location, 2007 – 2012 
 
Moving on to the zone operator and sector focus, Figure 4-5 shows how these two 
characteristics, which are frequently considered to be of importance for zone performance, 
combine. For this purpose, we compare the share of the public, PPP and privately operated 
zones in the overall sample with their representation in the shrinking, stable and growing sub-
groups (left side of Figure 4-5). Among the growing zones, privately operated zones are 
overrepresented compared to their share in the total sample while they are underrepresented 
in the shrinking group. The share of publicly run zones is larger in the shrinking group than in 
the overall sample. This, in principle, confirms the general perception in the literature that 
publicly operated zones tend to be less successful.  
We apply the same procedure to the sector focus (right hand side of Figure 4-5). A clear pattern 
can be detected: among the shrinking zones there is a strong presence of zones focused on 
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high-technology sectors. This first descriptive account suggests that low-tech manufacturing 
firms tend to do better than their high-tech counterparts.  
Figure 4-5: SEZ growth, nature of operator and sector focus, 2007 – 2012 
 
Regarding the programme variables and specifically some of the incentives commonly 
provided to companies, Figure 4-6 shows how the level of corporate tax exemption, and 
availability of subsidized utilities is related to SEZ performance. For this purpose, the level of 
corporate tax exemption is grouped into a low, medium, and high category using the corporate 
tax exemption indicator as defined in the previous section. Zones with a value between 0 and 
7 for this indicator are in the low incentive category; those from 7 to 14 in the medium one; 
and those above 14 in the high category. Again, we compare the representation of these groups 
in the overall sample with their shares in the three performance groups. Among the growing 
SEZs, the medium incentives category is overrepresented compared to its share in the overall 
sample. The same is true for the shrinking group. High levels of tax incentives can be found 
in the shrinking group in a similar share than in the overall sample. Thus, no clear pattern can 
be detected overall. This may suggest that generous tax exemptions alone do not guarantee 
zone success. The picture for subsidized utilities lends some support that subsidized utilities 
are zone growth promoting: zones with subsidized utilities are overrepresented in the growing 
category, while they are slightly underrepresented in in the shrinking group.  
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Figure 4-6: Fiscal incentive package and SEZ performance, 2007 – 2012 
 
4.6 Econometric analysis  
4.6.1 Period of analysis 2007 - 2012 
The correlations presented above, although interesting, only give a very partial picture of what 
factors drive SEZ performance, as they do not control for additional factors that may influence 
what drives the economic dynamism of SEZs. When internal and external factors are 
considered together, some indicators may display a greater connection than others or even 
limit the association of other factors with zone economic growth. Hence, in order to be able 
to give a more accurate and complete picture of what drives SEZ performance, we conduct a 
simple OLS econometric analysis of Model (1). The model combines both SEZ-related factors 
and programme factors (the factors internal to the zone) together with country- and regional-
level endowments (the factors external to the zone). The analysis is conducted for 343 zones 
considered over the period between 2007 and 2012. Table 4-3 provides an overview of the 
results taking into account the two dependent variables: a) the overall performance of the zone 
and b) how well does the zone do relative to the economic performance of the country where 
it is located.  
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Table 4-3: Dependent variable: SEZ performance 2007 – 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Zone growth Zone growth Zone growth Zone growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
         
SEZ specific variables 
      
Initial lights  
in zone 
-0.000988*** -0.000990*** -0.000986*** -0.000992*** -0.000800*** -0.000804*** -0.000799*** -0.000803*** 
(0.000179) (0.000166) (0.000167) (0.000164) (0.000150) (0.000139) (0.000140) (0.000138) 
Years 
in operation 
-0.00303** -0.00330*** -0.00393*** -0.00439*** -0.00262** -0.00278*** -0.00332*** -0.00365*** 
(0.00143) (0.00125) (0.00138) (0.00141) (0.00120) (0.00104) (0.00117) (0.00120) 
Size 0.0931*** 0.0943*** 0.0924*** 0.0937*** 0.0751*** 0.0763*** 0.0746*** 0.0756*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0152) 
High-tech 
focus 
-0.0400* -0.0485** -0.0318 -0.0372* -0.0320 -0.0376** -0.0241 -0.0280 
(0.0239) (0.0214) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
Operator         
   PPP -0.00974 -0.0190 -0.00566 -0.00288 -0.00856 -0.0166 -0.00671 -0.00470 
 (0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0283) (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
   Private 0.0102 -0.0158 -0.0237 -0.0283 0.00890 -0.0109 -0.0191 -0.0225 
 (0.0428) (0.0329) (0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0349) (0.0270) (0.0316) (0.0319) 
Distance 
largest city 
-0.00725*** -0.00456* -0.00477* -0.00556** -0.00591*** -0.00374* -0.00383* -0.00440** 
(0.00271) (0.00262) (0.00248) (0.00253) (0.00224) (0.00215) (0.00206) (0.00209) 
SEZ programme variables       
Corporate Tax 
exemption 
  0.00255 -0.0787**   0.00236 -0.0562** 
  (0.00351) (0.0311)   (0.00278) (0.0261) 
* ln GDP pc    0.00918**    0.00662** 
    (0.00357)    (0.00297) 
Subsidized 
utilities 
  -0.0595 -0.0240   -0.0486 -0.0230 
  (0.0429) (0.0447)   (0.0352) (0.0378) 
National one-
stop-shop 
  -0.0201 0.0295   -0.0121 0.0237 
  (0.0411) (0.0370)   (0.0344) (0.0310) 
Foreign owner. 
requirement 
  -0.414** -0.438**   -0.339** -0.357** 
  (0.187) (0.188)   (0.161) (0.162) 
Independent 
zone regulator 
  -0.0233 -0.0116   -0.0143 -0.00583 
  (0.0279) (0.0265)   (0.0225) (0.0216) 
Contextual factors       
Reg. / nat. 
GDPpc 
-0.107*** -0.0848*** -0.0900*** -0.0926*** -0.0849*** -0.0659** -0.0704** -0.0722*** 
(0.0378) (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0328) (0.0309) (0.0255) (0.0277) (0.0270) 
Proximity to 
large markets 
 0.0104*** 0.0111*** 0.00939***  0.00744*** 0.00810*** 0.00686** 
 (0.00327) (0.00347) (0.00350)  (0.00273) (0.00287) (0.00297) 
Industry (% of 
GDP) 
 0.375** 0.346** 0.374**  0.261** 0.244* 0.264** 
 (0.158) (0.166) (0.157)  (0.125) (0.135) (0.132) 
Rule of law  0.0145 -0.0282 -0.0474  0.00820 -0.0244 -0.0382 
  (0.0392) (0.0388) (0.0367)  (0.0325) (0.0332) (0.0313) 
GDPpc 2007  -0.0268 -0.00127 -0.0711*  -0.0182 0.00279 -0.0476 
  (0.0243) (0.0275) (0.0380)  (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0331) 
Country 
nightlights 
growth 
 0.301*** 0.317** 0.101  -0.516*** -0.496*** -0.652*** 
 (0.113) (0.147) (0.140)  (0.0921) (0.115) (0.124) 
Constant 1.295*** 0.710*** 0.498 1.400*** 1.045*** 1.533*** 1.341*** 1.992*** 
 (0.0802) (0.225) (0.308) (0.446) (0.0660) (0.188) (0.253) (0.391) 
         
Country 
dummies 
Yes - - - Yes - - - 
Structural 
nightlights  
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
R-squared 0.422 0.388 0.401 0.408 0.372 0.336 0.349 0.354 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: Structural controls are the population density around the zone and whether the zone is located directly next 
to a highway or a water body 
Columns 1 – 4 present the results for the regressions with absolute zone growth as dependent 
variable, columns 5 – 8 use the zone performance relative to its host country. We start by 
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testing the effect of SEZ specific characteristics, using country fixed effects and then 
sequentially add contextual and SEZ policy specific variables. To examine the impact of zone 
specific variables, zone characteristics together with the initial levels of lights are introduced 
in the analysis. The regressions including only country fixed effects are presented in columns 
1 and 5, while columns 2 and 6 substitute the country fixed with more specific regional and 
national contextual controls which may affect the economic performance of the zone as well 
as that of the region and country where it is located. SEZ programme variables are finally 
included in columns 3 – 4 and 7 – 8. Given the large number of independent variables, the 
estimations are as parsimonious as possible. Of the six SEZ specific variables included in the 
regressions, four show a consistently significant correlation with SEZ performance and one 
displays a significant correlation in 4 out of the 8 regressions.  
First, the results of the analysis display, as expected, a certain convergence in the zone growth. 
The initial level of lights within the zone is negatively correlated with zone economic 
performance in all regressions, regardless of the level of controls included. This implies that 
more established zones in 2007, which in most cases display a high level of nightlights, grew 
at a slower pace than younger zones and that zones that were created at the beginning of the 
period of analysis. Not surprisingly, SEZs grow faster in the initial years of their life, with 
their economic dynamism plateauing as they mature. 
A second factor that confirms that older, more established zones tend to be less dynamic is 
that the coefficient for the number of years the zone had been in operation by 2007 is 
consistently negative and statistically significant in all eight regressions. This result is robust 
to the inclusion of initial level of lights in the estimation. Hence, the coefficient cannot be 
considered as driven by lower levels of initial light for newer zones. This points to the fact 
that the success of zones is relatively short-lived. Growth is higher (as also indicated in Figure 
4-4 and reinforced by the degree of convergence in zone growth) in the early years of the zone 
and peters out with time. More established zones in our sample, once everything else is 
controlled for, are less economically dynamic. This is in line with much of the literature that 
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has stressed the challenge of maintaining economic performance after initial success (World 
Bank, 2011).  
Third, zone size matters. The size of the SEZ is positively and significantly correlated with 
zone performance. Larger zones have an advantage over smaller ones when it comes to growth 
potential.  
Fourth, the results provide consistent evidence that the distance to the largest city is negatively 
correlated with zone performance. Zones located further away from the main city in the 
country are less dynamic, holding other things constant. This is in line with the large body of 
literature, which emphasizes the strategic role of zone location (Asian Development Bank, 
2015; Madani, 1999). Alternative city distances were also considered, including distance to 
the closest city of either more than 1 million or 500 thousand inhabitants and distance to the 
closest major port, but the results of the analysis provide no consistent evidence to support the 
role of large cities – beyond that of the main city in the country – or to ports. SEZs have 
therefore benefited from proximity to the largest and often more accessible agglomeration in 
the country, but the benefits of greater agglomeration and accessibility do not expand beyond 
the primary city.  
Fifth, the more successful SEZs in emerging countries during the period of analysis have been 
those with a low technological component. The indicator depicting the presence of high-
technology zones displays negative and statistically significant coefficients in four out of the 
eight regressions. This lends support to the notion that, in this type of countries, more 
successful zones are generally those specialized in low-tech, low-cost manufacturing products 
and not those that have aimed and succeeded in attracting sectors with a higher technological 
component and value added. This result reflects the challenge zones face when aiming to move 
away from more standard manufacturing and up in the value chain, in particular when they 
are located in areas with inauspicious conditions for the development of high-tech sectors 
(Asian Development Bank, 2015; World Bank, 2011). It also reflects the risks of technology 
driven shortcuts to economic development in many parts of the world where the conditions 
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for the rapid development and assimilation of new technology are simply not there 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Hardy, 2014). 
Finally, the nature of the zone management does not seem to matter as much as frequently 
assumed: the results of the analyses do not support the idea that private operators are more 
effective than public ones or vice versa. This is in line with the findings by Farole (2011) and 
is likely to reflect a strong context dependency for this variable: it is frequently the case that 
whether zones are operated by the private or public sector is dependent on country level 
policy-making and legislation. 
In brief, the results of the zone specific variables point to a number of structural features that 
are closely connected to zone performance. First, zone growth is difficult to sustain over time 
and the largest benefits accrue shortly after start of operations and wane as the zone matures. 
Second, larger SEZs seem to have an advantage over smaller ones. Third, despite a recent 
push to upgrade SEZs from being purely labour intensive “sweatshops” of standard, low 
value-added manufacturing products to locations for industries with a greater technology 
component, it is the low-tech manufacturing zones that have done well in the period of 
analysis. Furthermore, a strategic location in close proximity to the largest city in the country 
is beneficial for zone performance. The insignificant results of the other variables likely reflect 
a large degree of variability and context dependency in terms of these characteristics and their 
impact on growth.  
Programme variables (Table 4-3, Columns 3 – 4 and 7 – 8) tend to have a more limited 
association with zone performance than zone-specific characteristics. Only two of the five 
programme variables related to incentive packages, programme requirements, and set up are 
significant. This would suggest that specific aspects of the programme design of the zones by 
themselves – which have been the object of considerable attention in past research – are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to explain zone level growth.  
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There seems to be a limited connection between incentive packages and SEZ economic 
performance. Both variables for corporate tax exemption and subsidized utilities have an 
insignificant coefficient in columns 3 and 7 of Table 4-3. This implies that incentives on their 
own do not play an important role in explaining zone performance. When we test for a varying 
effect of corporate tax breaks depending on the level of development, the results, however, 
become highly significant (Table 4-3, Columns 4 and 8): the main term is negative and its 
interaction with GDP per capita is positive. The impact of corporate tax holidays thus seems 
to depend to a large extent on the level of development, as the impact is negative for poorer 
countries, but becomes positive for wealthier ones. The tipping point is at a GDP per capita of 
roughly 5100US$ where corporate tax exemptions start to have a positive correlation with 
zone performance. Tax breaks may thus be an effective tool to attract investments in more 
developed countries, but not in less developed ones.  
The second significant result is the negative correlation between the foreign ownership 
requirement and SEZ performance. This suggests that imposing a minimum participation of 
foreign firms on SEZ companies hinders SEZ dynamism. This finding lends support to best 
practice guides that frequently advocate the removal of foreign ownership requirements in 
order to minimize the distortions created by favouring foreign companies over local ones 
(OECD, 2009). 
The remaining programme variables – availability of a one-stop shop and the independence 
of the zone regulator – display insignificant coefficients throughout. They thus do not seem to 
be drivers of SEZ performance. These results go counter claims in many best practice guides, 
which have underlined the importance of programme characteristics for the viability of SEZs 
(Asian Development Bank, 2015; OECD, 2009). 
From a programme design perspective, we can therefore conclude that corporate tax 
exemptions can play an important role in stimulating growth in SEZs, but only under certain 
circumstances. Furthermore, interventions such as imposing foreign ownership requirements 
183 
 
are likely to be detrimental for SEZ performance. By contrast, the type of programme set-up 
and other benefits play a less vital role than anticipated.  
Last but not least, examining the results for the contextual factors provide some interesting 
insights. Proximity to large markets delivers significant and positive coefficients, pointing to 
a beneficial effect of being close to the customer base, as is the case of the previous 
industrialization level. This is in line with much of the case study literature that emphasizes 
the importance of “traditional” locational advantages (Madani, 1999; Rolfe et al., 2004; 
Watson, 2001). It also highlights the challenge that countries with an economic structure 
dominated by agriculture, face if they attempt to industrialize through SEZ policies.  
In contrast to previous studies stressing the salience of the general business environment 
(Aggarwal, 2005; Daude & Stein, 2007; Farole, 2011), rule of law is insignificant in our 
analysis. Experimentation with alternative measures of the quality of institutions at a national 
level, such as the Ease of Doing Business Rank, also delivers insignificant results. The 
business environment therefore seems to have limited sway over the performance of SEZs. 
This may also be related to the low-tech, low value added dimension behind the success of 
many SEZs. When the main factors of SEZ success are related to low labour costs, proximity 
to large markets, and some background in industry, the quality of national institutions may 
matter less than when the more complex networks and value chains related to high-tech 
manufacturing are required to be in place. 
The ratio between regional GDP per capita and national GDP per capita is negative and highly 
significant throughout, further underlining the importance of low-cost environments for the 
success of SEZs. Consequently, SEZs in poorer areas of the country – albeit with reasonable 
accessibility to the main city – have performed better than those in better off regions. 
Traditional wage-based advantages therefore remain of great importance for firms seeking a 
location in a SEZ in an emerging country.  
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Finally, while GDP per capita levels in 2007 are insignificant apart from one regression 
(column 4), the growth of lights from 2007 to 2012 in the whole country is strongly significant 
throughout. It displays a positive correlation with SEZ performance when we use the absolute 
level of SEZ growth as dependent variable. Not surprisingly this relationship turns negative 
once the dependent variable is the relative performance. This positive correlation suggests that 
zones grow faster in rapid growth environments. At the same time, when using the relative 
performance measure, it is more difficult for a zone to outperform national growth in the 
presence of high growth rates, hence the negative correlation in columns 5 to 8. 
The analysis of the contextual factors, hence, indicates that firms in SEZs still seek, overall, 
low cost locations in less developed areas of the countries and in close proximity to the main 
city, and with easy access to North American and European markets. Previous 
industrialization also plays a role in the success of zones. By contrast, institutional factors, 
seem to be less relevant for SEZ economic dynamism. 
4.6.2 Five-year growth rates 
The analysis for the period between 2007 and 2012 contains zones at different stages of 
development: some nascent, some more mature. As the results of Table 4-3 show, the maturity 
of zone has a bearing on its overall performance, and limits the perception of what drives the 
success of SEZs start-ups. Hence, in order to get a clearer picture of the factors behind the 
zone take-off, we analyse what determines a zone performance in the first five years after the 
start of operations. This implies that the period of analysis is different for each zone, covering 
the phase between t0 (start year) and t5 (five years after the establishment of the zone). This 
can only be done for a reduced sample, as the founding of the SEZ needs to take place after 
1992, when the nightlights data becomes available. The sample for this analysis contains 252 
zones, in contrast to the 343 considered in Table 4-3. 
Furthermore, the SEZ dataset currently only contains information for the policies applicable 
in the years from 2007 onwards. We therefore have to exclude the SEZ programme related 
explanatory variables from the five-year growth regressions. All other explanatory variables 
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remain the same as in the previous section with one exception: as each zone’s performance is 
measured from its start date, the years in operation variable is substituted by a variable which 
reflects the year the zone became operational. This allows to control for the fact that zones 
started operating at different points in time and therefore may have been exposed to different 
economic environments. Appendix 4 includes the summary statistics per country. 
Table 4-4: Dependent variable: SEZ growth after 5 years from the start of operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Zone growth Zone growth Zone growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
       
SEZ specific variables       
Initial lights in zone -0.00156*** -0.00136*** -0.00129*** -0.00118*** -0.00116*** -0.00111*** 
 (0.000246) (0.000278) (0.000277) (0.000242) (0.000252) (0.000317) 
Year established -0.00180 0.00588 -0.0103 0.0101* 0.00485 0.00996 
 (0.00864) (0.00792) (0.00762) (0.00592) (0.00655) (0.00631) 
Size 0.00145*** 0.00132*** 0.00108*** 0.00115*** 0.00114*** 0.00107*** 
 (0.000254) (0.000302) (0.000312) (0.000257) (0.000282) (0.000365) 
High-tech focus -0.0754 -0.0494 -0.0756 -0.0468 -0.0470 -0.0609 
 (0.0544) (0.0426) (0.0502) (0.0389) (0.0359) (0.0370) 
Operator       
   PPP -0.00806 0.124 0.138 0.135* 0.117 0.176* 
 (0.0647) (0.0954) (0.0946) (0.0740) (0.0790) (0.103) 
   Private -0.0386 0.00619 -0.0960 0.0345 0.0168 -0.0419 
 (0.0591) (0.0545) (0.0778) (0.0473) (0.0501) (0.0649) 
Distance largest city -7.84e-05 -9.10e-05** -0.000101** -9.11e-05*** -7.89e-05** -8.38e-05** 
 (6.16e-05) (4.56e-05) (4.85e-05) (3.33e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.72e-05) 
Contextual factors       
Ratio regional/national 
GDPpc 
-0.0263 -0.0393 0.00699 -0.0791*** -0.0357 -0.0756*** 
(0.0192) (0.0246) (0.0229) (0.0170) (0.0225) (0.0273) 
Industry (% of GDP)  -0.00108   0.000690  
  (0.00505)   (0.00467)  
Proximity to large markets  -0.478*   -0.324  
  (0.278)   (0.278)  
Rule of law  -0.0133   -0.0355  
  (0.0687)   (0.0612)  
GDPpc in year operational  -0.0218   -0.0191  
  (0.0493)   (0.0428)  
Country nightlights growth  0.557***   -0.430***  
  (0.122)   (0.106)  
Constant 3.948 -11.27 20.52 -19.14 -8.341 -19.09 
 (17.27) (15.77) (15.21) (11.83) (13.01) (12.61) 
       
Structural nightlights controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects - - Yes - - Yes 
       
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R-squared 0.240 0.355 0.413 0.247 0.302 0.305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: Structural controls is whether the zone is located directly next to a water body. 
 
Table 4-4 provides an overview of the results. As in the previous section, we use two 
dependent variables: the absolute growth of the zone (Table 4-4, Columns 1 – 3) and zone 
growth relative to national growth (Table 4-4, Columns 4 – 6).  Columns 1 and 4 show the 
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results taking into account only the SEZ characteristics. In columns 2 and 5 the contextual 
controls are introduced, whereas country dummies substitute those in columns 3 and 6. 
Country dummies have the advantages in this context that they pick up some of the effects of 
the SEZ policies, which cannot be included individually in this section.  
The results lend further support to some of the findings for SEZ specific characteristics 
presented in Table 4-3. Zone size remains positively correlated with zone performance, 
indicating a stronger growth performance of larger zones in the first five years of 
establishment. The negative impact of distance to the largest city is also confirmed. Zones 
which are located further away tend to be less dynamic than those closer to the largest city. 
The coefficient for the high-tech dummy remains negative throughout, but is not significant. 
Furthermore, neither the year of zone establishment nor the nature of the operator seem to 
make a difference for zone performance. We find no evidence of either an early mover 
advantage or of a ‘learning-from-past-errors’ effect, as more recent zones have not had a better 
economic performance in their first five years of life than those that were founded earlier. 
In terms of the contextual factors, most indicators are insignificant with the exception of 
country nightlights growth and the ratio between regional and national GDPpc. The latter is, 
however, only significant in two out of the six regressions. The national growth of nightlights 
displays the same dynamics as those reported in Table 4-3: it is strongly positively correlated 
with absolute zone growth, while it is negatively correlated with the relative growth rate. 
Proximity to markets is negatively correlated but only in one regression and at the 10% 
significance level. This suggests that the result should not be emphasized overly. The 
remainder of the contextual controls is insignificant.  
While these results should be interpreted with some caution due to the lower number of 
observations, they lend further support to the notion, found in the analysis for the period 2007 
to 2012 that larger zones in closer proximity to the largest city, but in relatively cheap locations 
tend to display the best overall performance.  
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4.6.3 Case study: Vietnam 
In order to get a closer insight into the results of the analysis, we look into one specific case 
study of an emerging country that has been particularly active in the promotion of SEZs. 
Vietnam introduced its SEZ policy in 1996, allowing first the establishment of industrial 
zones, export processing zones, and economic zones. This was followed by the introduction 
of high-tech parks in 2003. Since then, different types of SEZs have proliferated throughout 
the country. The advantage of analysing zones within one country that has been active in 
promoting this type of intervention, such as Vietnam, is that the contextual factors related to 
the SEZ policy, institutional set-up, and the country endowment in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics apply to all zones. This allows to delve deeper into whether the role of SEZ 
specific characteristics and potential interactions may become enhanced – once the noise 
stemming from the inclusion of a variety of national, institutional and regulatory variables has 
been reduced. 
Table 4-5 presents the results of the case study analysis. As we are dealing with only one 
country, only the results of the absolute performance of the zone are reported (Columns 1 – 
3). The results in Column 1 include regional dummies as controls, in Columns 2 and 3 we 
include the regional GDP per capita to control for the socio-economic characteristics of the 
areas in which the zones are located. 
The results, by and large, support the findings of the previous sections: zone performance 
within Vietnam is much more related to the size of the zone, its (low-tech) dimension and 
location than to the specific programme characteristics. The positive connection between SEZ 
size and zone performance, and the negative coefficients for the maturity of the zone and 
distance to the largest city are confirmed. An interesting nuance to the previous high-tech 
findings is presented in Column 3 where we interact the high-tech dummy with the regional 
GDP per capita. The main effect of a high-tech focus remains negative but turns highly 
significant, whereas the interaction term displays a positive and highly significant coefficient. 
This result is intuitive: high-tech zones in remote areas struggle as they lack the basic local 
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capabilities and endowments to make SEZs viable. A high-tech focused zone in a more 
developed area of Vietnam – i.e. in close proximity to Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City – in contrast 
has a greater chance of becoming successful. 
Table 4-5: Case study Vietnam. Dependent variable: SEZ performance 2007 – 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Zone growth Zone growth Zone growth 
    
Initial lights in zone -0.00193*** -0.00203*** -0.00220*** 
 (0.000356) (0.000315) (0.000309) 
Size 0.00149*** 0.00151*** 0.00159*** 
 (0.000265) (0.000206) (0.000201) 
Years operating  -0.0218* -0.0249** -0.0231** 
 (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0103) 
High-tech focus -0.00997 -0.0463 -4.669*** 
 (0.141) (0.131) (1.177) 
* ln (regional GDPpc)   0.586*** 
   (0.150) 
Operator    
   PPP -0.146 -0.0272 -0.0220 
 (0.0882) (0.0990) (0.0984) 
   Private -0.0646 -0.0589 -0.0411 
 (0.0794) (0.0661) (0.0664) 
Distance largest city -0.000264 -0.000177** -0.000179** 
 (0.000329) (7.70e-05) (7.71e-05) 
One-stop-shop on-site 0.0221 -0.0635 -0.0370 
 (0.107) (0.0994) (0.101) 
Power substation in zone 0.0682 0.00912 0.0142 
(0.116) (0.0992) (0.100) 
Ln (regional GDPpc)  -0.000668 0.00221 
  (0.0652) (0.0644) 
Constant -42.37* -49.38** -45.86** 
 (22.25) (21.34) (20.80) 
    
Structural nightlights controls Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes - - 
    
Observations 100 100 100 
R-squared 0.692 0.437 0.451 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Two new indicators to reflect the infrastructure and services offered within the zone were also 
included in the analysis. Both, the existence of a dedicated sub-power station and a one-stop-
shop within the zone, are not correlated with zone performance. Similarly, the regional GDP 
per capita is not significant in any of the regressions. This differs from the results in the 
previous sections, where it was found that zones in less developed regions performed better 
than in more developed ones.  
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4.7 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the factors driving SEZ performance in emerging 
countries. We relied on an entirely new dataset with information on SEZ characteristics and 
programmes as well as contextual factors across 346 zones in 22 emerging countries, which 
were operational by or before 2007. To overcome the challenge of limited data availability for 
SEZ outcomes, nightlights data have been used to proxy for SEZ performance. 
While there is certainly no shortage of research which has focused on the lessons learnt from 
SEZ policies around the world using case study approaches, the analysis conducted in this 
paper is the first to deal with the economic dynamism of SEZs from a quantitative perspective, 
covering a large number of zones across developing countries. The change in approach and 
method has delivered results that to a certain extent confirm, but also refute part of the 
dominating knowledge about the viability, success, and influence of SEZs on economic 
development in the emerging world.  
First and foremost, SEZs on the whole cannot be considered as a growth catalyst in emerging 
countries. Despite considerable variation in their performance across and within countries, 
their overall economic dynamism does not exceed that of the countries where they are located, 
casting doubts about claims that portray them as a panacea for growth. 
Moreover, the results of the zone specific econometric analysis point to some crucial structural 
features behind the economic success – or lack of it – of SEZs. Key results include that a) 
zone growth is difficult to sustain over time; that b) trying to upgrade the technological 
component or value-added of SEZs is challenging, as zones focused on high-tech sectors have 
performed worse than those in low-cost, labour intensive sectors; and that c) size matters: 
larger zones seem to have an advantage in terms of growth potential. 
Country- and regional-specific context further determine SEZ performance. Zones in 
relatively poor areas, but not too far away from the largest city in the country and in countries 
with relatively easy access to the main developed markets of the world have displayed the 
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greatest economic dynamism. Zones in countries with a history of pre-existing 
industrialization have also been favoured.  
Incentive packages to attract firms to SEZs and ownership and management schemes, by 
contrast, have had limited influence in the success of the zones. Factors such as the type of 
operator of the zone i.e. private, public, or PPP, corporate tax exemptions, or sundry 
subsidized utilities do not seem to have largely affected the success of zones across the 
emerging world. The backbone of most SEZ policies, corporate tax breaks, also seem to have 
played a relatively minor role in zone dynamism, which has been limited to the more 
developed countries in the sample. Hence, the role of factors such as tax breaks, the presence 
of an independent zone regulator, or non-fiscal benefits, such as the availability of a national 
one-stop-shop, seems to be much more context dependent than hitherto thought and there is 
no guarantee that the provision of these sort of support, incentives, and/or subsidies bears fruit 
in terms of zone dynamism.  
The findings of the analysis have important policy implications. They point to the fact that 
SEZ policies in emerging countries do not take place in a vacuum and certain pre-conditions 
need to be met for these policies to maximize the returns of SEZs. Closeness to attractive 
markets is essential as is the pre-disposition of the economy. A country dominated by 
agriculture will have difficulty to industrialize through SEZ policies alone. Furthermore, a 
cost advantage through a low cost labour base is likely to remain an attractive feature for firms 
and continue to affect the dynamism of zones and their surrounding areas. Policy-makers 
should therefore consider carefully whether a SEZ programme can credibly achieve the 
desired outcomes in a given country context. Moreover, even in places where zone 
programmes have a greater potential to succeed, the effects are likely to be limited both in 
time. Hence, SEZ policies cannot substitute for wider structural reforms aimed at enhancing 
the potential for the development of economic activities, as well as the absorptive capacity in 
the country. Finally, there is a high degree of context dependency for SEZ policies. Whether 
a country requires an independent zone regulator, a private or a public operator, or certain 
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services that are more or less needed in a specific zone, depends essentially on the precise 
context where the zone operates. Different combinations may be effective in different 
contexts. 
The research presented here represents an important change in approach with respect to 
previous analyses about what determines the economic dynamism of SEZs. However, it is 
certainly not without limitations. First, the analysis measures economic growth based on 
nightlights data. Nightlights are an increasingly common alternative in economics for 
economic activity in those areas of the world where economic data either do not exist or are 
not reliable. However, their use is not exempt from controversy. Second, the definition of 
SEZs – in part conditioned by the use of nightlights as a proxy for economic growth – discards 
a large number of small SEZs, as well as those that, despite being planned, did not take off or 
became operational after 2007. The sample remains highly dependent on data availability in 
in some specific geographical areas of the world (e.g. East Asia vs. Africa). Finally, the 
gathering of data about the characteristics, programmes and incentives associated to the SEZs 
is limited to the type of information that can be readily quantified. This implies a loss of 
information particularly regarding ‘soft’ aspects, such as those relating to the quality of 
services provided at zone level or about the political will driving zone implementation, both 
at the zone and at the national level. Consequently, while, on the whole, the approach 
represents a considerable step forward in our understanding towards what makes SEZs across 
the emerging world work, given the caveats associated to the approach, the results must be 
considered with some caution.   
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Appendix 1 – Regressing nightlights on SEZ firms and employment  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SEZ employment Number of Firms 
   
Nightlights within zone 177.3*** 0.363*** 
 (23.77) (0.0567) 
   
Country dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant -7,859*** 9.740 
 (1,909) (9.635) 
   
Observations 104 135 
R-squared 0.556 0.524 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2 – Variable description 
Variable Description Source 
SEZ performance  
Absolute SEZ 
performance 
(Yi,1 - Yi,0)/ Yi,0 : Growth rate of the sum 
of nightlights of the pixels that compose the 
SEZ surface over period of analysis  
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp
/downloadV4composites.html 
Relative SEZ 
performance 
Ratio of change in SEZ light intensity 
(Yi,1/Yi,0) over change of country light 
intensity (Ycountry ,1/ Ycountry,0)  
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp
/downloadV4composites.html 
SEZ related variables  
Years in 
Operation 
Number of years zone has been operating in 
2007 
 
Size SEZ size in hectars 
All SEZ related variables are 
from the newly assembled 
dataset. Information obtained as 
described in the body of this 
paper. 
High-Tech Focus Dummy = 1 if the zone either ‘self-
proclaims’ on their advertising material that 
they specifically target high-tech sectors or 
if companies established are within high-
tech sectors, as defined by OECD 
Operator Nature of zone operator: 0 = public, 1 = 
PPP, 3= private 
Variable takes into account whether the 
public sector is involved in the development 
of the zone and/ or provides the land 
Electricity Sub-
Power Station 
Dummy = 1 if SEZ has its own Sub-power 
station onsite 
One-stop Shop 
Onsite 
Dummy = 1 if SEZ provides ones-top-shop 
services onsite 
Distance Largest 
City 
Road distance in kilometres to the largest 
city in the country 
Distance closest 
Major Port 
Road distance in kilometres to the closest 
major port 
Distance closest 
City with at least 
500k Inhabitants 
Road distance in kilometres to the closest 
city with at least 500,000 inhabitants 
Distance closest 
City with at least 
300k Inhabitants 
Road distance in kilometres to the closest 
city with at least 300,000 inhabitants 
SEZ programme variables  
Corporate Tax 
Exemption 
Index based on the level of tax exemption 
and the number of years granted over a 20 
years horizon. This index can take values 
from 20 – reflecting a company that is 100% 
exempt from paying corporate income tax 
over the entire 20 year horizon – to 0 – 
indicating 0% exemption in any of the 
years. 
All regulatory variables are 
from the newly assembled 
dataset. Information obtained as 
described in the body of this 
paper. 
Subsidized 
Utilities 
Dummy = 1 if firms within the SEZ benefit 
from subsidized utilities 
National  
One-stop-shop 
Dummy = 1 if one-stop-shop services are 
available to companies within the SEZ from 
a national authority 
All regulatory variables are 
from the newly assembled 
dataset. Information obtained as 
described in the body of this 
paper 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Requirement 
% of firm ownership required to be hold by 
foreign company in order for firm to be able 
to locate within SEZ 
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Variable Description Source 
Independence of 
Zone Regulator 
Dummy = 1 if zone regulator is an 
independent entity  
Free  trade 
domestic market 
Dummy = 1 if firms within SEZ can trade 
with the local market without paying import 
and export duties or other restrictions 
Contextual factors  
Ratio regional / 
national GDPpc 
Natural logarithms of Regional GDP per 
capita / Country GDP per capita 
Regional dataset sourced from 
Gennaioli, LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleif
er/publications?page=1 
Proximity to 
Large Markets 
Sum of the inverse distances from each 
country to the US and European Union 
Based on distances from 
http://www.distancefromto.ne 
Industry (% of 
GDP) 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) in the 
beginning of the period of analysis 
World Development Indicators 
Rule of Law Rule of Law indicator in the beginning of 
the period of analysis. Values range from -
2.5 to 2.5. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay 
and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010).  
"The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators:  Methodology and 
Analytical Issues" 
Political Stability Political Stability indicator in the beginning 
of the period of analysis. Values range from 
-2.5 to 2.5. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay 
and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010).  
"The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators:  Methodology and 
Analytical Issues" 
GDPpc  Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in 
the beginning of the period of analysis 
(constant 2010 US$) 
World Development Indicators 
Country 
nightlights 
growth 
Growth rate of the sum of lights within the 
country in the period of analysis 
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp
/downloadV4composites.html 
Regional GDPpc Natural logarithm of the GDPpc in the 
within-country region the SEZ is located in  
Regional dataset sourced from 
Gennaioli, LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleif
er/publications?page=1 
Structural nightlights controls  
Population 
density around 
SEZ 
Population density in immediate vicinity of 
the zone: 1 = isolated,; 2 = sparsely 
populated; 3 = densely populated 
Based on visual inspection of 
SEZ sites in googlemaps 
satellite view 
 
Waterbody Dummy = 1 if zone is located directly next 
to a waterbody 
Highway Dummy = 1 if zone is located directly next 
to a highway 
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Appendix 3 – SEZ growth 2007 – 2012 
Summary statistics for absolute SEZ nightlights growth 2007 - 2012 
Country # SEZs Mean Min Max StdDev 
Argentina 4 0.123127 0.079646 0.2160494 0.063017898 
Bangladesh 8 0.086411614 -0.17241379 0.25 0.128250978 
Chile 3 0.244405533 0.127572 0.3157895 0.102008353 
China 33 0.081519892 -0.11031175 0.9285714 0.256483049 
Colombia 6 0.08383643 -0.04761905 0.2972973 0.150838106 
Dominican Republic 10 0.119304864 -0.03225806 0.3714286 0.142807016 
Ghana 1 0.1787709 0.1787709 0.1787709 - 
Honduras 3 0.036355767 0.0204082 0.0535714 0.016617926 
India 8 0.132515369 -0.03174603 0.4213836 0.177547738 
Jordan 1 0.0173913 0.0173913 0.0173913 - 
Kenya 1 0.2564103 0.2564103 0.2564103 - 
Korea 64 0.000157947 -0.09128631 0.5128205 0.095994402 
Lesotho 1 0.0147059 0.0147059 0.0147059 - 
Malaysia 6 0.01654229 -0.02564103 0.111399 0.04894747 
Nigeria 1 0.6321839 0.6321839 0.6321839 - 
Pakistan 3 -0.18533668 -0.31034483 -0.04958678 0.130710478 
Philippines 29 0.0682588 -0.19565217 0.4615385 0.144810764 
Russia 4 0.163269225 0.0086207 0.3064516 0.151793801 
South Africa 1 0.0140845 0.0140845 0.0140845 - 
Thailand 20 0.125659473 -0.03174603 0.8915663 0.23944778 
Turkey 36 0.229802393 -0.0625 1.1904762 0.291811076 
Vietnam 103 0.284063211 -0.20454545 1.4615385 0.377889949 
Grand Total 346 0.146868494 -0.31034483 1.4615385 0.282058067 
 
Summary statistics for relative SEZ nightlights growth 2007 – 2012 
Country # SEZs Mean Min Max StdDev 
Argentina 4 0.90429435 0.8692853 0.9791115 0.05073932 
Bangladesh 8 0.997298475 0.7597033 1.147469 0.117731233 
Chile 3 1.0263724 0.9300092 1.085249 0.084135502 
China 33 0.914741112 0.7524914 1.631171 0.216931408 
Colombia 6 0.915561033 0.8045153 1.09588 0.127418987 
Dominican Republic 10 1.01467387 0.8772789 1.24323 0.129457635 
Ghana 1 0.7246067 0.7246067 0.7246067 - 
Honduras 3 0.993996233 0.9787006 1.010508 0.015938535 
India 8 1.003846625 0.8582475 1.259896 0.157376007 
Jordan 1 0.8321588 0.8321588 0.8321588 - 
Kenya 1 0.7757092 0.7757092 0.7757092 - 
Korea 64 0.978339575 0.8888901 1.479818 0.093900244 
Lesotho 1 0.80386 0.80386 0.80386 - 
Malaysia 6 0.811284067 0.7776183 0.8869875 0.0390641 
Nigeria 1 1.424929 1.424929 1.424929 - 
Pakistan 3 0.975099367 0.8254728 1.137583 0.156451821 
Philippines 29 1.027987041 0.7740251 1.406441 0.139351601 
Russia 4 1.06371485 0.9223014 1.194643 0.138802985 
South Africa 1 0.9246849 0.9246849 0.9246849 - 
Thailand 20 0.86354643 0.7427932 1.45111 0.183691788 
Turkey 36 0.911232989 0.6946489 1.623053 0.216220009 
Vietnam 103 1.059035955 0.6560541 2.030163 0.311666184 
Grand Total 346 0.984477436 0.6560541 2.030163 0.224244824 
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Appendix 4 – SEZ five-year growth rate  
Summary statistics for absolute SEZ five-year nightlights growth 
Country # SEZs Mean Min Max StdDev 
Argentina 4 -0.07602095 -0.3050848 0.16 0.194771585 
Bangladesh 7 -0.035036886 -0.375 0.75 0.39563221 
Chile 0     
China 32 0.158902197 -0.1988304 0.928571 0.293642116 
Colombia 3 0.241249667 0 0.511628 0.257054784 
Dominican Republic 2 0.4151585 0.176471 0.653846 0.3375551 
Ghana 1 0.036585 0.036585 0.036585 - 
Honduras 2 -0.0161118 -0.0526316 0.020408 0.051646796 
India 3 0.344177 0.083333 0.676471 0.30295544 
Jordan 1 0.084112 0.084112 0.084112 - 
Kenya 1 0.580645 0.580645 0.580645 - 
Korea 45 0.143176873 -0.1884058 1.023256 0.254785274 
Lesotho 1 0.021739 0.021739 0.021739 - 
Malaysia 2 0.984837 0.318584 1.65109 0.942224029 
Nigeria 1 -0.1518987 -0.1518987 -0.1518987 - 
Pakistan 2 -0.1760606 -0.2121212 -0.14 0.05099739 
Philippines 19 0.344530279 -0.475 1.318182 0.546229908 
Russia 3 0.072497567 -0.1256983 0.270777 0.198237663 
South Africa 1 0.358108 0.358108 0.358108 - 
Thailand 6 0.191734317 -0.0666667 0.578125 0.252919611 
Turkey 31 0.155172355 -0.4133334 0.925 0.285877618 
Vietnam 85 0.597637024 -0.2441314 1.571429 0.476264011 
Grand Total 252 0.315885587 -0.475 1.65109 0.440788337 
Summary statistics for relative SEZ five-year nightlights growth 
Country # SEZs Mean Min Max StdDev 
Argentina 4 0.876521975 0.6581042 1.077775 0.174224155 
Bangladesh 7 0.987825186 0.5963211 1.83394 0.415574403 
Chile 0     
China 32 0.92287325 0.6922644 1.631171 0.241013158 
Colombia 3 1.222506 1.092802 1.410803 0.16690121 
Dominican Republic 2 1.5301508 0.9581916 2.10211 0.808872458 
Ghana 1 1.131593 1.131593 1.131593 - 
Honduras 2 0.90150405 0.8243075 0.9787006 0.109172408 
India 3 1.0433606 0.9444895 1.22534 0.157795732 
Jordan 1 0.8414701 0.8414701 0.8414701 - 
Kenya 1 1.218322 1.218322 1.218322 - 
Korea 45 1.070589516 0.7813815 1.650469 0.175391175 
Lesotho 1 1.027075 1.027075 1.027075 - 
Malaysia 2 1.6027185 1.068876 2.136561 0.754967304 
Nigeria 1 0.7914019 0.7914019 0.7914019 - 
Pakistan 2 0.81882245 0.674718 0.9629269 0.203794468 
Philippines 19 1.156766153 0.5583654 2.122151 0.466711879 
Russia 3 0.7674731 0.6256452 0.909361 0.14185791 
South Africa 1 1.368062 1.368062 1.368062 - 
Thailand 6 0.94279455 0.5595368 1.162033 0.222323678 
Turkey 31 0.979659939 0.6013014 1.409558 0.21887086 
Vietnam 85 1.225770053 0.5948063 2.233004 0.42690143 
Grand Total 252 1.093289317 0.5583654 2.233004 0.355346135 
  
